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Title: The radicals are coming! On the institutionalization, tensions, and racialization of anti-
radicalization practices in Montreal and in Quebec. 
By: Sujitha Sugen 
This thesis analyzes how anti-radicalization practices came into being in contemporary 
Montreal and in Quebec by relying on access to information requests, semi-conducted 
interviews, and attending various seminars and discussions. The purpose of this thesis is to 
address how the construction of the radicalization phenomenon becomes enchained with the 
establishment of institutionalized counter practices, ensuing public tensions among provincial 
ministries and local community organizations, and the racialization of preventative and detection 
programs. This research begins by reviewing the literature on radicalization/terrorism studies, 
critical security studies, and critical race studies. Next, the chapters reflect on how the 
radicalization discourse in Quebec is conceived and produced through the elaboration of 
definitions, causal factors, and models and how such knowledge production becomes 
institutionalized by the provincial government and the Center for the Prevention of 
Radicalization leading to Violence (CPRLV); on how the materialization of security and 
preventative practices proliferates through contested relationships and tensions; and on how race 
shapes anti-radicalization programs. I argue that the knowledge production involved in 
instituting anti-radicalization practices in Montreal and in Quebec by states and other powerful 
organizations in turn creates tensions in public discourses as well as racializes visible minorities, 
notably Muslim bodies. As such, this work contributes to contemporary surveillance and race 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Radicalization is not a new word. For well over a century in North America, the term has been 
attributed to groups deemed ideologically threatening or politically marginal (Edwards, 2015). 
However, beginning in 2004, references to such phenomenon began to be incorporated into 
discussions of homeland security and domestic terrorism in North America (Edwards, 2015). In 
Quebec, radicalization became more alarming when, in January 2015, seven adolescents and 
young adults left Canada to join forces with the Islamic State and fight for the Syrian cause 
(Solymon, 2016). A couple of months later, a dozen others were intercepted at the Trudeau 
Airport in Montreal by police as they were getting ready to leave. In order to properly address 
this problem, the City of Montreal alongside the Quebec government implemented in March 
2015 the Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV), the first 
independent non-profit organization in North America that focuses on anti-radicalization 
practices. The Center aims at preventing radicalization leading to violence by providing support 
to “radicalized” individuals (or those on the verge of radicalization), administering services 
related to the prevention of hate crimes, as well as the catering of psychosocial support and 
counselling for victims of such acts.   
Since the inception of the CPRLV, the Premier of Quebec, Phillipe Couillard, announced 
a series of measures aimed at studying how and why radicalization is manifested, how it will be 
prevented and detected, and more crucially, how social cohesion among Quebecers can improve 
when radicalization is often associated with Muslims and/or brown-skinned individuals. These 
fifty-nine measures are grouped into a provincial-wide governmental action plan for 2015-2018 
entitled “La radicalisation au Québec: agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre-ensemble.” It is written 
and spearheaded by the Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and social Inclusion (MIDI) with the 
 2 
 
collaboration of eight different Quebec ministries: the ministries des Affaires municipales et de 
l’Occupation du territoire, de l’Éducation, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche, de la 
Famille, de la Justice, des Relations internationales et de la Francophonie, de la Santé et des 
Services sociaux, de la Sécurité publique et du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale, 
and the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. The measures in the 
action plan are categorized into four axes: action, prevention, detection, and “vivre-ensemble,” 
and are geared towards ameliorating the understanding of radicalization, grouping together 
different actors and sectors in order to better detect the early signs of radicalization, and 
prioritizing fast interventions and disabling its intensification. These measures are important 
because, as MIDI states, radicalization harms the cherished, democratic values that Quebec has 
historically worked hard to uphold and maintain (MIDI, 2015).  
These two initiatives, the CPRLV and the action plan, are riddled with important 
questions. Since the CPRLV came into being in 2015, it has devised and delivered workshops, 
guides, and tools on the detection and prevention of radicalization leading to violence to different 
community organizations, schools, and police departments in Montreal and in Quebec (CPRLV, 
2016). Its work on radicalization raises issues as to how the Center documents this phenomenon, 
how its knowledge production informs a range of prevention strategies, guidelines, and tools to 
concerned family members, and social/health workers, and how these formulations fit into a 
larger discussion on social cohesion, discrimination, multiculturalism, tolerance, gender and 
race. Similarly, the action plan raises questions as to how these measures came into being, why 
they are crucial to implement, and what this concept of living together or vivre-ensemble is 
signifying. These questions provide the entry point to the concerns of this thesis. 
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 Such questions also point to an emerging literature on racialization and on various anti-
radicalization measures. This literature, as one might expect, is far from unified. To start off, the 
definition of radicalization itself is not consensual among scholars (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 
2009). Whether it’s considered a myth (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009) or simply an ambiguous 
term (Neumann, 2013), the concept of radicalization nonetheless supplies an abundant array of 
institutionalized anti-radicalization policies and scientific models in North America and beyond. 
Such counter anti-radicalization programs are layered with tensions (Kundnani, 2012; Maira, 
2014) like the NYPD’s study entitled Radicalization in the West: the homegrown threat because 
they use harmful models (Silber and Blatt, 2007, as cited in Kundnani, 2012) that specifically 
target Muslim bodies under alleged concerns over national and urban security. In the context of 
the evolving war on terror, Arun Kundnani (2014) states that this new discussion of 
radicalization presents itself as the more wiser, liberal alternative to the more controversial 
accounts of terrorism offered immediately after 9/11. He points out that a new lens to view and 
terrorize Muslim bodies as “suspect” is emerging, resulting in an abuse of rights and increased 
discrimination by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Sherene Razack (2007) 
also believes that in a post 9/11 climate, galvanized by fears of “home-grown terrorism” in 
Canada, racialized hierarchies are built based othering practices.  
This research paper attempts to question how the construction of radicalization 
seamlessly becomes enchained with the establishment of governmental counter practices, 
ensuing public tensions, and the racialization of such anti-radicalization methods. As such, my 
study revolves around three mains questions:  
(1) How is the radicalization discourse in Quebec conceived and produced through the 
elaboration of definitions, causal factors, and models? More specifically, how does the CPRLV 
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and the Quebec government navigate such a wide range of information? When they do favor 
particular knowledges, how do they utilize them to make the general public understand 
radicalization and prevent its proliferation?  
(2) How are the institutionalization and subsequent materialization of the radicalization 
discourse into security and preventative programs proliferating through contested relationships 
and tensions in Montreal? More specifically, how does the CPRLV, as a burgeoning institution 
set on proving its legitimacy and expertise, maintains its authority through tensions, 
disagreements, and contested relationships among local community organizations, academics, 
and experts on radicalization in contemporary Montreal and in Quebec? What would the 
mapping of the various debates on anti-radicalization practices resemble?  
(3) How does race shape anti-radicalization programs that are proposed by the CPRLV, 
by various Quebec ministries, and by the provincial action plan?   
This research makes three main contributions to the literature on racialization. My 
examination of the radicalization problem is particularly insightful as it illuminates the merging 
of institutionalized counter-radicalization praxis, their contentious effects in public discourses 
among local community organizations, and their subsequent othering effects on non-white 
bodies. The story of radicalization in Montreal and in Quebec is riddled with surveillance and 
racial logics and helps to build on the academic literature that unfolds the relationship between 
security and race studies. Further, while the link between surveillance and race in radicalization 
studies have been explored (Kundnani, 2012; 2014, Silva, 2017), few scholars touch upon the 
entanglements of security and race in state and non-state interventions in Montreal and in 
Quebec. Hence, the investigation into anti-radicalization practices adds to this important body of 
literature. Apart from drawing attention to the institutional and racial underpinnings of 
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radicalization, my research will also contribute to the literature on the tense relationships 
between states (cities of Montreal and Quebec), institutions (like the CPRLV) and local 
community partners. Examining anti-radicalization programs is important because it helps to 
understand current shifts in preventative and detection praxis, particularly how Montreal and 
Quebec handle domestic terrorism. As such, this work contributes to contemporary surveillance 
and race studies.   
This thesis contains four main sections, including this introductory chapter. In the 
literature review chapter, I explore how academics are theorizing the meaning of radicalization, 
resulting in various definitions ranging from a pro-military to a critical scholarship. Further, in 
the second section of the literature review, I explore how the materialization of surveillance and 
counter-terrorism practices have been heavily applied in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and in Canada, especially in the period after 9/11.  In the last section of my literature 
review, I examine how state interventions, justified in the preventative practices of 
radicalization, in addition to increased, systematic surveillance practices on Muslim Americans 
in the war on terror climate, can illuminate global issues like racialized and gendered hierarchies, 
anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racisms, othering practices, security, citizenship rights, and the 
politics surrounding (in)tolerance in Quebec. Lastly, the methods section details how I answer 
these questions by using a mix of different research methods. I rely significantly on data 
provided through access to information requests, semi-structured interviews, public forums, 
seminars, and academic theories. I use the same research methods as a form of continuum (but 
will utilize different qualitative data) to answer how the institutionalization, tensions, and 
racialization of anti-radicalization praxis came into being in Montreal and in Quebec through 
expert knowledge and practices formulated by governmental institutions. 
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Following the introduction, chapter two focuses on the institutionalization of anti-
radicalization practices in Montreal and in Quebec. This chapter broadly frames competing 
definitions, modelling, preventative tools and presentations that have been conceived by the 
CPRLV and the Quebec government. Chapter three, in turn, sketches the diversity of opinions, 
tensions, and debates from various key players involved in the implementation of counter 
radicalization praxis. The fourth chapter examines the racialization of anti-radicalization 
programs, most specifically the othering practices and orientalist discourses that are found in 
different mediums such as the Quebec action plan, the PowerPoint presentations during the 
seminar held by the École Nationale de Police au Québec, and various public records from 
Quebec ministries. In the concluding chapter, I argue that the knowledge production involved in 
instituting anti-radicalization practices in Montreal and in Quebec by states and others powerful 
organizations in turn creates tensions in public discourses as well as racializes visible minorities, 
notably Muslim bodies. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW I: DEFINITIONAL ISSUES, CAUSAL FACTORS, AND THE 
MODELING OF RADICALIZATION 
One important theme in the literature on radicalization is the (contested) meaning of the concept 
itself. Definitional issues and causal factors have become a central component in debates about 
radicalization and how these definitions and purported causal factors have shaped security 
practices and policies. The literatures on this theme range from pro-military to critical 
scholarship. On one end of the spectrum, then, some scholars view radicalization as an alarming 
threat to national security. On the other end, scholars who are more critical of radicalization 
(Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009) consider it a “myth.” In this view, growing security practices 
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engulfing everyday life, heightened by news media, have appropriated radicalization as a vehicle 
to legitimize an environment of “hypersecurity” in the (false) hopes of mitigating future terrorist 
dangers.   
More specific contributions within this range of views warrant attention. Neumann 
(2013) argues that radicalization is not a myth but rather its meaning is ambiguous. He further 
states that all major debates and controversies that have sprung from the radicalization discourse 
are linked to this same inherent ambiguity. Radicalization, moreover, provides the backdrop for 
strikingly diverse policy approaches. Along these lines, definitional issues surrounding the 
radicalization discourse provide the setting for how governments and policy makers should 
understand the causes behind radicalization through its conceptualization into scientific models. 
Neumann argues that scholars and governments draw on two main explanatory strains: firstly, 
radicalization is a purely cognitive phenomenon that culminates into radically different ideas 
about governance and society, and secondly, it is understood as dangerous and coercive actions 
leading to violent extremism, explained by models that conceptualize various factors and 
dynamics as a result of successive steps, with no identifiable timeline.  
In fact, scholars advance more than just the two strains of explanation identified by 
Neumann. Other scholars explain the process of radicalization as one in which those who are 
perpetrating violence are drawn form a larger pool of extremist sympathizers who are influenced 
by Islamic theology that inspires their actions (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009; 
Wiktorowicz, 2005). Still others posit that those who enter into this wider pool are influenced by 
individual or group psychological or theological factors (Laqueur, 2004; Sageman 2004; 2008, 
Horgan, 2005; Sedgwick, 2010). As this suggests, literature on radicalization exhibits no 
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consensus regarding the meaning of radicalization or how the process of radicalization comes 
into being. 
Mirroring the dissensus among scholars, governments who seek to combat radicalization 
differ in their understandings of the phenomenon. Many of the definitions currently employed by 
governments can be distinguished by their emphasis on a particular interpretation (Neumann, 
2013). For instance, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP, 2009) views radicalization as a 
purely cognitive phenomenon, consisting of “the movement of individuals from moderate 
mainstream beliefs to extremist views” (p. 1). In contrast, the British government’s use of 
definition is the most explicit, connecting radicalization with violent actions like terrorism, and 
noting that it is “the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism 
and, in some cases, then to participate in terrorist groups” (Her Majesty’s (HM) Government, 
2009, p. 41).  
Beyond general descriptions of the radicalization process, the literature proposes various 
models of the process. These models, created by academics, include the “pyramid” (Moghadam, 
2005), the “staircase” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008), and the “conveyor belt” (Baran, 
2005). Cognitive models such as the “cultural-psychological disposition” model, the theological 
process model, and the theological-psychological process model, are perhaps the first models 
that explicitly target a specific ethno-religious group: Muslims. In a prime example, Walter 
Laqueur (2004), also known as the founding father of terrorism studies, argues that the “cultural-
psychological disposition” to radicalization refers to the process by which Muslim newcomers 
feel resentment and insecurity toward authorities and non-Muslims because of a failure to 
culturally and socially integrate into a host society (Laqueur, as cited in Kundnani, 2012). This 
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ostensibly leads to underachievement and “sexual repression” (Laqueur, as cited in Kundnani, 
2012).   
A similarly problematic model refers to radicalization as a theological process. Here, the 
adoption of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, of trusting only a select and ideologically 
rigid group of religious scriptures and authorities, of believing that the West and Islam and 
irreconcilably opposed, and of the attempt to indoctrinate religious beliefs onto others are 
indicators that reflect theological explanations of radicalization (Kundnani, 2012). In other 
words, the theological model targets Muslims specifically. In another model, finally, 
radicalization is theorized as a combined theological-psychological process. Rather than 
religious ideologies alone driving people to violence, a more complex, interactive process 
manifests itself in response to a cognitive opening, an identity crisis or a group bonding dynamic 
that is simultaneously lead by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam (Kundnani, 2014; 
Sageman, 2004; 2008; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Indeed, all these models according to Kundnani are 
designed to watch over Muslim bodies. 
As the above suggests, definitions, causal factors, and models on radicalization are 
numerous and complex. My research seeks to contribute to this literature by showing how 
particular understandings of radicalization were produced and utilized within a specific 
geographical context.  No current study has examined how radicalization is understood, applied, 
and contested in Quebec and in Montreal. From the different proposed approaches and 
arguments stemming from literature on the definitions, causal factors, and the eventual modelling 
of radicalization, I seek to closely examine and apply scholarship that is most critical about 
radicalization, such as Hoskins and O’Loughlin’s (2009) theory that radicalization is a myth. I 
also situate the CPRLV within the existing literature by showing how it used a “pyramid” model 
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of radicalization. To make this contribution, this thesis asks: how do different institutions and 
organizations in Montreal and in Quebec navigate the genealogy of definitions, causal factors, 
and models on radicalization? When they do favor particular knowledges, how do they utilize 
them to make the general public understand radicalization and prevent its proliferation?   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW II: THE MANAGEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT TENSIONS OF 
RADICALIZATION 
Literature on managing radicalization by different governmental institutions poses numerous 
tensions. The materialization of surveillance and counter-terrorism practices, informed by the 
various definitive, causal factors, and models on radicalization have been heavily applied in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and in Canada, especially in the period after 9/11. 
Some governments and enforcement agencies, the literature shows, have understood 
radicalization as a theological-psychological process. In 2007, the Intelligence Division at the 
New York Police Department (NYPD) published a study, to which scholars contributed a 
significant amount of input, entitled Radicalization in the West: the homegrown threat. This 
study outlined a simplified version of the theological-psychological radicalization model 
(Kundnani, 2012). The report also outlines four phases in the radicalization process that 
identifies “jihadist” ideology as the key driver in the implementation of a terrorist act: the first 
phase is pre-radicalization (a person’s mental state before exposure to “jihadi-Salafi Islam”); the 
second is self-identification (pointing to the early stages of discovering “Salafi Islam”); the third 
is indoctrination (a progressive intensification of beliefs as a result of group socialization); and 
the fourth is jihadisation (where a person finally participates in jihadi, violent acts). As Kundnani 
explains, the NYPD study argues that “giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling, and urban hip-
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hop gangster clothes” in addition to “wearing traditional Islamic clothes, [and] growing a beard” 
are warning signs found in phase two (self-identification) of their jihadist-inspired radicalization 
model (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 31, as cited in Kundnani, 2012, p. 19).   
This model clearly informed the NYPD’s security practices. In 2012, the Associated 
Press leaked reports on the NYPD’s surveillance program that revealed that FBI agents, 
undercover informants, and “mosque crawlers” were deployed to detect suspicious Muslim and 
Arab Americans (Maira, 2014). More than 250 mosques in New York and New Jersey and 
hundred more hotspots like cafés, taxi-cab hangouts, and student associations were listed as 
potential security risks. Additionally, many of these places were also identified by the NYPD as 
radicalization “incubators” (Kundnani). As well, a secret team known as the “Demographics 
Unit” dispatched recruited informants and undercover officers to eavesdrop at these “suspect” 
locations and were particularly active in an NYPD-led surveillance program known as the 
“Moroccan initiative” where Moroccan restaurants, gyms, barbershops, halal meat markets, and 
taxi companies were heavily surveilled. The mission of the team was to compile a list of every 
known Moroccan cab driver in New York (Kundnani, 2012). In the hands of a powerful 
institution like the NYPD, the academic literature on radicalization not only becomes a powerful 
document for the mass surveillance of Muslim bodies but produces racialized hierarchies through 
a series of surveillance practices whereby Muslim Americans are unfairly targeted by the 
government as terrorists by virtue of their religious orthodoxies, appearance, and inability to 
properly “integrate” themselves into Western societies.  
Another powerful institution, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has a similar 
understanding to radicalization but utilizes a different path. A combination of community self-
policing and tip-offs are favored, as they believe this approach can counter radicalization more 
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effectively among Muslim Americans. By training members in a range of professions (like 
teachers, social and health workers) that work with young Muslims and in spotting the signs or 
“indicators” that lead to terrorism, Kundnani (2014) states that relying more on community self-
policing than law enforcement enables the United States government to avoid charges of 
violating the First Amendment to the constitution on freedom of speech and religion.   
Another example of anti-radicalization practices is the Channel Project. This project is 
part of Britain’s “Preventing Violent Extremism” program and has been run by the Greater 
Manchester Police since 2008 and is highly influenced by scholarship on radicalization like Marc 
Sageman (2004) and Quintan Wiktorowicz’s (2005) focus on cognitive openings and group 
dynamic theories. Through an extensive surveillance program, teachers, police officers, and 
youth workers provide counselling, mentoring, and religious instruction to young individuals in 
order to pre-empt suspected radicals from furthering themselves in the extremism process.  
Hence, across Britain between 2007 and 2010, 1,120 individuals were identified by the Channel 
Project as potentially exploring the radicalization process. These individuals were not necessarily 
suspected of criminal activity but were nevertheless regarded as drifting towards radicalization or 
terrorist violence. Of these, 290 were under sixteen years old and 55 were under twelve. 
Additionally, over ninety percent of these individuals were Muslim. However, “the Channel 
project is shrouded in secrecy” (p. 125), states Kundnani. Official guidelines are vague as to how 
individuals, especially young Muslims, are identified and referred to the Project and what actions 
exactly are taken thereafter.   
A somewhat different approach to radicalization was implemented in Denmark. In 
January 2008, the Danish government implemented a working group, comprised of ministry 
officials, tasked with developing an action plan to prevent radicalization and extremism among 
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young people. In January 2009, after a process of public consultation on a draft version, the 
Danish action plan entitled A Common and Safe Future was launched to provide a multi-faceted 
approach to preventing radicalization and to pinpoint seven main areas of intervention with 
twenty-two concrete policy initiatives (Lindekilde, 2012). According to Lasse Lindekilde (2012), 
the seven areas of intervention focus on: direct contact with young people; inclusion based on 
rights and obligation; dialogue and information; democratic cohesion; efforts in vulnerable 
residential areas; special initiatives in prisons; and knowledge, cooperation, and partnerships. 
The overarching goal of the Danish government’s action plan, as stated in the preface, is a wish 
to: “maintain and further develop Denmark as a democratic society with freedom, responsibility, 
equality, and opportunities for all. Primarily, because it holds an independent value for society as 
well as for the individual, but also in order to weaken the growth basis for radicalization of 
young people and to strengthen society’s resilience to extremism” (Regeringen 2009, p. 11, as 
cited in Lindekilde, 2012, p. 112).   
Many of the practices in the Danish action plan share a goal of managing the onsets of 
radicalization by governing an individual’s sense of freedom (Lindekilde, 2012). For instance, an 
existing institutionalized program known as “School-Social services-Police” (SSP), which was 
traditionally concerned with crime prevention and drug/alcohol abuse, was refurbished to include 
the training of school teachers in the identification of radicalization signs, in understanding 
radicalization processes, and in initiating early intervention. However, school teachers initially 
resisted the program, believing that is was not their task to “spot potential terrorists” and that 
youth delinquency and radicalization are not the same, since the latter is treated as problem with 
political undertones (Kuhle and Lindekilde, 2010). A different set of practices outlines a 
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divergent agenda: providing adolescents with information about radicalization, Danish 
democracy, and civic citizenship1.   
Canada’s role in practices related to the management of radicalization has not been 
examined in the literature. However, there is a literature on Canadian Muslims’ experience of 
negative stereotyping, suspicion, bias, and discrimination coupled with feelings of fear, worry, 
anxiety, and insecurity (Jamil 2006; Antonius 2002; CAIR-CAN 2002; Helly, 2004). These 
experiences, the literature suggests, are related to the heightened combination of domestic and 
foreign policies on security practices. Paul Bramadat (2014) uses the concept of securitization to 
refer to the growing emphasis on national security understood both narrowly (like increased 
border controls for particular states) and broadly (like the pursuit of groups such as al-Qaeda 
under the war on terror context). The concept, for Bramadat, also refers to the ways in which 
specific ethnic and religious groups become the targets of social stigmatization, suspicion, racial 
profiling, surveillance, and harassment. Banking on this concept, Bramadat argues that 
radicalization and securitization are dialectically related. Anti-radicalization efforts are indeed 
entangled with the state’s execution in reinforcing security praxis in Canada and other Western 
countries. 
Also focusing on anti-Muslim surveillance practices in Canada, Jamil (2006) argues that 
securitization affects more than just the people and groups drawn to radicalization; it is a part of 
the sociopolitical fabric that envelops how Muslim communities are perceived in Canada, 
particularly how they are inevitably and collectively identified by the process of “guilty by 
association” as potential dangerous threats to national security (Jamil 2006; Bakht, 2008). 
                                                          
11 LiŶdekilde also aƌgues: ͞It is oďǀious that seǀeƌal of these iŶitiatiǀes aƌe desigŶed to taƌget iŶfoƌŵatioŶ floǁs 
iŶǀolǀiŶg, paƌtiĐulaƌly, youŶg Musliŵs iŶ DaŶish soĐiety͟ ;ϮϬϭϮ, p. ϭϭϰ-5) ranging from the systemic monitoring of 
schools in residential areas with a high percentage of citizens with a Muslim background in Denmark to the framing 
of ͞soft͟ ƌadiĐalizatioŶ pƌeǀeŶtioŶ poliĐies diƌeĐted toǁaƌds DaŶish Musliŵs. 
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As the above suggests, different forms of knowledge have guided the implementation of 
preventative practices and new security efforts in the West. Particularly helpful to my research is 
Lindekilde’s (2012) criticism of the Danish action plan against radicalization, especially as it 
pertains to the eventual targeting of Muslims. His insight can be used as a comparative tool when 
analyzing the different measures proposed by the Quebec action plan, particularly when certain 
visible minorities are involved. And yet, very little research has examined how the 
implementation of anti-radicalization measures encounters tensions – tensions, in particular, 
between the various institutional and non-institution actors that are involved in this 
implementation. My research thus contributes to mapping the various debates, tensions, and 
narratives amongst key players regarding the CPRLV and the action plan in contemporary 
Quebec and in Montreal. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW III: HIGHLIGHTING THE RACIALIZED AND GENDERED 
UNDERPINNINGS OF RADICALIZATION  
Literature that addresses how anti-radicalization programs become racialized is scarce. 
However, scholars do discuss how race and terrorism, especially in a war on terror era, are 
entangled.  Anti-radicalization efforts are often associated with racialization processes. This idea 
builds upon counter practices that center Muslim bodies as suspect that were reviewed 
previously like the Danish action plan and Canada’s securitization programs. Literature indicates 
that  while state interventions are justified in the preventative practices of radicalization, 
increased, systematic surveillance practices on Muslim Americans in the war on terror climate 
also sheds light on global issues like the emergence of a racial apartheid caused by the Cold War, 
religion, security, and citizenship rights. Sunaina Maira (2014) argues that war on terror, is “a 
 16 
 
technology of nation making that produces youth as subjects that must be preserved and 
protected, as well as monitored, contained, repressed, or removed, if necessary through violence” 
(p. 86). These technologies of surveillance directed towards visible minorities and/or immigrants 
who are Muslim inevitably intensify the racialization2 of Muslim-ness or Arab-ness which, as 
Maira argues, is the result of disciplining and managing racialized populations.  
Gender also infuses wars, such so that othering constructions of enemy populations 
animate the politics of detection technologies.  Maira states that the larger project of involving 
the surveillance of Muslim communities stems from the missionary zeal of “white men...saving 
brown women from brown men” as Gayatri Spivak (2006) succinctly puts it, and of rescuing 
racialized others, particularly women in the name of humanitarian efforts; this has become a 
centralized political logic in the war on terror.  The concept of white men and white women 
saving Muslim women reinforces gendered and racialized hierarchies precisely because brown-
skinned women in need of “desperate help” have become the central figure in both the war on 
terror and in the radicalization context. As such, the logic behind the war on terror “is embedded 
in the gendered politics of colonialism, nationalism and liberalism” (Maira, p. 632) because in a 
post 9/11 world, “the assimilability of Muslim women and men are intertwined with gendered 
discourses of neoliberal citizenship and imperial nationalism that are couched in rhetorics of 
Western modernity, democracy, and the ‘American way of life’” (Maira, p. 632).  This concept 
disguises imperial interventions in order to strengthen neoliberal democracy through the premise 
of advocating for human rights; it also naturalizes and regulates the binary of “radical” versus 
“moderate” Muslims or the “good” versus the “bad” Muslim: radicalized Muslims, particularly 
                                                          
2 AŶthias et al. ;ϭϵϵϯͿ uses Miles’ ;ϭϵϴϵͿ defiŶitioŶ of ƌaĐializatioŶ as ͞...the ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶal pƌoĐess ǁheƌeďy 
social significance is attached to certain biological...human features, on the basis of which those people possessing 
those characteristics are designated as a distinct collectiǀity͟ ;p. ϭϭͿ. 
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males, who are presumably always prone to violence (and also females in some cases) must be 
disciplined and surveilled (Maira, 2009).  
 Similarly, models, fueled by the radicalization discourse, exclusively engender increased 
social profiling, discrimination, and social stigmatization among Muslim bodies, especially 
during the NYPD’s surveillance program on Muslim Americans. Kundnani (2014) also argues 
that radicalization has become the lens through which Western societies have come to view 
Muslims by the end of the twentieth century.   
Banking on Kundnani’s point, Sedef Arat-Koc (2010) argues that a racialized, global 
apartheid is in the making, as she historicizes the complexities and contradictions of whiteness 
and race in the post-Cold era of neoliberal, capitalist globalization. She argues that while 
neoliberal globalization and political processes of the post-Cold War era have disrupted and 
complicated the socio-economic privileges of whiteness, they have not marked the end of race as 
a pervasive, insidious ideology. Arat-Koc states that a significant geopolitical development in the 
last few decades has brought on a return or a restabilization to white supremacy and racism, and 
this time with a stark intensity: the war on terror. An example of how racial supremacy have 
come full force in the aftermaths of 9/11 have been anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racisms. Arat-
Koc, following Nikhil Pal Singh, defines “race” in terms of the “historic repertoires and cultural, 
spatial, and signifying systems that stigmatize and depreciate one form of humanity for the 
purpose of another’s health, development, safety, profit and pleasure” (p. 162). Further, she 
argues that race is a technology of power because it stigmatizes, excludes, and subordinates 
people into global, racialized hierarchies. Based on Manichean, racialized binaries like white 
versus black and white versus Arab, the more recent anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racisms have 
found a newer bearing within these categories as a result of security anxieties expressed by white 
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Westerners after 9/11.  Consequently, an upsurge of these forms of racisms has resulted in the 
suspension of basic civil and citizenship rights, a differential legal system and an unfair 
implementation of the law for Muslims all around the world. The historical placing of anti-Arab 
and anti-Muslim racisms in the post Cold War era connects with contemporary anti-
radicalization endeavors by institutions, particularly since the radicalization discourse has 
become a vessel legitimizing the intense surveillance and targeting of Muslim bodies. Anti-Arab 
and Anti-Muslim racisms are direct responses, according to Arat-Koc (2010), to the threatened 
privileges of whiteness caused by neoliberal, capitalist policies (like the dismantling of the 
welfare state that has affected the white working class) in Western nations. They arise from, and 
feed on, the fears and insecurities of the white “losers”3 of globalization. This project of 
“nationalizing the West” and of reaffirming white superiority over the non-Western world and 
non-white peoples have become the laying foundation for Samuel Huntington’s (1993) popular 
“clash of civilizations” thesis, which argues that warfare inspired by binaries of West/East, 
modernity/pre-modernity, Christianity/Islam, civility/savagery, and Westerner/Arab is justified. 
The clash of civilizations thesis stipulates the belief that the West and Islam can never co-exist 
and are perpetually bound to be in conflict because of irreconcilable cultural and religious 
values: Westerners possess reason while racialized others do not and thus, it is the moral 
obligation of the West to discipline, correct, and keep them in line in order to defend themselves 
against their irrational excesses (Razack, 2007). The hegemonic project of crystallizing pre-
existing boundaries of a white national identity simultaneously validates anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, 
anti-immigrant, and anti-refugee ideologies. However, in a war on terror context that is both 
                                                          
3 Arat-KoĐ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ƌefeƌs to the ǁhite ͞loseƌs͟ ;p. ϭ6ϰͿ of gloďalizatioŶ as EuƌopeaŶ populatioŶs losiŶg theiƌ 
privileges of whiteness and sense of belonging due the threat imposed by neoliberal policies like the dismantling of 
the welfare state.   
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indeterminate and de-territorialized, increased security practices will eventually “sow the seeds 
of a far more repressive and violent future” (Arat-Koc, p. 165). 
While Arat-Koc (2010) concludes that the end of the Cold War is the beginning of a type 
of racial unification of the white world and a reactivation of an older Western fear of Islam, this 
underlying construction of racialized hierarchies in a war on terror context also engenders 
intense surveillance practices on Arab and Muslim Americans. Maira (2014) extends this 
argument by noting that in addition to military assaults being increasingly replaced by secret 
drone warfare, counter-terrorism programs has shifted its focus to the “terrorists” found in the 
Middle East to “terrorist sympathizers” found in North America. Maira states that the US-led 
war on terror that has been fought in battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan has also been 
accompanied by a similar warfare at home. This domestic war on terror is often invisible, for it is 
conducted covertly through a surveillance regime that targets and produces gendered and 
racialized bodies. Inevitably, surveillance shapes the process of Othering4 found in the cultural 
politics of the war on terror. Maira theorizes that the backlash experienced by Muslim and Arab 
Americans post-9/11 is not an exceptional case but rather, is part of a long history of state 
regulation, consequently causing the social marginalization of groups defined as “anti-
American.” Empire-making or state regulation disguised under the rubric of war on terror, as 
Maira argues, “is constitutive of an imperial govermentality that rests on the exclusion of certain 
groups from citizenship at different historical moments” (p. 87). 
While racialized hierarchies propelled by the Cold War and more recently, by the war on 
terror climate have crystallized on a global scale, they have also made a mark in Canada. In June 
2006, seventeen young Muslim men (five of whom were teenagers) in Toronto were arrested on 
                                                          
4 The process of Othering, as described by Edward Said (1978) in his book Orientalism, culturally justifies the 
subordination and domination of a people by situating them as the Other, as being at the periphery of imperialist 
power, thus authorizing WesteƌŶeƌs to ĐoŶduĐt a ͞ĐiǀiliziŶg ŵissioŶ͟ to assiŵilate, eduĐate aŶd ĐoŶǀeƌt the Otheƌ.  
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suspicion of planning to bomb the CN tower and the headquarters of Canada’s security services. 
They were all subsequently brought to the courtroom with shackles on their legs, surrounded by 
the heavy presence of police snipers while awaiting their sentencing (Razack, 2007). Sherene 
Razack (2007) argues that such public display of what “dangerous” Muslim men resemble was 
part of a discursive ploy to validate othering practices. Canadian newspapers covering the terror 
arrests overtly referred to all of the accused as “brown-skinned” and made great lengths to 
distinguish between those who were merely “Canadian-born,” as the seventeen accused are, and 
those who are truly Canadian by virtue of reflecting Canadian values of democracy, equality, and 
secular liberalism, if not Canadian skin. In a climate fueled by fear of “home-grown terrorism” 
and where the suspension of rights is legally authorized in a war on terror context, a narrative of 
encounter between the Canadian government and its racial others was quickly developing into 
“the consolidation of a racially ordered world” (Razack, 2007, p. 6).  
A racially ordered world is not necessarily built on concepts of race. Indeed, religious 
convictions can also become racialized. As Kundnani (2014) argues: “Since all racisms are 
socially and politically constructed rather than reliant on the reality of any biological race, it is 
perfectly possible for cultural markers associated with Muslimness (form of dress, rituals, 
languages, etc.) to be turned into racial signifiers” (p. 11-12). For instance, wearing a hijab has 
come to represent a racial signifier functioning in similar ways to the more significant racial 
markers of skin and biological makeup (Kundnani, 2014). As Vakil (2011) writes: “The 
involvement with ‘Islam’ does not relegate discussion to a theological register or matters of 
belief or doctrine.  Religion is ‘raced’, Muslims are racialized. What is fundamentally at stake in 
this is not a matter of the protection  of belief per se, but rather of unequal power, legal 
protection and institutional clout, in the context of entrenched social inequalities” (p.276). 
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Razack’s concept of race thinking ties in with how Kundnani argues that markers associated with 
Islamic piety are indeed racialized. Othering practices in post 9/11 era target Muslim bodies as 
brown-skin in addition to rituals, forms of dress, and languages are detectable as signs of home-
grown terrorism. 
While there was a clear rise in anti-Muslim racism, it was not surprising that there was a 
strong resurgence of an orientalist rhetoric. Said (1978) argues that orientalism is attributed to 
Western colonial power and refers to the mode of thought that conceives a sharp dichotomy 
between the East and the West, between the Orient and the Occident and, more importantly, is a 
discourse of power and domination over the imagined East. This resurgence of orientalism has 
led to the naturalization of surveillance practices, detention, and the suspension of rights for 
those who are “Muslim-looking” (Razack, 2007). The war on terror after the 9/11 attacks has 
deeply increased the policing of racial others, especially by Canada’s proposal of the Anti-
Terrorism Act. By the implementation of such legislation, the police gained extensive power and 
can now arrest a suspected individual of terrorist activity without a warrant and detain him/her 
for more than twenty-four hours (Razack, 2002).  
Henry, Tator et al. (2009) would complement Razack’s analysis of the implementation 
and regulation of the Anti-Terrorism Act by connecting it to the concept of “new racism.” The 
ideology of new racism “often derives from a negative evaluation of other cultures rather than 
from a focus on race” (Henry, Tator et al., p. 111-112). Hence, while the police claim to not 
believe in racial superiority (Razack, 2007), they also think that not all cultures are equally 
moral. As Henry, Tator et al. argue, when race is associated with identity and culture, the 
bourgeoning of new security practices enables people “to speak about race without mentioning 
the word” (p. 112). To invoke a clash between premodernity and modernity, as much Orientalist 
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and anti-Mulsim rhetoric does, requires race thinking, a form of thought that divides the world 
into binaries, between the deserving and the underserving according to descent (Razack, 2008). 
Race thinking is more complex than racism since it refers to “any mode of construing and 
engaging social hierarchies through the lens of descent” (Silverblatt, 2005, p.17-18). The talk of 
Western values conceals the racial hierarchy it expresses: the rhetoric of descent, claims of 
common origins, a sense of kinship, and the naturalization of social relations. It draws implicitly 
on the modern perception of race as shared natural and social characteristics of a group (Razack, 
2008).  
In that sense, as a link between the long-standing, imperial belief that Westerners are 
more prone to civility and the ability to possess an innate quality to govern themselves has 
always echoed in the colonial takeover of the Global South (and Indigenous communities in the 
Global North). As Razack (2008) argues: “Race thinking reveals itself in the phrase ‘Canadian 
values’ or ‘American values,’ uttered so sanctimoniously by prime ministers and presidents 
when they articulate what is being defended in the ‘war on terror’” (p. 8). Casual, but politically-
motivated statements of universal, Eurocentric values spoken by politicians and government 
officials reinstall the notion of bloodlines though the discourse that some civilizations are 
innately prone to rationality more so than others (Razack, 2008). Race thinking erupts into to 
full-blown racism when it’s employed as a political weapon to bolster ideas of Western values, 
capitalism and individualism. When race thinking is combined with bureaucracy and the 
systematic expansion of imperial control, “it loses its standing as a prejudice and becomes 
instead an organizing principle” (Razack, 2008, p. 9).   
One result of race thinking is increased security practices such as the suspension of rights 
in the interests of national security. Moreover, race thinking seeps into bureaucracy and law so 
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that phrases like “they are not like us” implies the idea that “they” must be killed so that “we” 
can live peacefully (Razack, 2008). As a result, the suspension of rights appears not as violent 
but as a necessary, legal step. Putting it differently, violence directed towards racialized others is 
justified for an ordered civilization such as Canada and something that the state must do to 
preserve itself (Razack, 2008). The modern state strengthens its sovereignty by having power 
over life and thus, requires racism (Razack, 2008). As Razack (2008) states: “Racism enables us 
to live with the murderous function of the state and to understand the killing of Others as a way 
of purifying and regenerating one’s own race” (p. 10). It is the foreigner’s inherent difference, 
manifested through his/her accent, outward appearance, and religious and cultural practices that 
poses a threat to an imagined homogeneous citizenry, a difference that is understood to embody 
savagery and which fuels the state to invoke state-of-exception security measures (Razack, 
2008).   
The idea that Islam is a threat to North American security, national interest and Western 
values is part of an Orientalist framework, which according to Said (1997) has come to govern 
Western relations with Muslim populations in such a way that “malicious generalizations about 
Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West” (Said, 
1997, p. xii). Such malignant denigrations of Muslims are at times overt; at other times, they are 
disguised by the use of disclaimers like “I have nothing against Muslims, but...” (Saghaye-Biria, 
2012). As Mazrui (2007) argues, Western fears of Islam are driven by political ideologies and 
race-thinking but as Lila Abu-Lughod (2007) demonstrates, anti-Islamic tendencies are also 
bound by cultural relativism.5 Mankinde (2007) quotes an anthropological definition of culture 
as peoples’ traditions, manners, customs, religious beliefs, values, and social, political or 
                                                          
5 Although I refer to a small theoretical portion of cultural relativism as an academic discipline, it does, in fact, 
encompass a wide scope of scholarship that refers to methodological issues, post-colonial politics, and moral 
relativism amongst others.  In this paper, I discuss cultural relativism briefly in relation to post-colonial politics. 
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economic organization because culture is how individuals organize themselves to express and 
preserve their identity and way of life (as cited in Awajiusuk, 2014). Indeed, Awajiusuk (2014) 
states that cultural relativism, which holds an exclusive cross-cultural reference, is the view that 
different cultures, societies, and groups differ in their view of what is good and bad, in relation to 
character and conduct. In light of this, cultural relativism can inflame anti-Muslim racism as such 
concept can insidiously divide what are deemed good religious orthodoxies and praxis from the 
bad ones. Most scholars agree that anti-Islamic sentiments are indeed elevated by discourses on 
culture.  
While Maira (2014) refers to the war on terror as a cultural war, Abu-Lughod (2007) 
argues that the constant need to draw from religio-cultural explanations instead of historical, 
socio-economic, and political explanations when discussing the war on terror is problematic. As 
Abu-Lughod states: “We had become politicized about race and class, but not culture” (p. 491).  
Similarly, Kundnani (2014) argues that by using the argument of culture to frame a “Muslim 
problem,” it produces the same effects as race thinking. As Kundnani (2014) writes: “In the 
West, people make culture; in Islam, culture makes people” (p. 43). As such, a consistent resort 
to the cultural, especially by the media, to make sense of women and Islam, is evident as if 
having a greater knowledge about such relationship can help one to understand the tragic attacks 
on 9/11 or how Afghanistan has come to be ruled by the Taliban. Such cultural framing of a 
particular country, of wanting to explore more about its religious beliefs and cultural treatment of 
women, prevents from exploring the historical and political development of repressive regimes 
in the region and the US role in this history. Hence, Abu-Lughod asks: what are the ethics 
involved in the war on terrorism, a war that justifies itself by claiming to liberate or save Afghan 
women and does anthropology have anything to offer in our search for a viable position to take 
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regarding this rationale for war? Abu-Lughod points to the ethical pitfalls associated with the 
plight of Muslim women that white feminists seem to be preoccupied with like the act of veiling 
in order to show how anthropology as an academic discipline is complicit in the crystallization of 
cultural difference. 
If religio-cultural explanations are elaborated by experts, political, historical and socio-
economic explanations are pushed to the side. As Kundnani (2012) points out, radicalization 
scholarship that associates a particular model, be it cultural or psychological or some 
combination of the two, with terrorist violence enables intelligence gatherers, like academics, to 
use these dispositions as a proxy to structure surveillance efforts against Muslims more 
effectively. Instead of questions that might lead to global interconnections, we are offered ones 
that work to divide the world into separate fields, recreating  imaginative geographies fueled by 
orientalist tropes: East versus West, Us versus Them and civility versus savagery.    
Accepting the possibility of difference has not been easy, especially in Quebec, and 
points to the uneven relations of power reflected in the acts of tolerance/intolerance found in the 
Hérouxville “code of conduct” and “reasonable accommodation debates.” These debates, though 
not focused on terrorism or radicalization, exhibit a similar form of race thinking. A case that 
made the headlines was when in January 2007, rising hysteria in a small Quebec town called 
Hérouxville adopted a ‘life standards’ code of conduct for immigrants, which banned its 
residents from immolation (which is burning of a body as a form of sacrifice) and the stoning of 
women, all practices considered to embody Muslim barbarianism. Despite Hérouxville residents 
being almost entirely white French-Canadian, with few, if any, Muslims, the municipal 
counsellor justified the concerns of his residents by stating publicly: “I like the way we live and I 
don’t want it to change” (Razack, 2008, p. 5) and asked the Quebec premier to declare a state-of-
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emergency in order to protect Quebec culture from non-Christian beliefs and practices. The issue 
of reasonable accommodation struck an emotional chord with French-Canadian Quebecers as 
many believed that immigrants would threaten cherished values of Quebec’s national history and 
identity like gender equality and secularism. In response to this public discontent, the provincial 
government established a consultation commission in February 2007, which was to be led by two 
prominent scholars: Gérard Bouchard, a well-known sociologist, and Charles Taylor, an 
internationally-acclaimed philosopher of multiculturalism. 
The Bouchard-Taylor Commission, a 2007-8 government consultation, was established in 
Quebec to study interculturalism, secularism, and national identity in response to the “reasonable 
accommodation debates” over to what extent minority and immigrant cultural practices could be 
accommodated.  Hence, interculturalism is different from multiculturalism. While 
multiculturalism refers to a pluralist society in which tolerance for diversity reigns, 
interculturalism refers to the subordination and respect for the French-language culture, which is 
itself a minority identity in Canada as a whole (Mahrouse, 2010). The intention of 
interculturalism is to promote Quebec citizenship as a “moral contract” between the host country 
and immigrants in order to create a “common public culture,, thus implying a degree of 
assimilation on the part of minority groups. Gada Mahrouse (2010) argues that in a number of 
subtle ways, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission paradoxically perpetuates the racialized 
hierarchies that it wanted to overcome between French-Canadian Quebecers and minority others 
within Quebec. To prove this, Mahrouse explores two aspects of this Commission: the citizens’ 
forum and the ways in which it responded to the idea of crisis.   
Mahrouse (2010) argues that, in a number of subtle ways, the Commission paradoxically 
perpetuated the racialized hierarchies and exclusions that it wanted to overcome between French-
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Canadian Quebecers and minority others within Quebec. One significant aspect of the 
Commission was its decision to avoid addressing how the pervasive narrative of Quebec as 
victim whitewashed French-Canadian responsibilities in the violent colonization of Indigenous 
peoples and in the recognition and acknowledgment of First Nations nationalism, undermining 
the very foundations the province has built its special status within Canada (Mahrouse; Bilge, 
2013). In addition, Mahrouse demonstrates how invisible and inaudible positions of superiority 
and hierarchy are reinforced during the citizens’ forum: it wasn’t the overt, racist remarks that 
sullied Quebec’s image as accommodating but a strengthening of discourse over who can belong 
to Quebec and who cannot, who is doing the tolerating and who is being tolerated, who is 
dominant and who is subordinate. This is proven by a pattern found during the testimonies in the 
citizens’ forums: French-Canadians lamented over the loss of the mythical days when Quebec 
was not threatened by cultural differences. In response, immigrant and visible minorities were 
expected to soothe such anxieties.   
The relations between dominant and subordinated groups that Mahrouse (2010) outlines 
during the citizen’s forum similarly complements Ghassan Hage’s (2000) notion on the practices 
and politics of (in)tolerance. Hage argues that although practices of tolerance are perceived as 
morally good, they are structurally similar to the nationalist practices that condone racist 
violence and exclusion, thus preserving and consolidating an imagined, White nation fantasy. As 
Hage states, racism has historically been associated more with tolerant acts rather than with 
intolerant acts. Tolerant acts, deployed in societies that are racially and ethnically diverse, 
maintain a sense of social cohesion. Paradoxically however, multiculturalism remains marked by 
continuing intolerance, prejudice, and is predicated on ethnic and racial oppression. As with all 
tolerant nations, the transition from intolerance to tolerance is fast and does not require any 
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shake-up of Western institutions or the disintegration of uneven power relations. As such, Hage 
demonstrates how tolerance is inextricably linked to power, especially when politicians and 
government officials who are urging citizens to be more tolerant are those who have the 
authority to inflict corporal sufferings and penalties. To put it differently, the ones who are 
concerned with the call to tolerate are the same people who feel entitled to engage in intolerance 
in the first place and those individuals, as Hage argues, are always and inevitably white 
Europeans who work within very narrow thresholds of tolerance levels. To tolerate is not 
conditioned on acceptance, but is performed to position the other within specific boundaries that 
reinforces the demarcated spatiality that is part of such tolerance.   
Bouchard and Taylor suggest that much of the moral panic around Quebec’s cultural 
identity stems from a broader western climate of post 9/11 racism and suspicion against 
Muslims. However, this is never discussed in the report (Mahrouse, 2010; Jamil, 2006).  
Mahrouse (2010) argues that their attempt to challenge the notion of a color-line dividing the 
modern from the pre-modern, the Enlightened West from tribal Muslims, is somewhat limited by 
their failure to see how their own Commission is implicated in furthering this perception.  
Consequently, the Commission concluded its inquiry by giving greater prominence to a general 
request for generosity and tolerance amongst Quebecers rather than challenging the social 
structures that sustain racial oppressions. But as Philomena Essed (1991) argues: “Although ... 
the language of cultural tolerance suggests increasing equality among different racial and ethnic 
groups, this not the case.  On the contrary the idea of tolerance is inherently problematic when 
applied to hierarchical group relations” (p. viii). The idea of tolerance hides how state and 
institutional racism, rather than individual attitudes, propagates insidious processes whereby 
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what lies perhaps beneath the surface of the “reasonable accommodation debates” are discursive 
rhetorics deployed for the integration and discipline of immigrants.   
Literature on race and race thinking helps to tie in the connection that the radicalization 
phenomenon is racialized. I make contributions to this literature by examining how anti-
radicalization practices in the West instituted by states and other powerful non-governmental 
organizations further discriminatory and marginalization processes on Muslim bodies in 
Montreal and in Quebec. How racialization is conjoined in the conception of radicalization, 
especially since the post 9/11 climate, informs how the systemic discrimination experienced by 
Muslim bodies from state interventions stems from a global, racialized apartheid, resulting in the 
proliferation of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racisms. I also discuss how the re-nationalization of 
citizenship among Muslim bodies contributes to the sustainment of racialized hierarchies in a 
war on terror context and how the politics surrounding (in)tolerant acts found in the “reasonable 
accommodation debates” also builds towards the strengthening of uneven relations of power. In 
light of these points, my research builds on existing work on race and racism in Quebec by 
looking at the crucial issue of security. Further, my study also contributes to the ways in which 
the radicalization discourse feeds into processes of racialization in Quebec and in Montreal when 
institutional and organizational actors in Montreal and in Quebec understand the various 
definitions of radicalizations and how the latter are materialized into security and preventative 
practices. Following on that same thread, other questions arise as to whether institutional and 
organizational actors are subtly targeting visible minorities or ethno-religious groups when 






My research is concerned with three interrelated questions and it requires specific methods to 
address each question. The first question deals with how radicalization is conceived. Exploring 
this question requires utilizing textual analysis of various governmental documents, 
presentations, tools, and action plans, written by the CPRLV and different provincial and 
municipal ministries for social/health workers, teachers/ professionals in the education field and 
for family members. Textual analysis is also applied to documents retrieved from access to 
information requests. Access to information requests were sent and responded by various 
provincial and municipal ministries that were involved in the redaction of the action plan: 
Ministère de l’Immigration, de Diversité et de l’Inclusion, Ministère des Affaires municipales et 
de l’Occupation du Territoire, Ministère de la Santé et des Services Sociaux, Ministère de la 
Famille alongside non-participant institutions like the Commission Scolaire de Montréal 
(CSDM). PowerPoint presentations on preventing violent extremism in Canada from Public 
Safety Canada as well as documents pertaining to any and all correspondence, notes, emails, 
ministerial briefing notes and media inquiries that discuss the RCMP Countering Violent 
Extremism program are currently in my possession by way of an access to information request to 
Public Safety Canada and the RCMP.  Additionally, I attended a seminar, held by l’École 
National de Police du Québec, on radicalization leading to violence in Quebec and the various 
initiatives and security practices that are utilized by different branches of the police in Quebec 
and in Montreal. This seminar specifically targeted and was mostly attended by police officers, 
community organization liaisons, correctional centers, centres jeunesse, and CEGEP teachers 
from policing programs. The second question concerns the management of radicalization through 
preventative and security practices and focuses on the resulting tensions and debates between 
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actors involved in the implementation of these practices. To explore this question, I conducted 
five semi-structured interviews. I conducted a semi-structured interview with a government 
official who helped to design in the formulation of the action plan regarding the different 
practices and measures pertaining to security and prevention practices that are outlined in the 
action plan. Contact was initiated and made through the interview participant’s email that was 
found in an access to information request made to a Quebec Ministry. I also conducted semi-
structured interviews with presidents and vice-president of two community/non-profit 
organizations: Confédération des Organismes Familiaux du Québec (COFAQ) and Conseil 
Jeunesse de Montréal (CjM), who have sat through presentations given by the CPRLV on 
various topics such as definitive issues surrounding the radicalization discourse, intervention 
tactics, behavior monitors, and pyramid diagrams. The usage of such research methods helps to 
understand the various tensions present in anti-radicalization programs in Montreal and in 
Quebec as I map out the contested discourses and knowledge productions that institutional and 
non-institutional actors possess. This is important because I illustrate how the institutionalization 
of counter-radicalization praxis proves problematic despite crucial tensions existing in their 
formations.  
Additionally, the Service de Police de la Ville de Montreal (SPVM) has sent to me, via an 
access to information request, an official protocol between the SPVM and the CPRLV, outlining 
access, communication and exchange of personal information in an intervention/prevention 
context when dealing with an radicalized individual who is considered to be dangerous to the 
public and to himself of herself. This protocol will help in understanding how disagreements 
among key players involved in the radicalization phenomenon in Montreal and in Quebec like 
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Ministry workers and local community organizations points to fissures in how radicalization is 
being managed by governments. 
The third question concerning the racialization of anti-radicalization programs in 
Montreal and in Quebec will be answered through a mixture of research methods. I will employ 
textual analysis of the public documents accessed through access to information requests. I will 
also use data from the same semi-structured interviews, conferences, and public forums to 
answer how counter radicalization programs racialize Muslim bodies as suspect and further 
stigmatize and marginalize their place in Quebec society. 
As a racialized woman, my positionality in regards to doing research on radicalization in 
Montreal and in Quebec has influenced my findings greatly. Questions of what it means to be an 
insider/outsider swayed who I was able to get in contact with, especially when it came to 
speaking with peoples of power involved in the institutionalization of anti-radicalization 
management. Getting interview participants from both Muslim and non-Muslim groups involved 




CHAPTER 2: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ANTI-
RADICALIZATION PRACTICES  
“Radicalization is not a choice to reject reason; it is an organized embodiment of 
unreason itself” (Edwards, 2015, p. 116). 
 
As noted in the first part of the literature review, definitional issues cloud the problem of 
radicalization. Its elusiveness provides the basis for the construction of diverse security policies, 
preventative practices, and various scientific models used by governments and their affiliated 
institutions (Kundnani, 2014). Indeed, the definition of radicalization is elaborate in nature 
because it is interweaved with two main narratives to justify preventative tools, action plans, and 
anti-radicalization practices: that radicalization can indicate revolutionary acts in response to 
declining power and societal ailments (Ellner, 2005; Ferrero, 2005); and that radicalization 
points to an intensification of existing politico-religious ideologies and behaviors that can shift 
from peaceful activity to violence (Brighton, 2007; Jenne, 2004; Jenne et al., 2007; Van den 
Broek; 2004). In addition, radicalization is also considered a myth (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 
2009), a notion that enables the creation of hypersecurity policies geared towards ending future 
terrorist attacks. I make this point in order to argue, alongside other scholars critical of 
radicalization, that the concept is indeed ambiguous. I also highlight this to bring Edward’s 
(2015) quote at the beginning of the chapter into context: I argue that the vagueness inherent in 
different causal factors, charts, tools and processes leading to the radicalization of an individual 
informs how states and non-states consequently institutionalize preventative and security tools 
that are also rooted in ambivalence. Next to Edwards, I explain how the institutionalization of 
counter-radicalization praxis is indeed an organized embodiment of unreason itself. 
 34 
 
In this chapter, I examine how knowledge about the radicalization phenomenon was 
produced in Montreal and in Quebec and how this knowledge shaped institutionalized anti-
radicalization practices. I focus, in particular, on three powerful institutions: the CPRLV, the 
Montreal police force, and the Quebec government. I begin by examining the public discourse 
surrounding anti-radicalization practices that lead to the creation of the CPRLV. Next, I describe 
the CPRLV’s mission statement and its connection to the different definitions that they have put 
forth. I argue that the knowledge produced by the CPRLV about radicalization is rooted in 
broad-brush understandings, confusions, and ambiguities. I then explore the various “show and 
tell” presentations during a seminar based on the provincial action plan at the École nationale de 
police au Québec (ENPQ) by CPRLV workers and police officials. Here, I illustrate the broad 
generalizations made by seminar presenters and how they rationalize the salience of 
radicalization. Some presenters favored particular characteristics like causal factors to make the 
audience understand radicalization while others rely on different features like on the 
philosophical and radical attributes that make it intelligible. Such deviations showcase instances 
of vagueness where confusions embedded in theories and concepts tend to be incorporated into 
institutionalized security and preventative practices. Consequently, such programs do more harm 
than good when detecting a radical. These preventative tools grounded in generalizations 
ultimately lead to the close surveillance of Muslim bodies. 
In the final section, I describe measures by the provincial action plan that has been 
implemented and how they relate to measures executed in the Danish action plan against 
radicalization. I conclude the chapter by arguing that the institutionalization of anti-radicalization 
rhetoric and practices is an exercise in reifying a wiser, liberal, and preventative approach in 
combating radicalization leading to violence. The (re)interpretations, (re)articulations, and 
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(re)constructions of the radicalization discourse by different governmental branches and 
academics uncover successful ways to associate the phenomenon of radicalization with 
ambiguous, conflicting, and contested forms of understandings.  This is significant because 
dismantling the knowledge production behind these practices discloses how they discriminate 
against Muslim bodies under the context of protecting Quebec’s national security.  
MORPHOLOGY OF RADICALIZATION: VAGUE EXPLANATIONS OF 
RADICALIZATION BY THE CPRLV 
Vague definitions and conflicting indicators that are theorized in order to understand 
radicalization provides the background for the institutionalization of problematic tools, diagrams, 
and action plans used by state actors. Various formulations and categorizations of the nature of 
radicalization have been put forth by the CPRLV. However, such definitions are rooted in 
different levels of ambiguity. Throughout the first part of this chapter, I illustrate how definitions 
composed by the CPRLV echo with anecdotal and superficial rhetorics in an attempt to present 
anti-radicalization measures as a wiser, more liberal way of managing terrorism, as was 
presented by Benjamin Ducol, a researcher at the Center. In fact, such open-endedness and 
generalizations confuse those who access such information, whether it is the police force or 
concerned family members. Indeed, the problem lies in where to draw the line (or if lines should 
be drawn in the first place) when radicalization is often defined as progressive process where a 
transfer of ideas and actions morph from peaceful to violent. 
 The CPRLV, established in 2015, is an important figure in the prevention of 
radicalization in Montreal today. Following the November 2015 Paris attacks, where a series of 
coordinated suicide bombings and mass shootings in public spaces made headlines, Montreal 
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Mayor Denis Coderre swiftly officiated the Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading 
to Violence (CPRLV) and an increasing number of phone calls flooded the CPRLV’s 
confidential hotline (CBC News, 2015). Soon thereafter, the CPRLV unveiled its official 
website, featuring various definitions, models, and preventative tools on radicalization. Coderre’s 
initiative to open a private, non-profit institution geared towards prevention, the first of its kind 
in North America (Arruda and Ducol, 2015), was billed as a move toward maintaining a sense of 
social cohesion or “vivre-ensemble” in Montreal and in Quebec amid growing concerns over 
(in)tolerance. 
The practice of “prevention” is central to the Center’s work. Preventative and detection 
practices are often the solutions to eradicating the proliferation of violent radicalization for 
Western states. “Prevention is key to our collective security and living in harmony,” said Coderre 
at the re-launch of the Center in November 2015 (CBC News, 2015). He further added:  “We are 
creating a Montreal model by sending a message that to achieve results on anti-radicalization you 
have to invest in prevention” (CBC News, 2015). Preventative practices are considered to be the 
more liberal, wiser pathway to eradicate radicalization and as a result, tend to legitimize 
extensive scholarly research. 
Efforts focused on prevention, however, raise complex questions about the kinds of 
action that are to be prevented and how they can be anticipated. The meaning of radicalization 
leading to violence, to begin with, is more ambiguous than it might appear. Taken broadly, this 
process could include a wide range of movements and ideologies. Philosophically, radicalization 
has been described as a general process relating to forms of revolution and rebellion (Ellner, 
2005; Ferrero, 2005). Taking this broad view, the CPRLV (2016) offers four definitive types of 
violent radicalization: (i) right-wing extremism, which is associated with fascism, racism and 
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supremacism; (ii) politico-religious extremism, which is associated to a political interpretation of 
religion and the defense of a religious identity perceived to be under attack by violent means; 
(iii) left-wing extremism, which is associated with anarchist, Maoist, Trotskyist, and Marxist-
Leninist groups that primarily focus on anti-capitalist demands and social inequalities by use of 
violence; and (iv) single-issue extremism, which is associated by a sole issue whether this 
includes radical environmental and animal rights groups or anti-abortion movements or anti-
gay/anti-feminist organizations that use violence to further their political causes (CPRLV, 2016).  
Everyone, this suggests, is susceptible to the radicalization process. But can a phenomenon so 
broad be understood? Can it be identified and managed? To what extent will non-Muslim forms 
of radicalization receive attention, given motivations for the Center’s foundation (i.e., the Paris 
attacks)? A definition that could class so many different peoples is of little use for practical 
reasons. 
 Anticipating radicalization is similarly complex. Central to the Center’s work is a series 
of tools meant to make the process intelligible and mark the points in the process where an 
intervention is necessary. As I discussed in the literature review, the process of radicalization can 
be understood in a diversity of ways. Different scholars variously blame radicalization upon a 
number of social and economic factors ranging from exposure to violent ideologies, 
victimization, alienation, and the internet to deficiencies in family bonds, trauma, social and 
economic deprivation, and “cultures of violence” (Bjorno and Horgan, 2008; Dalgaard-Nielson, 
2008; Juergensmeyer, 2003; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Silber and Bhatt, 2008; 
Wiktorowiz, 2005, as cited in Brown and Saeed, 2014). Such broad-brush indicators encourage 
governments to believe that they can effectively pre-empt future radical attacks through a range 
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of prevention practices and interventions in everyday life (Coolseat 2011; Sageman, 2007; 
Volintiru, 2010, as cited in Brown and Saeed, 2014). 
The core features of the Center’s work are consistent with anti-radicalization initiatives 
elsewhere. The Center’s use of preventative and detection tools like the “behavior barometer” 
(which will be detailed below) parallels the FBI’s use of community self-policing by non-
governmental actors who work regularly with American Muslims in spotting early signs of 
radicalization (Kundnani, 2014). It also aligns with Britain’s Channel Project, which cast the 
surveillance of young British Muslims over to community and religious leaders (Kundnani, 
2014). The Center’s hotline, meanwhile, has been criticized as a form of anti-Muslim “whistle-
blowing” by the Association of Muslims and Arabs for a Secular Quebec (AMAL-Québec) 
(Lalonde, 2015). As the CPRLV’s hotline coincides with an embodiment of community 
engagement whose purpose is to gather intelligence and self-police each other, Kundnani (2014) 
argues that “such practices have been encouraged, organized, and legitimized by the 
radicalization models that law enforcement agencies adopted” (p. 14). Contrary to Coderre’s 
mission of offering a wider, liberal solution to radicalization in the form of prevention, the 
hotline, in any case, exemplifies as a tool to increase security practices.  
Like anti-radicalization initiatives in other contexts, the Center’s work relies on particular 
forms of knowledge that render the problem of radicalization intelligible and manageable. The 
CPRLV’s official mission statement provides an entry point into the heap of extensive, layered 
definitions, charts, and models used by the institution. Here, the Center outlines its major aims:  
Develop innovative expertise in the prevention of radicalization leading to violence 
as well as of hate crimes and incidents, throughout the province of Quebec. It is 
mandated with documenting the nature of such phenomena, developing a range of 
prevention strategies, setting out guidelines for prevention and intervention in these 
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areas, and providing tools and support to family members, teachers, professionals, 
and members of the community regarding these issues (CPRLV, 2016). 
 
Based on the mission statement, it is uncertain whether the association of radicalization 
with hate crimes merits similar preventative strategies, and thus whether both issues are molded 
from similar causes. After the Mosque shooting in Sainte-Foy, Quebec in January 2017, the 
Center decided to send its personnel to the capital city in hopes of responding to the numerous 
calls they have received thereafter (Normandin, 2017). In fact, during the nine months before the 
shooting, the Center reports having fourteen complaints tied to hate incidents, of which six are 
related to islamophobia (Normandin, 2017). Although it remains unclear whether the Center 
would describe the Mosque shooting in 2017 as an horrible incident that stems from 
radicalization, hate crime, or both, information as to how they would respond to such event is 
unknown. 
Such tensions also ensue in the “Definition” section of the CPRLV’s website. While the 
Center claims that there is no universally accepted definition for radicalization leading to 
violence, they nevertheless offer one of their own: “[a] process whereby people adopt extremist 
belief systems—including the willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence—with the aim 
of promoting an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation.” 
(CPRLV, 2016). Not only is this definition riddled with an anecdotal and superficial rhetoric, as 
there are a lack of citations that support such a definitive claim, but its open-endedness and far-
reaching generalizations tend to confuse the reader. If radicalization moves within a continuum, 
then pinpointing when violence enters the picture seems pretentious. How radicalization 
“experts” like CPRLV professionals can knowingly spot the transformation of political thoughts 
into ideas with violent means is yet to find grounding in rationality. It is only impressionistic to 
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argue that academics/experts can truly detect the adaptation of extremist beliefs into violent 
extremist beliefs.  
The pervasive vagueness underlies other definitions conceptualized by the CPRLV. The 
Center seeks to draw a distinction, for example, between non-violent radicalization and violent 
radicalization. Non-violent radicalization, for the Center, encompasses powerful, revolutionary 
radicals of nonviolence who opposed democratic norms like Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and 
Nelson Mandela (CPRLV, 2016). Violent radicalization, on the other hand, suggests similar 
political agendas for radicalism and activism, but legitimizes, encourages, and validates violence 
in the name of a specific belief system, as radicals are categorically convinced that their 
ideologies are absolute. This is a vague and untenable distinction. There have, for example, been 
revolutionary leaders that did employ violence to further their political causes (including Nelson 
Mandela). Isolating problematic radicalization proves to be rather difficult. Indeed, the problems 
encountered by the Center are consistent with those encountered in other anti-radicalization 
efforts. As Sedgwick (2010) points out, two problems tend to arise in these efforts: the issue of 
where along a continuum radicalization becomes problematic and the issue of where to draw the 
line between groups in need of serious attention and those who do not. In official definitions 
from institutions, it is possible to distinguish between thoughts or actions that embody a 
“threat”?  Is it possible to characterize non-violent radicalization as dangerous or peaceful? 
These ambiguities, in Montreal as elsewhere, have important effects. As O’Loughlin et 
al. (2011) explain, the absence of a clear profile of those radicalized, coupled with speculative, 
vague discourses in the mainstream news media on radicalizing agents contribute to a persistent 
but diffused and underspecified threat, that of a state of “hypersecurity” leading to further 
tensions. The radicalization discourse in turn amplifies such condition of possibility. Indeed, 
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Coppock and McGovern (2014) argue that a certain level of open-ended vagueness when it 
comes to defining radicalization serves the imperatives of state power. It allows for the 
(re)construction, (re)articulation and (re)interpretation of what constitutes radicalization and how 
its potential, widened applicability can pertain to different ideas, actions, attitudes, groups and 
individuals. Mistaken or over-general assumptions about radicalization can shape and feed into 
broader debates about security and identity. In this sense, exploring different understandings of 
the radicalization concept is troubling as its conceptual fuzziness may itself contribute to feelings 
of insecurity in contemporary societies. As I noted above, the CPRLV’s definition can refer to a 
number of various individuals: student activists, anarchists, environmentalists, parents, and 
children. Everyone is susceptible to the radicalization process. There is no limit to the potential 
targets of anti-radicalization practices. 
THE CPRLV AT WORK 
One of the Center’s most concrete efforts to define the radicalization process can be found in a 
model proposed by Benjamin Ducol, the research team leader at the Center. In April 2016, the 
Center participated in a major conference on radicalization at the École nationale de police au 
Québec located in Nicolet. The conference was entitled “Séminaire sur la radicalisation au 
Québec.” Inspired by the provincial action plan, the conference aims to gather researchers, police 
supervisors, officers and operations, community liaisons agents, correctional agents and teachers 
in the field of prevention and intervention in order to i) clearly situate the phenomenon of 
radicalization leading to violence in Quebec, ii) highlight and share different initiatives and 
practices from police organizations, and iii) equip participants in efficiently defining 
radicalization and consequently, bring out the best, effective, and rapid prevention practices 
(ENPQ, 2016).   
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As one of the first presenters at the conference, Ducol starts off with situating definitional 
issues surrounding radicalization in Quebec and in the world. In a PowerPoint slide entitled “La 
radicalisation au Québec: un phénomène nouveau au Québec?” Ducol (2016) explains that 
violent radicalization is not a new, social reality but has already touched Quebec during the 
1960s to the 1970s in the form of the FLQ (Front Liberation du Québec), a paramilitary group 
that fought for Quebec’s sovereignty. The FLQ conducted a number of violent attacks and 
killings, most notably as the kidnappings of British Trade Commissioner James Cross and the 
Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte became pinnacle incidents during the cause. According 
to Ducol (2016), violent radicalization permeates Quebec’s radical history, but what changes in 
today’s political climate is a collective consciousness derived from the most extreme 
manifestations of radicalization: terrorism. While the CPRLV makes conscientious decisions to 
not explicitly refer to the radical as a serious threat, Ducol (2016) does so freely. In this way, he 
disrupts the generally defined concept in radicalization scholarship that “the terrorist is presumed 
to be a radical, but the radical is not presumed to be a terrorist, at least not yet” (Sedgwick, 2011, 
p. 483). 
However, Ducol (2016) is quick to point out a confusion that seems to persist in such a 
narrative: radicalization does not equate to terrorism. In a PowerPoint slide entitled 
“Radicalization vs. Terrorisme: Quelles Différences?,” a Venn diagram illustrates two 
interlocking circles: one circle represents a pre-criminal space and the other a criminal space 




                            Figure 1: “Radicalization vs. Terrorisme: Quelles Différences?” Venn diagram                
                             (Ducol, 2016) 
On one side, terrorism lies within the criminal space circle, as possessing dangerous explosives 
becomes a police matter. On the other side, radicalization lies within the pre-criminal space as all 
radical behaviors and manifestations are not punishable offenses but have the potential to follow 
such an illegal pathway. However, a crucial explanation of the Venn diagram was not discussed 
by Ducol (2016): the space in which the spaces of pre-criminality and criminality interlock, the 
center of the gray zone in which the explanations over the conjoining of both circles is never 
addressed.  
The continual use of diagrams (others will be examined below) on the radicalization 
phenomenon provides a vehicle for policy makers and government officials to explore the 
process by which a “terrorist” is socially constructed and to provide an analytical basis for 
preventive, counter-radical strategies that do not resort to the use of state violence (Kundnani, 
2014). The diagrams, in other words, are essential to the anticipation and prevention of 
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radicalized violence. Like the ambiguities in the definition of radicalization, however, these 
diagrams create ambiguities that foment public fears and suspicions. The diagram makes 
violence intelligible as an action that touches and even overlaps with non-violent beliefs and 
tends to animate, therefore, the rhetoric of national security and heightened vigilance in the face 
of  radicalization (read: “homegrown terrorism”) in Quebec. Other Canadian institutions have 
also banked on the “pre-criminal space.”  In an access to information request demanding all 
correspondence, notes, emails, and ministerial briefing notes regarding the RCMP’s Countering 
Violent Extremism Program (CVE), efforts to mobilize resources in the pre-criminal space is 
crucial as curtailing individuals at risk of being radicalized to violence is fundamental to the 
Program. 
The same problem emerges in other parts of Ducol’s presentation. In a slide entitled 
“Rappel important: Radicalisation vs. Violence,” Ducol (2016) makes an important but 
contradictory distinction: being a non-violent radical is not inherently different from being a 
radical that uses violent means. Adding to the confusion, he later claims that we are all radicals 
within our core because, he says, everyone in the conference believes that slavery is 
unacceptable (Ducol, 2016). Why opposition to slavery should be considered radical in the 
present is never explained. Nor it is explained how a concept of radicalism that encompasses 
everyone can be used to prevent a relatively rare phenomenon like terrorism. Again, the 
definition of radicalization is extremely broad: the term is understood and used in a variety of 
various ways, ranging from anti-slavery to killings to “Islamist terrorism.” This tends to confuse 
how and why governments are managing radicalization. 
Still further inconsistencies arise in the same slide when Ducol (2016) states that “tout 
geste de violence n’est pas nécessairement lié à la radicalisation.” As an example, he refers to 
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Hell’s Angels and street gangs more broadly. The latter, he explains, are criminal groups 
committing criminal offenses but such actions are not framed by particular political ideologies 
but by financial and territorial causes. Moreover, Ducol (2016) reveals that we must make the 
distinction between radicalization and radicalization leading to violence, and between violence 
and radicalization, but fails to acknowledge the essentialization of categories, the complexity of 
each concept, or how they can ultimately bleed into one another. Ducol (2016) insists that 
working on the profiles of radicals is “absolutely stupid” when referring to his “Pas de profil 
type” slide as we are incapable of knowing whether certain cultures, certain professions, and 
certain geographical locations are tied to radicalization, even when particular ethno-religious 
communities like Muslims bodies are often associated with radicalization in the media.   
Broad generalizations and untenable distinctions permeate how the CPRLV makes sense 
of radicalization. This is most clearly demonstrated during the Nicolet presentations when Ducol 
does not diligently attend to the vague appropriation of the pre-criminal and criminal spaces that 
could render violent radicalization supposedly optimal in his Venn diagram. As I have argued, 
however, this failure is widespread. Radicalization as a theorized concept produced by the 
CPRLV is grounded in ambiguity and confusions and can, therefore, be applied to various 
ideologies, actions, and individuals that may not lead entirely to violence. This confusion, as 
Sedgwick (2010) points out, is common to anti-radicalization efforts. The author argues that 
despite its popularity, the concept of radicalization is a source of confusion. The rationality (or 
lack thereof) when it comes to radicalization is significant. When powerful institutions are 
heavily involved in the production of knowledge about radicalization but its conceptual fuzziness 
(Coppock and McGovern, 2014) drive the materialization of such theories into definitions, tools, 
and charts of prevention, unreason as Edwards (2015) puts it becomes forefront.  
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TOOLS AND CHARTS OF PREVENTION 
The diagrams presented by Ducol at the Nicolet conference represent a small part of a larger 
repertoire. One of the Center’s tasks, as I mentioned, is to provide guidance to various groups 
and institutions, guidance that will help them to identify and prevent radicalization. In this work, 
like Ducol’s presentation at Nicolet, various diagrams play an important role. Since its founding, 
a whole series of charts, pyramids, and models have been designed by the CPRLV to help in the 
detection and prevention of radicalization leading to violence for a wide range of individuals: 
coworkers, families and relatives, social and health workers, teachers, and the police. One 
particular tool is heavily utilized by the CPRLV when offering their services and expertise to the 
public: the behavior barometer (See Figure 2). 
  
                                  Figure 2: the CPRLV’s behavior barometer (CPRLV, 2016) 
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My interviews with presidents of both the Conféderation des Organismes Familiaux du 
Québec (COFAQ) and the Conseil Jeunesse de Montréal (CjM) revealed that the behavior 
barometer was presented by the Center during information seminars to detect (and understand) 
early warning signs of violent radicalization that are cause for concern and those that are not. 
The barometer is divided into four color-coded categories based on the Center’s deduction of 
different levels of severity. The first category of insignificant behavior displays signs of adopting 
visible signs such as traditional clothes, beard, religious symbols, and specific tattoos to express 
one’s identity and sense of belonging in addition to displaying a desire for excitement and 
adventure. The second category of troubling behavior represents an increasingly sustained self-
identification with an ideology which includes isolating oneself with family/friends, being drawn 
to conspiracy theories, and expressing a need to dominate or control others. The third category of 
worrisome behavior encompasses an acute mistrust of the outside world, which includes a 
sudden disinterest in professional or school activities and hiding a new lifestyle, allegiance, or 
belief system from close ones. The fourth and final category of alarming behavior that leads an 
individual to use violence as the only legitimate means of action would perhaps lead the reader to 
contested, confusing understandings in terms of prevention (“Recognizing violent radicalization” 
section, para. 2).   
Based on the behavior barometer tool, it’s interesting to note that the CPRLV is attracted 
to patterns of beliefs and behaviors. However, such patterns does not cause radicalization but 
only correlate with radicalized risk (Kundnani, 2011). Indeed, questions of causality are 
frequently overlooked in the radicalization discourse, despite the CPRLV’s keen interest in 
detecting “root causes.” Following on that same thread, Kundnani (2011) argues: “radicalization 
discourse claims predictive power, but lacks explanatory power” (p. 10). Scholars and 
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government officials who allocate resources to detecting future threats by creating tools of 
prevention like the behavior barometer ignore why certain behaviors are classified as worrisome 
while others are alarming. As a result, the CPRLV (2016) conveniently inserts a disclaimer under 
the “Advice on proper use of the behavior barometer” section. The Center insists that “a person 
may display a range of behaviors spanning all four categories at once” and consequently, the 
barometer should not be used to carry out a purely qualitative behavioral assessment” but rather 
“a qualitative assessment” as the behavior barometer is not a clinical assessment tool that 
CPRLV employees utilize. The knowledge production involved in the diffusion of preventative 
tools, without the institutional discomfort that follows when confusion entangles with the 
radicalization discourse, is easily resolved by such disclaimer. Knowledge that associates certain 
actions and behaviours with radicalization is useful to governments and law enforcement 
agencies. It constructs radicalization as something intelligible that can also be easily controlled.  
Another readily accessible tool on the CPRLV website is a complex diagram illustrating 
the multifarious, nonlinear pathways leading towards violent radicalization, a diagram that also 
was explained to presidents of COFAQ and Conseil jeunesse de Montréal by the CPRLV 




            Figure 3: “Process of radicalization leading to violence” diagram (CPRLV, 2016). 
In the early prevention and primary prevention section of the diagram, the CPRLV (2016) offers 
a number of sociopolitical characteristics that can shape a person to feel social malaise and, as a 
result, to question their identification with “the collective values of shared community” (CPRLV, 
2016). Sociopolitical circumstances like the state’s positioning on global events (such as public 
and foreign policies) combined with social and economic vulnerability all contribute to the 
development of frustration, humiliation, stigmatization, and discrimination. The diagram also 
lists specific vulnerabilities: intolerance towards ambiguity, lack of critical thinking skills, 
impulsiveness, isolation, and difficult life events. Radical/violent indoctrination ideologies 
encompass a concealment of a lifestyle or an allegiance, dehumanizing others, and losing a sense 
of moral reference, in addition to a sudden loss of interest in school or professional activities. 
Such path ultimately leads to “questioning the promise of togetherness” (CPRLV, 2016).  
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There are several problems with this diagram. For one thing, many emotions that are tied 
to the radicalization process in the diagram could also result from various socio-economic issues 
and could lead in many directions (besides violence). Such a broad list of indicators (illustrated 
in the CPRLV’s diagram) cannot make a person’s process of radicalization intelligible, much 
less illuminate the key points in which the process can be interrupted (Githens-Meyer, 2012, 
2010). As Bouhana and Wikstrom (2010) and Kundnani (2011) argue, radicalization processes 
are best resumed as “exploratory” rather than “explanatory” (as cited in Brown and Saeed, 2015).   
The second problem with the diagram is that the language of radicalization often 
marginalizes and infantilizes radicals or suspected radicals while justifying acts of expanded 
scrutiny and surveillance. The diagram encourages surveillance, but describes this as an act of 
care – the care shown by a parent, for example, who looks over a child and stops the latter from 
making a bad decision. These acts of care are thinly veiled into acts of surveillance. The diagram 
also removes the agency of radicalizing individuals. As Edwards (2015) poignantly points out: 
“Despite acting, they are passive. Despite making choices, they do not choose” (p. 115). The 
actions depicted in the diagram are accorded very different values. On one side are actions 
deemed commendable like “heroism”, “rebellion” and “thrill seeking” (CPRLV, 2016). On the 
other side are actions deemed threatening like “intolerance towards ambiguity,” “feeling of 
frustration and discomfort,” and “social/economic vulnerability” (CPRLV, 2016). These 
distinctions are highly dependent on those passing judgment, as police officers, governments and 
academics tend to do.  Uneven relations of power dictate what characteristics should be 
celebrated in the radicalization discourse and which ones should be punished. 
The third problem with the diagram is the lack of mention of racisms, the social/racial 
profiling of visible minorities from the police/state and the inevitable association of 
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Muslim/Arab-looking individuals with terrorist attacks. As one of the objectives of the CPRLV 
(2016) is to develop innovative expertise in the prevention of hate crimes, it is interesting to note 
that factors for hate crime incidents are not explicitly mentioned in a diagram concerning 
radicalization, as both phenomena are co-constitutive according to the Center. According to the 
CPRLV (2016), “hate crimes and incidents can be an important cause of radicalization leading to 
violence. Conversely, violent radicalization may itself spur the commission of hate acts.” The 
silence on factors leading to hate crimes is deafening. 
THE POLICE:  INSTITUTIONALIZING PREVENTATIVE AND SECURITY PRACTICES  
Aside from the CPRLV, key actors that forward the institutionalization of preventative and 
security practices include the SPVM, the SPVQ, and the RCMP. Notably, the SPVM is a key 
player in how radicalization is handled in Montreal. Prior to the opening of the CPRLV, the 
SPVM was not particularly interested nor invested in the phenomenon of radicalization. In 
March 2015, when the Center was officially established by Coderre, the SPVM became a key 
player in supporting the Center and its goal to offer preventative resources that would hinder 
violent radicalization (SPVM, 2015). In a patent letter listed with a filing number of 
1171054001, detailing the registry of an enterprise for Revenu Québec (RQ), the CPRLV listed 
in 2015 Marc Parent, then director of the SPVM, as president of the Center. Khan Du Dinh, an 
SPVM police officer and expert on intercultural relations and racial profiling, was also listed as 
the Center’s secretary (RQ, 2017). This comes as a surprise as the Center constantly vows 
separation from the SPVM in the media (Zabihiyan, 2015). 
SPVM officers also carved out a space in the institutionalization of preventative and 
security practices. Continuing on forward with the action plan theme of “agir, prévenir, détecter 
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et vivre-ensemble” in Nicolet, Khanh Du Dinh (2016) shares SPVM’s best practices and 
solutions on terrorism or violent radicalization. (Du Dinh used these words interchangeably 
during his presentation compared to Ducol (2016) who insufficiently differentiates both 
phenomena). Du Dinh (2016) emphasizes that prevention is key to SPVM’s investigation on 
radicalized individuals and that maintaining lines of communication with different police 
institutions in Quebec and in Canada, notably with the RCMP, proves successful. Du Dinh 
(2016) believes that it’s crucial to involve citizens in community policing as everyone is a “co-
actor” in the prevention of radicalization. Sageman (2008) argues that community policing can 
pre-emptively usurp violent radicalization by reducing social alienation experienced by Muslim 
bodies, as the “American Dream” of individualism and equal opportunity facilitates favorable 
integration more so than European welfare state models, which cultivates dependency. In other 
words, according to the SPVM, instituting anti-radicalization programs anchored in community-
policing is key to preventing violent radicalization before it happens.  
Hence, in order to achieve such a goal, Du Dinh (2016) states that the stigmatization and  
racial profiling of ethno-cultural communities must be avoided as the relationship between the 
SPVM and citizens must be preserved and must be based on confidence between both parties. In 
contrast, in a 2014 press release found in an access to information request made to the federal 
government, the Calgary Police maintains a close relationship with the city’s Islamic community 
and has recently increased measures to develop strategies to address radicalization in conjunction 
with Muslim bodies. As radicalization is a complex and multi-faceted problem, Du Dinh (2016) 
believes that the SPVM has no control over its diffusion. A chart entitled “Prévenir en assurant 
équilibre entre sécurité et vigilance” outlines three axes of intervention: expertise/leadership, 
skills, and partnerships. Du Dinh (2016) argues that by establishing a partnership with Montreal 
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school boards like the CSDM (Commission Scolaire de Montréal), the SPVM is able to work 
with young adolescents in the prevention of radicalization. In an access to information request 
made to CSDM in May 2016 regarding an anti-radicalization partnership with the SPVM, no 
such collaboration existed at the time. However, in a document made out to teachers on how to 
address student concerns about the 2015 Paris attacks, several instructions stand out, notably that 
teachers should enforce zero tolerance regarding xenophobic and pro-terrorist discourse. 
Additionally, the CSDM also encourages the promotion of founding principles to students that 
uphold a democratic society such as the “vivre-ensemble” characteristic, established qualities 
that define Montreal as a multicultural city.   
While the SPVM plans on institutionalizing community-policing as an effective 
preventative technique, the SPVQ believes that fostering an intercultural dialogue between the 
local police force and ethno-religious peoples is crucial. Along these lines, Marie-Ève Côté-
Henri (2016), police and prevention officer in mental and in radicalization for the SPVQ, 
spearheads the action plan put into place by the SPVQ for the prevention of radicalization. The 
action plan consists mainly of three specialized committees that work together: the strategic, 
tactical, and community committee. With a continued partnership with the RCMP, the action 
plan’s mandate is to collect information, produce information reports and as a result, make 
recommendations which are then sent to the steering committee. The strategic committee has 
goals of teasing out political and media trends in addition to weighing in on the “pulse” of the 
public and monitoring certain kinds of groups. The tactic committee has an aim of targeting 
threats and their evolution from a criminal standpoint. Lastly, the community committee, of 
which Côté-Henri (2016) is a part of, aims to develop and maintain and intercultural dialogue in 
order to strengthen bonds and lines of communication between the police and ethnocultural 
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communities and to involve such communities in the prevention of terrorism. Groups that are 
addressed for such objective include religious leaders of “targeted” communities, maisons 
jeunesses, youth from ethnocultural backgrounds, and newly arrived immigrants. As opposed to 
the provincial action plan managed by MIDI, the Ville de Quebec’s action plan transparently 
points to the usual “at risk” or “vulnerable” populations that are often associated with the 
profiling of specific attributes linked to radicalization. Situated within the post 9/11 and the war 
on terror context, such signs are related with certain “types” of Muslims, like bearded men, 
veiled women and converts (Kepel, 2004). 
Actions that will take place in the future include developing awareness campaigns to 
youths and ethnocultural communities that are in line with the politics of the SPVQ, and 
developing and maintaining intercultural sensitization and inclusion activities for newly arrived 
immigrants. A second objective of the action plan includes augmenting the knowledge of police 
patrollers and government employees (that have increased contact with citizens) so that they can 
better detect and collect information on indicators (or acts that seem like potential indicators) of 
radicalization in the field.  Côté-Henri (2016) states that these indicators include a change in 
appearance, in discourse, in presentation, and in lifestyle. Solutions such as training sessions on 
indicators and diffusing an information kit destined to inform and raise awareness on such 
indicators will be put into place. Hence, solid partnerships between police forces, local 
authorities, and community organizations are meant to identify problematic, radicalized 
individuals, as guided by the government’s action plan. 
Police organizations in Quebec like the SPVM firmly believe that the solution to 
preventing violent radicalization is through community policing. However, such tactic poses 
concerns over how the SPVM and the SPVQ use detection signs like facial signifiers to stop 
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terrorist acts before they happen, as beards are often associated with Muslim/Arab-ness. Another 
concern arises as to why the SPVQ pays particular attention to ethnocultural communities that 
are racialized and whether such strategy is indicative of racially profiling Muslim/Arab bodies. 
While discourses by the police like the SPVQ’s action plan stem in liberal inclusiveness when it 
comes to the detection of radical signs, there were still instances, especially during Henri-Côté’s 
presentation, when the ambiguous nature of the radicalization definition was utilized to step 
away from secular liberalism and into racialization processes. We see this notably when Henri-
Côté makes constant references to ethnocultural communities and targeted religious leaders as 
key players in the prevention of terrorism in Quebec when the SPVQ’s action plan was 
discussed. Indeed, this ambiguity feeds into the police efforts to surveil potential radical acts. 
LA « RADICALISATION AU QUÉBEC : AGIR, PRÉVENIR, DÉTECTER ET VIVRE-
ENSEMBLE» 
In 2015, the Quebec government unveiled its anti-radicalization action plan, entitled “La 
radicalisation au Québec: agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre-ensemble.”  Before the departure of 
seven adolescents and young adults who planned on leaving Quebec to join forces with the 
Islamic State and fight for the Syrian cause, the phenomenon of radicalization was never much a 
cause for concern for the Quebec government. However, a research-action study was put forth, 
as it was also framed by a measure made in the action plan to further research on radicalization 
in Quebec, specifically as it pertains to students from CEGEP Maisonneuve. The report explains 
that the overexposure made by the Quebec media in regards to the departure of these individuals 
(who were also students at Maisonneuve) to Syria became a catalyst for the high demand of this 
study by the Quebec government (Institut de recherche sur l’intégration professionnelle des 
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immigrants (IRIPI), 2016).  I would argue that such incident also became a catalyst for the 
construction and implementation of the governmental action plan against radicalization. 
 The action plan is similar in many ways to the efforts of the Centre and the various 
Quebec police departments. Like these other efforts, for one thing, prevention is essential to the 
action plan. In the introduction of the action plan under the “Prévenir” section, MIDI explains:  
Prevention also needs a solid comprehension of this phenomenon: many measures 
aim precisely to conduct research, mainly on radicalization and deradicalization. 
Understandings will allow for the enrichment of training and sensitivity workshops 
that will be put into place under this axis to serve social workers in the public sector, 
youths, and the general population (GQ, 2015, p. 8).   
Another similarity, not surprisingly, is the action plan’s problematic efforts to define 
radicalization. The plan does not offer a radicalization discourse that is heavily based on the 
expansion of indicators, causal factors, competing definitions, and scientific models. It does, 
however, propose its own definition of radicalization: “a group of acts qualified as ‘extreme’ or 
stem from a more literal interpretation of systems, whether they are political, religious, cultural 
or economic”(QC, 2015, p. 9). While such definition does not mention the radical shift from 
peaceful activity to violence, a principal characteristic that other institutions like the CPRLV and 
the Quebec police force emphasize upon, the definition is anchored in ambiguity as 
“interpretations” of political, religious, cultural or economic systems could point to any kinds of 
ideologies. And any forms of such ideologies can incite violence. In addition, the action also 
reveals the provincial government’s (QC, 2015) definition for deradicalization: “A method used 
to mentally change a person already radicalized and make him abandon his viewpoints.” (p. 9). 
The action plan, does not offer however, what it means of a person who has already become 
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The same ambiguities appear in an internal communication concerning the unveiling of 
the action plan by MIDI. Here, Stéphanie Vallée, Minister of Justice, states that expressing 
hateful ideologies like radicalization leading to violence is in direct violation of rejecting 
democratic values that are held dear in Quebec. Difficulties arise when foreboding 
demonstrations of solidarity, revolt, and youthful frustrations in addition to an exacerbation of 
political or religious ideologies would ever directly lead to violence or if actions that do not lead 
to violence at all should be considered violent. The problem lies in where to draw the line when 
the transfer from peace to violence occurs or why lines are drawn in different places in response 
to different definitions. 
 The notion of Quebec values enters discussions of racialization in other ways as well. 
Specifically, how the action plan groups fifty-nine measures into the four main axes of “agir”, 
“prévenir” “détecter” and “vivre-ensemble” tends to also illuminate how the Couillard 
Government generates selective understandings of radicalization to Quebecers. At the same time 
as the Quebec government launched its efforts to eradicate hate speech inciting violence, honor 
crimes and forced marriages with the tabling of the Bill 59, intentions to attack radicalization 
leading to violence followed suit with the institutionalization of state-sanctioned measures. 
According to MIDI, assuring the security of Quebecers and valorising social cohesion within an 
ethnocultural diversity framework remains the outmost preoccupation for the Quebec 
government. According to MIDI, issues of hate speech inciting violence, honor crimes, and 
forced marriages are solely associated within an ethnocultural framework. In other words, these 
issues are purely related to cultures that are not indigenous to Quebec. Because honor crimes and 




The provincial action plan against radicalization leading to violence was the first tool in 
Quebec that was institutionalized by the Couillard Administration as a way to counter terrorist 
acts through anti-radicalization praxis. The first axis in the plan, that of “agir,” intends to put 
measures in place so that various professionals can effectively intervene promptly in situations 
that poses risks to national security and the safety of individuals (GQ, 2015, p. 11). Notable 
measures in the first axis that are works in progress include Measure 1.7 that accentuates 
communication between various police corps in Quebec on trainings regarding the evolution of 
the radicalization phenomenon, Measure 1.12 that continues the coordination and the 
collaboration of the Structure de gestion policière contre le terrorisme (SGPCT) with the RCMP 
and the SPVM, and Measure 1.4 that assures a follow-up on the training of patrollers who deal 
with individuals with mental illnesses and who have criminal files on hate crimes and 
intimidation (GQ, 2016).  
The role prescribed to the police in the plan is similar to the Danish government’s anti-
radicalization measures (mentioned in the literature review). In practice, however, the Danish 
plan does not invest much funding in the surveillance and training of law enforcement agencies. 
As Lindekilde (2012) argues: “Security is advanced in society by the facilitating integration and 
the development of liberal citizens, and not so much by the control, surveillance, and repression 
of the older anti-terrorism practice regime” (p. 113). Indeed, the Danish government invests 
more in solving radicalization through the implementation of more a wiser, liberal approach to 
combating radicalization by targeting the identity and citizenship of Danes. Contrarily, the 
Quebec government believes that eradicating radicalization is best resolved through preventative 
and security measures. 
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The second axis in the Quebec plan, that of “prévenir,” endeavours to sensitize 
prevention of radicalization through research, education and training in the education, health and 
social services sectors (GQ, 2015). As such, the Quebec Government financed a research-action 
in partnership with College Maisonneuve (where most of the young adults who were at Trudeau 
Aiport were students) in order to study and identify factors of radicalization amongst youths at 
risk. Hence, such task comprises of Measure 2.4 that will make resources and information 
available to families regarding the indicators and signs of radicalization, Measure 2.6 that will 
continue to enrich training to personnel in schools by the addition of new seminars on violent 
radicalization and in-class intervention following violent incidents in the news and Measure 2.19 
that frames laws regarding marriage in order to police the age consent, especially for those who 
are between the ages of sixteen to nineteen years old (GQ, 2016).  
Here again the plan mirrors the Danish example. In the Danish action plan, mentoring 
programs that focus on young people and identity issues aims to help adolescents in the “target” 
group understand radicalization processes and the meaning of identity-building in such 
processes. Most notably, a significant initiative under the Danish action plan are the increased 
use of “preventative talks” conducted by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service with 
young adults showing the early warning signs of radicalization and who are affiliated with 
“extremist milieus.” Lindekilde (2012) argue that such preventative talk builds on an 
internalization of surveillance as the concept for these talks is to screen out persons in the early 
stages of radicalization. By comparing measures from different action plans, young adolescents 
and adults become the main targets in the prevention of radicalization while weaving educational 
efforts into the mix.  However, outcomes that are noticed in Danish initiatives, which of the 
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insidious nature of surveillance found in the “preventative talks,” are yet to be compared with 
Quebec preventative measures, as their outcomes are yet to be determined. 
The third axis in the action plan, that of “détecter,” aims to detect precocious signs of the 
radicalization process and is geared towards police organizations and professionals in the 
psychosocial field who will be better equipped in immediately interlocking the deradicalization 
process and guaranteeing the efficiency in the fight against radicalization (GQ, 2015). Such goals 
embody Measure 3.4, which includes participating in the RCMP’s program “Signalement 
d’incidents suspects” (SIS) (through which the RCMP and the Sûreté du Québec collect alerts 
from social workers about suspicious incidents regarding potential threats of infrastructures and 
of national security) and Measure 3.5 which will put together a program for patrollers that will 
efficiently detect the signs of radicalization and of terrorism in the field (GQ, 2016). This is 
similar to the Danish action plan. The latter includes an institutionalized collaboration known as 
the “School- Social services-Police” (SSP), which has traditionally been concerned with 
drug/alcohol abuse and crime prevention trained school teachers in spotting the signs of 
radicalization. The initiative met some resistance, as school teachers did not believe it was their 
duty to spot potential terrorist risks (Kuhle and Lindekilde, 2010, as cited in Lindekilde, 2012).  
Following suit, the SIS program has similar traits of the SSP but because the SIS has not 
officially launched, we have yet to know its outcome. 
The last axis, that of “vivre ensemble,” comprises notably of Measure 4.2, which 
proposes models of success to youths, especially to those who are considered racial minorities in 
order to favor social inclusion. Globally, the fourth axis intends to eradicate discrimination, 
prejudices, islamophobia, and other racisms to reinforce self-esteem, feelings of belonging and 
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the participation of immigrants and ethnocultural minorities in the Quebec culture and society 
(GQ, 2015).  
The Danish action plan involved a similar effort. Most notably, it expresses similar 
concerns to the Quebec action plan about how a lack of integration, social cohesion, and 
experiences of marginalization can become the foundation for the proliferation of radicalization. 
Although the Danish action plan is founded upon a security agenda, it also concerns a much 
wider debate on how Western liberal democracies should integrate ethno-religious communities, 
especially Danish Muslims. Further, a set of initiatives in the action plan has goals of boosting 
“democratic competences,” as to make young adults abstain from radicalization. Specifically, the 
idea is to help target groups become aware of citizenship possibilities and democratic 
engagement, as the breeding ground for radicalization would be stomped (Lindekilde, 2012). A 
specific concept of the “ideal citizen” permeates the Danish action plan. In short, the formation 
of liberal, responsible, pro-democratic citizen who contribute to the greater good negates radical 
bodies that utilize violent and undemocratic means.  
Analyses of the Quebec action plan contribute to argument that the knowledge production 
behind how states manage radicalization is rooted within policies that further secular liberalism. 
In reality however, such measures listed in both the Danish and Quebec action plans utilize 
vague conceptualizations of the radicalization phenomenon to prove that ethno-religious bodies, 
particularly Muslims, should be monitored. Taking a step further, ambiguities inherent to the 
meaning of radicalization are also manipulated to fit an image that those who are radicals or who 
are radicalized do not respect nor conform to the democratic values associated with Quebec 
citizenship. In this sense, the multi-faceted approach exclusive to radicalization that it often 
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advanced by institutions like the Police and the CPRLV is often deployed to not only cover an 
urban security agenda, but to also justify the corruption of Quebec’s sacred values by radicals. 
CONCLUSION 
The institutionalization of anti-radicalization practices in Montreal and in Quebec is only made 
possible through the dissemination of making the phenomenon intelligible. My research question 
asks: how is the radicalization discourse in Quebec understood and made actionable through the 
elaboration of definitions, causal factors, and models?  
I conclude that the knowledge production behind the radicalization discourse is an 
exercise built on broad-based assumptions. As it pertains to definitive constructs, charts, and 
models, the CPRLV is keen on exercising caution because they would like to illustrate to their 
readers that they are adopting a liberal, wiser approach by how they view radicalization. Such 
outlook has the consequence of propagating ambiguous, malleable conclusions, especially when 
a parent or a teacher is in need of answers to basic questions as to whom and why someone can 
be radicalized. In light of this, how institutional actors who make radicalization intelligible like 
the CPRLV, the police force, and the Quebec government has a direct impact on how this 
phenomenon should be managed by the state through the implementation of preventative and 
security practices. Quebec’s police organizations also made similar strides by profiting on the 
elusiveness of the radicalization phenomenon by proposing measures in the action plan as well as 
community-policing as methods to justify the racial profiling of Muslim bodies. 
As outlined in the Quebec government’s action plan, vague theories and concepts 
ultimately feed into anti-radicalization practices through the rhetoric of prevention and security 
by institutional actors. While particular knowledges prioritize certain kinds of preventative and 
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security practices in the management of anti-radicalization, the institutionalization and 
solidification of such exercises of precaution build on underlying tensions. Such tensions are 
exemplified through the comparison and contrast of both the Danish and the Quebec action plan. 
Both Denmark and Quebec believe that the supervision and control of violent radicalization 
should be anchored to a security agenda. However, the Danish action plan differs to the Quebec 
plan. Solutions to anti-radicalization based on the development and integration of liberal citizens 
coupled with the exercise of identity-building, especially when referring to ethno-religious 
communities like Danish Muslim bodies remains a pervasive trend in the Danish action plan. 
Similarly, the Quebec action plan is more preoccupied with pre-empting future attacks through 
liberal, rational approaches in the form of prevention and security practices. Such tensions also 
carry on into how non-institutional actors, like community organizations, activists, students and 
academics, and the general public in Montreal disagree with the institutionalization of the 











CHAPTER 3: TENSIONS UNDERLYING ANTI-RADICALIZATION 
PRACTICES  
“During the workshop, I would have liked to get more information as to how the 
process works. How are they useful to someone that calls? Ok, we will take this into 
consideration but if this person is not violent, then we will keep him with us. If they 
are basing their whole organization on this hotline, then it would have been nice to 
get some more information.” –Marcel (interview participant) on the CPRLV’s 
hotline  
 
The CPRLV’s efforts to solve radicalization have involved more than the creation of new 
knowledges like the radicalization barometer. Its efforts depend on the links it forges with other 
institutions, organizations, and everyday citizens – the actors that the Centre hopes will use the 
knowledge it produces to combat radicalization. The Centre’s efforts to forge linkages, however, 
involve serious challenges, as not everyone is amenable to implementing its approach to 
radicalization. Moreover, some of the linkages it succeeds in forging, such as its linkage with the 
Montreal police, raise concerns for certain organizations, and make it even more difficult for the 
Centre to establish linkages with these groups. The implementation of the Centre’s anti-
radicalization agenda, in short, are fraught with tensions as it seeks to enlist other institutions, 
organizations, and citizens in this work. 
The tensions in the Centre’s work are perhaps most apparent when it comes to the Muslim 
organizations that it hopes to involve in the anti-radicalization fight. Although the CPRLV 
proclaims to be in the business of prevention instead of being heavily focused on detection 
practices, the Center nevertheless is accused by Muslim community organizations and other key 
players of systemically drawing on Muslim bodies to establish their own research and knowledge 
production on radicalization leading to violence. The usage of detection signs, according to 
AMAL-Quebec, is abusive and would lead to the religious/racial profiling of racialized 
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minorities who are already victimized (AMAL-Québec, 2015). As such, the Center is a pivotal 
figure as a source of tension in Montreal amongst Muslim peoples. 
Tensions like this are indeed commonplace in anti-radicalization efforts. In New York, for 
example, a similar problem emerged when undercover informants hired by the FBI in 2012 were 
deployed to target suspicious Muslim and Arab Americans (Maira, 2014) and when more than 
250 mosques in New York and New Jersey and hundred more hotspots like cafés, taxi-cab 
hangouts, and student associations were listed as potential security risks by the FBI as 
radicalization “incubators” (Kundnani, 2012). Further, the Prevent Strategy elaborated by United 
Kingdom government in 2011 demonstrates that while Prevent’s intention is to design and 
implement counterterrorism policies, the program has risked marginalizing and stigmatizing 
British Muslims by labelling them as suspect (Kundnani, 2012; Awan, 2012; Githens-Mazer 
2011; Hickman et al. 2011). These detection programs create tensions especially in Muslim 
communities as the racial/religious profiling of Arab- or Muslim-ness is discriminatory. It 
renders anti-radicalization efforts more difficult to the extent that these communities are seen as 
necessary allies in the efforts. 
This chapter will examine the tensions encountered by the CPRLV as it sought to 
implement its approach to radicalization. In particular, it will map the tensions and contested 
relationships that the Center has established with three identifiable players: 1) the SPVM 2) local 
community groups in Montreal and 3) with Ministries of Quebec. These tensions are important 
highlights in the radicalization discourse in contemporary Montreal and in Quebec because they 
demonstrate how the Center manages to maintain a strong arm in the institutionalization of 
preventative practices, despite ruptures displayed amongst sanctioned partnerships with the 
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SPVM and Quebec Ministries or amongst contested relationships with local community groups, 
the public, and scholar activists.  
 As I show in this chapter, the Centre encountered tensions with various institutions and 
organizations with which it sought to work. Its relationships with Muslim organizations have 
proved to be particularly fraught, but its efforts also jarred with the work of the Quebec Ministry 
of Immigration and Social Inclusion. In highlighting these tensions and how the Centre sought to 
navigate them, this chapter will demonstrate how the CPRLV maintains its authority despite the 
various debates and disagreements it has encountered. This fills an important gap in the 
literature, since most academic literature on radicalization does not address the social and 
political tensions that come along with anti-radicalization practices between institutional actors 
like ministry officials and local community organizations or activists. This chapter fills a gap in 
the literature by showing how contentious and collaborative unions between state and non-state 
actors are important in understanding the complexities of anti-radicalization programs in 
Montreal and in Quebec. 
 
INFORMATION-SHARING IN THE SPVM-CPRLV PROTOCOL 
One important tension emerged in the work of the CPRLV almost immediately after its 
founding: a tension concerning its relationship to the SPVM. As mentioned in the second 
chapter, the SPVM lent a hand when the CPRLV was first founded. When the Center was first 
registered as an enterprise back in 2015, two Montreal police officers were registered as the 
president and secretary respectively of the CPRLV. However, such partnership resulted in 
opposition, especially since Muslim bodies in Montreal and in Quebec became critical that such 
connection would racially profile ethno-religious peoples.   
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 As a result, in order to prove its legitimacy, the Center sought to distance itself from the 
Montreal Police as Muslim activists believed that the Center does not represent an alternative or 
a safe haven in relation to the SPVM when dealing with radicalization. In the few weeks since 
the Center’s opening, Muslim community members were acknowledging that particular radical 
groups that promote white supremacy are targeting vulnerable Muslims to fuel their political 
agendas and that the CPRLV would become an ally to racialized minorities. Most nevertheless 
recognized that the Center’s efforts to eradicate radicalization would in turn target Muslim 
bodies. Such opposition to the Center and their affiliation with the SPVM was met with 
responses from Muslim activists. 
Some like Haroun Bouazzi, co-president for AMAL-Québec doesn’t understand why the 
creation of the Center was so rushed and more specifically, why the CPRLV’s hotline connected 
callers directly to the SPVM. In an interview with the Montreal Gazette, Bouazzi worries that the 
tip line will be overflowed with anti-Muslim racism. Similarly, Fo Niemi, executive director of 
the Center for Research-Action on Race Relations (CRARR), mirrors Bouazzi’s opinions and 
explains: 
“My concern is that the hotline will be inundated by people who are anti-
Muslim. It will be like in the olden days when people were asked to denounce 
anyone who could be a communist. How will they weed out the real threats? What 
will be the checks and balances to ensure people are not falsely accused?” (Michelle 
Lalonde, 2015).  
 
Community partners sounded the alarms in regards to the Center’s phoneline as form of 
anti-Muslim racism. Jamil (2006) explains that security programs influence not only the people 
and groups drawn to radicalization but encircles how Muslim bodies are perceived in Canada, 
particularly how they are inevitably and collectively identified as potential dangerous threats to 
national security. If the Center’s hotline is viewed as a security practice, then Bouazzi and 
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Niemi’s concerns that the CPRLV will enforce racial profiling when managing radicalization are 
validated. Canadian Muslims who experience the aftermath of security practices such as negative 
stereotyping, suspicion and discrimination usually turns into a daily reality filled with anxiety 
and insecurity about their well-being (Jamil 2006; Antonius 2002; CAIR-CAN 2002; Helly, 
2004). As the Red Menace of communism suddenly mutates to fit contemporary concerns over 
the radicalization problem, how suspected radicals or radicalized individuals are framed is not 
entirely immersed over national security concerns.  
Further, because the SPVM’s partnership with the CPRLV proves contentious, the City of 
Montreal responded by restructuring the Center so that its connection with the Montreal Police is 
indirect. In a PowerPoint presentation conducted by the CPRLV in November 2015, 
guaranteeing the strategic and operational autonomy of the Center in regards to police 
organizations and governmental services is a priority as creating and maintaining a line of 
confidentiality with Quebec’s populations is essential (Michael Arruda and Benjamin Ducol, 
2015). Such restructuring distances the police from the CPRLV. Muslim community 
organizations also voiced concerns in the CPRLV/SPVM alliance. 
Since its birth, the CPRLV remains under the authority of the SPVM. However, the Center 
received backlash from public media and Muslim community organizations that such co-
constitutive relationship will further discriminate against racialized minorities in Montreal. Such 
concerns were validated during the registry of the Center to the City of Montreal in 2015. Marc 
Parent, former director of the SPVM is listed as president of the Center in addition to Khan Du 
Dinh, SPVM police officer and expert on intercultural relations and racial profiling, as secretary 
(RQ, 2017). Additionally, Herman Déparice-Okomba, who is currently the executive director of 
the Center, previously worked at the SPVM for ten years and was responsible for racial/social 
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profiling issues and community outreach. Yet the CPRLV has been able to mold their statements 
to fit the concerns that racial profiling would not become central to the Center’s work. In a 
Montreal Gazette article, Déparice-Okomba states that his team will have to convince the public 
that the Center will be independent from the police (despite his own professional ties to the 
SPVM) and will to help families whose children are either passed the courts, are under house-
arrest or are in Syria (Catherine Solyom, 2015). However, when questioned about the Center’s 
affiliation with the SPVM, Déparice-Okomba states: 
“The police are one of our partners. It’s normal that we would collaborate with them. 
But there will be no interference by security or intelligence services or the police. 
Every time someone calls the hotline, the first thing we tell them is that their call will 
be confidential, but second, that if we determine that there is a risk to the person or to 
the community, we have no choice but to alert the police. Of 150 calls we’ve 
received, we’ve had four cases where those risks were present, and in these four 
cases, it was a family member that asked us to tell the police. If we weren’t here, 
calling the police would be the only choice. We are the alternative” (Catherine 
Solyom, 2015). 
Yet, amidst public scrutiny, the partnership between the Montreal Police and the Center 
continued to solidify with the creation of SPVM-CPRLV information-exchange protocol (Refer 




Figure 4. Process of operation of the CPRLV (Michael Arruda and Benjamin Ducol, 2015). 
In an access to information made to the SPVM in July 2016, a protocol was made 
available outlining the collaboration, access, and the sharing of personal information of 
radicalized individuals in the intervention of radicalization leading to violence between the 
SPVM and the CPRLV. While protective measures are listed to validate the existence of such 
protocol (for instance, despite the sharing of private information, the SPVM has a duty to protect 
the lives of citizens, uphold law and order, and prevent crimes) numerous tensions exist within 
the document. Notably, the protocol has the objective to establish on one hand, the boundaries 
pertaining to the collaboration. On the other hand, the protocol specifies the roles and 
responsibilities of each party, especially the rules that the CPRLV must follow when sharing 
personal information with the SPVM in the case when the latter is obliged to carry out the 
Center’s mission.  
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The protocol also emphasizes that such partnership is the result of, on a voluntary basis, 
sharing information in order to prevent, interfere, and ultimately support the social reinsertion of 
individuals who could potentially pose a threat to public safety. From the SPVM’s side, if a 
radicalized individual or someone who’s under the influence of doctrines and ideologies is 
susceptible to causing harm to public security and motivate criminality, the Montreal Police can 
divulge personal information, without the consent of those concerned persons, to the Center. 
Moreover, if reasonable intention persists such as an imminent danger of committing death or 
grave injuries unto individuals or targeted groups of individuals, the protocol will be enforced. 
What constitutes a reasonable intention is left unmentioned in the protocol nor is an extended 
description at to what the SPVM considers harmful doctrines and ideologies is outlined.  Next, 
when the protocol refers to individuals swayed by risky doctrines and ideologies, is whether or 
not this tool is associating such concerns with a set profile or with behaviors. If it is the latter, 
then detection of radical behaviors that is described by the CPRLV as malleable and various can 
point to racial profiling. 
Further, from the CPRLV’s side, they can only transmit personal information to the 
SPVM under two conditions: that there exists a danger that would hinder urban security; and that 
there would be reasonable motives that would incite an infraction against the Criminal Code or 
any other laws.  Additionally, the protocol stipulates that the CPRLV has good reason to collect 
private, sensitive information only if to support the families and close ones of radicalized 
individuals through psychosocial aid and only on condition that such information sharing does 
not hinder an ongoing police investigation.  
There are rules of transmission to the SPVM-CPRLV protocol. Any guardian that has 
parental rights or informant that reveals information regarding a child or any other person 
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involved in violent radicalization must consent through written agreement if such data is 
collected, recorded and exchanged between the SPVM and the CPRLV.  However, as mentioned 
previously, if pending danger is detected by the police that would cause danger to others, consent 
is invalid. Another rule dictates that mandated workers from the Center and the SPVM are only 
to share information that they themselves deem necessary to assure the well-being of radicalized 
individuals or suspects of radicalization. Any data that is divulged because of the protocol should 
be kept confidential and should only be destroyed if their collection and communication are not 
entirely justified. Although what constitutes as a reasonable motive for the collection of sensitive 
information is unclear, it is equally important to note that the SPVM-CPRLV protocol fails to 
offer details to important questions. For instance, it is uncertain who the SPVM and the CPRLV 
will deem as a radical or someone in the process of radicalization. Also, concerns arise as to 
what specific instances are breaching consent allowed. 
The issue of information-sharing amongst CPRLV workers proves contentious as the 
SPVM-CPRLV protocol is not always respected. While the Center thinks it necessary to build 
strong relationships with other institutions in Montreal like with the SPVM in order to prove its 
legitimacy to the public, tensions have emerged in the midst of the CPRLV-SPVM protocol, as 
uneven relations of power between CPRLV psychologists and the Director of the Center erupts 
over systems of confidentiality. Louis-Philippe Ouimet (2016) states that Jacques Caron, CPRLV 
psychologist, who has worked at the Center in its early developmental stages, has the 
responsibility to communicate delicate information by professional order in the event that such 
information can prevent a violent act from occurring. However, according to Caron, Déparice-
Okomba, asked him to divulge any leads he would have, without letting him know how such 
information will be used. Caron explains that such request goes against the code of ethics: “I 
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want to win the confidence of this youngster to help him reintegrate. I don’t want to gain his 
confidence so that I can denounce arrest or imprison him” (Louis-Philippe Ouimet, 2016).  
A similar incident was repeated by another employee. Ouimet (2016) explains that 
another worker, who chooses to be anonymous, states: “The Center uses people who are familiar 
with counselling or in other words, instilling confidentiality in people so that they can open up 
and so that later we can report the facts.” Both CPRLV workers affirm that the CPRLV is not 
respecting the code ethics that follows the psychologist-patient relationship. I would argue that in 
both cases, the rules of transmission stipulated in the SPVM-CPRLV protocol are not only 
disregarded, but neglected as well by the Center. Building confidence between a CPRLV 
psychologist and a suspected radical has ramifications for both parties. While workers at the 
Center feel professional unease due to unethical demands from their boss, parents in question are 
left with fewer options to help their children. As Caron explains: “If I was a dad, it is not the 
center that I would go to denounce my son who is radicalizing” (Louis-Philippe Ouimet, 2016). 
Breaches in the information-exchange protocol in light of the Radio-Canada report have 
been denied by the CPRLV. In a press communication released by the Center the same day as the 
article, the CPRLV denies any allegations as to confidentiality violations in the information-
sharing protocol and promotes high degrees of transparency. As such, the CPRLV confirms: 
During the first 19 months of activities, the CPRLV held training and sensitization 
workshops, of which 628 people participated. During this same period, the CPRLV 
answered to 352 calls requiring assistance in need of intervention in the field. This 
work is accomplished independently, without the collaboration of police forces 
except in cases of imminent danger. Such procedure conforms to the intervention 
protocols elaborated by the CPRLV in addition to codes of ethics from different 
professional orders engaged in the prevention of radicalization like l’Ordre des 
psychologues et l’Ordre des travailleurs sociaux et thérapeutes conjugaux et 
familiaux. The Code of confidentiality of the CPRLV adds to the professional 
obligations of social workers during their practice (CPRLV, 27 October, 2016). 
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The Radio-Canada interview with CPRLV members does indeed demonstrate a rift in the 
rules of transmission of confidential information. If more crucially, such former CPRLV 
workers vehemently denounce these ethical infringements, then such fissures mirror 
important discrepancies in the CPRLV-SPVM protocol. Following on that same thread, 
many alarms exist within this document. Overall, the sort of portrait that both the SPVM 
and the CPRLV would paint as to what a radicalized (or someone in the process) would 
look like is left to speculation. Numerous attempts to gain data through access to 
information requests as to what kinds of profiles or behaviors are subject to intense 
policing prove unfruitful, mainly because such documents are either nonexistent, 
confidential or that access to information requests as a research method demonstrates 
inconsistencies. Such deviations are noticed in answers to information requests given by 
different institutions in Quebec who send documents that are readily available online like 
the action plan, reject my requests altogether because of  confidentiality rights, or send 
reports that do not fully respond to my requests.  
Many tensions percolate through the SPVM-CPRLV protocol. That the close 
relationship between the Center and the Montreal police in addition to the Center’s 
phoneline is denounced by AMAL-Quebec as an embodiment of anti-Muslim 
whistleblowing in Quebec; that the restructuring of the Center as distant from the SPVM 
by the City of Montreal responds to criticisms by local community organizations; that yet 
the municipal registry of the Center lists two (former) SPVM officers as president and 
secretary; that the information-exchange protocol shows crucial breaches of the sharing of 
personal information between the Center and the SPVM; and that CPRLV psychologists 
feel uneasy as they believe that the transmission of sensitive data of a suspected radicalized 
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youth to the police is unethical illuminate the various alarms bells that exist within the 
SPVM-CPRLV protocol. Such strains also echo through the various discussions, debates, 
workshops and seminars between the Center and local community organizations on anti-
radicalization practices. 
INTRODUCING TENSIONS AMONG LOCAL COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ON 
ANTI-RADICALIZATION PRACTICES  
The Center strongly believes that the prevention of radicalization leading to violence is best 
advanced through collaboration with local community organizations even amidst tensions among 
such groups. In the “Approach” section of the CPRLV’s website, the Center affirms that they are  
 able to rely on the support and collaboration of community and institutional partners 
as well as of social and health services, which enables it [the Center] to provide a 
remarkable breadth of intervention approaches in the field. This vital cooperation is 
governed by official protocols ensuring a balance between prevention and security is 
maintained in a fully transparent manner (CPRLV, 2016).  
Working alongside local community groups is essential for the CPRLV for mainly two reasons: 
firstly, they need community buy-in to empower the Center’s position on the dissemination of 
their prevention workshops, training programs, and research; and secondly, they need some 
community groups to become their partners. However, being “able to rely on the support and 
collaboration of community partners” (CPRLV, 2016) materializes into a hit-or-miss experience 
for the Center.  
Winning public support for its work is clearly essential to the Center. This has not always 
been easy. The Centre’s difficulties in winning over the public were palpable in public talks that 
have occurred on radicalization in community spaces, including Concordia University. On 
March 8, 2016, Concordia University hosted a panel discussion entitled, “(DE)Radicalization: 
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The popular discourse,” which aimed to deconstruct popular discourses of identity politics as 
they relate to the issues of failed pluralism, islamophobia, and radicalization. In a social media 
post sharing the event, the organizers described their aims as follows:  
“Within the framework of an inviting environment, panelists will share their lived 
experiences and professional expertise to draw comparisons between the Canadian 
and American social realities. An analysis of the relationship between western host 
societies and the Muslim minority community, therein, is much needed to develop 
solutions targeting associated grassroots challenges. Lend your voice to de-
radicalization.” 
These aims were only partially fulfilled. While a number of topics were briefly discussed 
at the event, such as interculturalism, pluralism, integration, and the Quebec Charter of Values, 
the discussion quickly morphed into an intense vilification of a panelist who worked for the 
CPRLV. Such CPRLV panelist presented the Center’s services to the audience and made efforts 
to prove its legitimacy as a leading institution in the prevention of radicalization in Quebec and 
in North America. Most notably, the co-president of AMAL-Québec, present on the panel, stated 
that the Center solely represented a political tool advocated by Coderre in order to center 
Montreal and his administration as innovative in combating radicalization in North America. 
Indeed, while the co-president celebrated the Center for its aid in offering psychosocial help to 
the concerned parents through its hotline, he also argued that the hegemonic and imperialist 
characteristics of the Center were counter-productive. The Center, funded by both municipal and 
provincial governments, was an offshoot and clear manifestation of the state. The latter, for him, 
showed that the Center wasn’t doing “concrete things to combat radicalization.” It should 
instead, he argued, implement policies that would last and deal with anti-Muslim racisms.  
Another tensions emerged at the Concordia event when the CPRLV worker stated that 
the Center was focused, besides offering preventative practices to communities, on creating 
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empirical-based research on the radicalization phenomenon. According to the CPRLV panelist, 
the key to changing problematic policies on radicalization was to “collect data on the ground” as 
most university students are trained. Another panelist interfered by answering: “Well, fuck 
imperialism!” and continued to argue that imperialism and colonialism as systems of power 
never did much good for Canada.  
While disagreements echoed throughout the discussion on the (de)construction of the 
radicalization discourse, it was evident by the end that the CPRLV panelist was put to the test 
from all sides. Two main points surfaced from this discussion: the Center is a hegemonic 
institution and it is also empirical and objective. The first point was made by the panelists who 
were critical of the CPRLV while the second point was made by the Center’s worker. I would 
argue that the Center chose to include one of their workers, the CPRLV panelist, in such debate 
to enlighten Concordia students that the Center is indeed benevolent of radicalized individuals 
and not in the business of reinforcing the profile of Muslim youths in Montreal and in Quebec. It 
was an effort, in other words, to build public support for the Centre’s work. However, this 
message was lost amidst the criticisms of the other panelists/academics. (De)constructing the 
innings and outings of radicalization at Concordia did not particularly contribute to a favorable 
portrayal of the Center. On the contrary, the CPRLV was “the bad guy” that needed sorting out. 
THOUGHTS ON ANTI-RADICALIZATION PRACTICES FROM MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
ORGANIZATIONS IN MONTREAL 
Tensions also emerged in the Centre’s efforts to build relationships with particular ethno-
religious communities in Montreal and in Quebec. These tensions became evident, among other 
places, in a conference entitled “Radicalisation: entre mythes et réalités” in April 2016. During 
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the event, hosted by the CMQ (Congrès Maghrébin au Québec), panelists discussed the double-
sided concerns that seemed to plague Arab/Muslim individuals in Quebec. On one hand, Muslim 
communities were concerned with the radicalization phenomenon, particularly as it related to 
urban security and the fear that life-threatening attacks would occur in Montreal. On the other 
hand, Muslim organizations worried that anti-radicalization approaches propagated 
stigmatization and racial profiling, particularly as most of the preventative and detection 
practices implemented by the Quebec government targeted Arab/Muslim youth. Panelist Aziz 
Djaout, a researcher on radicalization, emphasized the second concern, arguing that anti-
radicalization programs posed severe risks to young Muslims in Quebec. “Anti-radicalization 
programs,” he explained, “can become vehicles for stigmatization. We talk about this [the theme 
of radicalization] because we sense that the problem with radicalization and its management by 
states represents an obstacle for Muslim youth.”6  
The literature corroborates Djaout’s argument that anti-radicalization programs further 
the discrimination of Muslim bodies through discipline and violence. Maira (2012) believes that 
the war on terror materializes into a technology of nation making that subjects racialized youths 
to be “monitored, contained, repressed, or removed, if necessary through violence” (p. 86). 
Because the management of the war on terror intensifies the racialization of Arab-ness or 
Muslim-ness (Maira, 2014), the employment of anti-radicalization praxis results in the discipline 
of racialized populations. It is not just the targeting of racialized populations that raises concerns, 
however. At the event, Djaout, explained that anti-radicalization practices exist in order to justify 
the intrusion of Western states in different spaces: in schools and in health and social services 
                                                          
6 Quotes by Djaout has been translated from French to English. 
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locations. The practices not only target racialized populations, in other words, but extent that 
targeting into new spaces. 
Djaout was not the only participant at the event to raise concerns. Arguments over 
integration in the Quebec context surfaced during the talk as one audience member believed that 
anti-radicalization practices served as intimidation methods. Tensions among Muslim 
community organizations are complex: while some believe in the preventative work the Center 
has to offer, others fear that their detection programs will profile Arab and Muslim bodies. 
Similar tensions emerged in other efforts to build relationships with Muslim 
communities. In an access to information request made to MIDI demanding all reports, external 
communications, and specialized committees that are geared towards the theme of radicalization 
and the implementation of the provincial action plan, an insightful response was mailed back. 
Such response included, among other things, a list of Muslim community organizations that were 
invited by the Inter-ministerial Committee to participate, in October 2014, in a roundtable 
discussion on the execution and follow-up on the provincial action plan. Among the Muslim 
community and organizations that are listed and that engaged with other Quebec Ministries in the 
discussion on the detection and prevention of radicalization leading to violence were AMAL-
Québec, CMQ, Conseil canadien des femmes musulmanes, Centre soufi Naqshbandi, and 
researchers and professionals that possess a prominent and significant influence in Montreal and 
in Quebec on issues pertaining to Muslim/Arab, francophone bodies.  
The roundtable discussion involving Muslim activists was influential in the 
implementation of the action plan. In an interview I conducted with one of the members who 
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participated in this roundtable discussion and who I will refer to as Meriem,7 the discussion 
involving Muslim organizations was intended to map out the tensions and take the “pulse” of 
various Muslim communities after terrorist incidents like the 2014 St-Jean-sur-Richelieu attack 
in Ottawa. In fact, a number of discords and deceptions were present in moments following and 
during the roundtable discussion. Meriem states that the discussion was organized in haste by 
MIDI and other Ministries. Meriem was asked personally by one of my other interviewees, a 
government official who I will refer to as Laura, to recruit potential representatives that work 
with community organizations. However, Meriem was surprised that key people who were 
outspokenly critical about the institutionalization of radicalization in Quebec were not present 
during the discussion. Meriem asked Laura about the identity of potential panelists but she 
refused to answer as the panel discussion was not ready to be made public for “security reasons.” 
Following this, Meriem and other participants were left in the dark when it came to another 
crucial element about the discussion.  
In addition, the roundtable discussion was mediatised and broadcast live on television. 
When I asked about the relevance of media attention, Meriem explained that the talk was 
televised in order to showcase to politicians and Ministries that Muslim Quebecers were 
mobilizing among themselves to acknowledge and address the problem of violent radicalization 
and extremism. In the room were delegates from the Parti Québecois, the Liberal Party, and the 
National Democratic Party, as well as representatives from MIDI, Ministère de la Famille, 
Ministère de la Justice, and Ministère de la Sécurité publique. I questioned Meriem about 
whether this panel discussion involving Muslim community organizations was planned to help 
                                                          




with the implementation of the action plan, as is indicated in the access to information request. 
She responded that it wasn’t in the beginning because of how publicized the talk became8.   
Tensions were evident during the roundtable discussion. According to Meriem, various 
political positions were taken up within Quebec Muslim organizations. While one participant 
voiced disdain for the “barbarians” (the extremists or radicalized), others believed that the 
Quebec nation should enforce means to solidify the rhetoric of vivre-ensemble. Indeed, tensions 
reigned in the room partly due to a lack of consensus on strategies and ideas within Muslim 
community organizations. Nevertheless, most panelists affirmed that the amount of fear and hate 
towards Muslim bodies in Quebec was increasing.  
Strained discussions during the roundtable were followed by a frank declaration on social 
media by one committee member. In December 2016, two years after the inter-ministerial 
committee, Bouazzi, an invited panelist, posted via Twitter: “Following the campaign launch on 
#diversity, I suspend my participation at the #radicalization roundtable created by Couillard two 
years ago.” When the “Ensemble, nous sommes le Québec” media campaign created by MIDI 
broadcasted on television and on the internet, the showcasing of immigrants who have 
successfully integrated into Quebec values offended Bouazzi, who thought that the preventive, 
anti-radicalization ads were “assimilative,” “negative,” and full of “clichés” (Lisa-Marie Gervais, 
                                                          
8 In an interview with Laura, a ministry official, the topic of the roundtable discussion was discussed. 
For Laura, this discussion was organized to fulfill mandates in the action plan that dealt with fostering inter-
religious and inter-cultural dialogue. The provincial government chose to gather Muslim community 
organizations especially because they were entrusted by the Couillard government to propose actions that 
would help youth, especially of second-generation born from immigrated parents who feel anxieties about 
discriminatory acts. In addition, according to Laura, the committee was created by Couillard following the 
terrorist attacks in Quebec in order to discuss the relationship between Islam and radicalization. ǲCommunity organizations addressed Couillard to tell him: ǮNow, we must act because we are always targetedǯ, states Laura. ǲSo the Premier surrounded himself with Ǯdialogue agentsǯ in order to avoid the association between 
Islamic radicalization and Muslims who live here in peace, and who want to practice their faith, as citizens of 
Quebec.ǳ Hence, the committee was put into place not to target Muslim bodies but, according to Laura, to de-




2016). While revoking one’s own participation in a consultative committee seem controversial to 
Quebecers, the lack of understanding from MIDI over the different points of views attributed by 
various Muslim leaders in Quebec further stigmatizes radicalized individuals as failed 
immigrants. As such, the potential Islamization of the radicalization phenomenon translates into 
the dissemination of harmful stereotypes and superficial understandings and solutions by state 
institutions.  
UNDERLYING TENSIONS AMONG COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS 
COLLABORATING WITH THE CPRLV 
Non-Muslim organizations are another important partner for the CPRLV. These organizations, 
though they express fewer concerns about the targeting of racialized populations, bring other 
concerns to the fore. One concern pertains to the Centre’s protocols, especially as they pertain to 
their hotline. The bulk of the Centre’s outreach is dedicated to providing education, training, and 
sensibilization capsules to institutions rather than community organizations. However, in an 
effort to test their expertise in the hopes of expanding their credibility and knowledge, the 
CPRLV also organized workshops with community organizations. One such organization is the 
Conseil Jeunesse de Montréal (CjM), an organization mandated to represent the youth concerns 
during decision-makings made by the municipal administration. Another organization is the 
Confédération des Organismes Familiaux du Québec (COFAQ), a community organization that 
supports and defends the various needs of families in Montreal and in Quebec.  I discuss these 
organizations’ reflections on the workshops in turn. 
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 Reflecting on the workshop, CjM members expressed mixed feelings about the Centre. 
One of the most prominent themes from my interview with members of the CjM, Diana and 
Marcel, was their trust in the CPRLV’s team and services in anti-radicalization practices:  
“I adored their pedagogical and dynamic formula. Instead of pre-packaged 
content...their context was very interactive which is quite advantageous for 
reflection. It was more the participants that were engaging in the discussion rather the 
presenter. She [presenter] started off by asking us what is the definition of 
radicalization, then asking us to write a word that comes to mind on a piece of paper 
and pinning all of them on a board.” (Diana)9 
“I didn’t meet the director but I did meet the workers and they all seem dedicated to 
the cause.” (Marcel) 
“The team was young and dynamic. I referred Roxanne [CPRLV worker] to someone 
who wanted to leave for Syria. And now, she’s a paid intern at the Center. It super 
how they are integrating her and using her story as an example to youths.” (Diana) 
“Apart from promoting the Center, the majority of our Counsel has confidence in the 
Center and in their integrated mission and to keep in mind that if we know somebody 
(because we know a lot people) to refer them to the Center so that we can combat 
radicalization.” (Diana) 
 
All the above quotes from both Diana and Marcel are insightful as they highlight the CjM’s 
appreciation and confidence in the CPRLV’s work. They disrupt portrayals of the Center as a 
state-sanctioned institution who perpetuates the stigmatization of ethno-religious individuals by 
way of encouraging the social exclusion and racial profiling of Arab/Muslim bodies through 
anti-radicalization programs and interventions. The last quote from Diana also underlines the 
need for the Center to acquire community buy-in and positive referrals from organizations and 
the public as it would strengthen and clear any doubts or wrongdoings about the CPRLV. As 
Diana mentions in the interview: “The context was more like ‘If you think the Center can 
interfere, think of us, refer them to us.’” Indeed, the CPRLV stresses on recommendations and 
word-of-mouth of their services to their audience.  They also utilize their participants, like the 
                                                          
9 Quotes from both Diana and Marcel were translated from French to English. 
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CjM, to test out their workshops on the prevention and awareness of violent radicalization and 
assessing what educational tools work and which ones seem confusing and ambiguous. As Diana 
explains: “It was pretty much a test to see whether the formula works, make changes if necessary 
and the start the process of presenting the workshop to other youths.”  
If explaining the purpose of the Center’s hotline as a tool of prevention is part of the 
formula to test out the effectiveness of the workshop, then questions concerning the transparency 
of the telephone line and its protocol preoccupied the minds of CjM members. When questioned 
about the Center’s hotline, Marcel said:  
“During the workshop, I would have liked to get more information as to how the 
process works. How are they useful to someone that calls? Ok, we will take this into 
consideration but if this person is not violent, then we will keep him with us. If they 
are basing their whole organization on this hotline, then it would have been nice to 
get some more information.”  
When prompted further about the phoneline, both Diana and Marcel were confused about the 
Center’s stance on information-sharing with the SPVM. Diana confirms: “I would have liked to 
get more information on the kinds of phone calls they get. Who answers the phone call? Is there 
a structure already established? Are the calls recorded? If so, do the callers know?” Marcel 
further adds: “Ok, we [the Center] receive a call in the afternoon, when will they call back the 
mother? Will they call back the mother or will they wait until the mother phones back? If the 
mother calls and says that her son bought a gun, what will they do? Do they transfer the call to 
the police or not?”  
Concerns over the Islamization of anti-radicalization programs were not met with the 
same level of preoccupation, however. When I asked about issues of racial profiling raised by 
Muslim community organizations, Diana did not seem alarmed. When asked whether Diana 
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believes that these prevention and detection practices are coded as methods of racial profiling 
conducted by the SPVM, she responded that this was certainly not the case here in Montreal.  
While CjM members displayed both positive opinions and serious concerns over the 
Center’s work on security and preventative anti-radicalization practices, COFAQ believes 
differently. In fact, COFAQ highly praised the success of the Center’s training workshop on the 
detection and prevention of radicalization leading to violence. In an effort to educate social 
workers from Maisons des jeunes, teachers and parents on the radicalization phenomenon, the 
Director of COFAQ, Marie Simard, invited the CPRLV to educate participants on the process 
and definition of radicalization. During the seminar, case studies, and prevention tools like the 
behavior barometer were explained and deconstructed. In the end, according to my interview 
with Simard, all participants walked away having the knowledge to interpret the behaviours of an 
individual suspected of being radical. As the turnout brought around twenty social workers from 
different youth organization from Montreal, Simard said that the CPRLV was and will continue 
to be a great potential ally and an important resource for supporting families confronted with the 
radicalization phenomenon. “I think that their communication plan is well done and well 
structured,”10 said Simard. When asked about the prevention tools constructed by the Center, 
Simard confirmed that “their sketching of the radicalization process is well done. I think that the 
conference did a good job in demystifying radicalization.” 
Simard also voiced concerns that were more critical and ambiguous of the CPRLV as 
well. When asked whether the seminar participants felt confusion when different definitions of 
radicalization were being proposed by the Center, Simard stated:  
                                                          
10 “iŵaƌd’s Ƌuotes aƌe tƌaŶslated fƌoŵ FƌeŶĐh to EŶglish. 
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“Yes, there was certainly confusion. We were twenty and they divided us into four 
sub groups and we were given each a profile and we had to figure out if it [profile] fit 
into the green, orange, yellow or in the red part of the barometer. When we have a 
profile and we have to place it on a color scale, there are a lot of complications. It’s 
[the barometer] really well done.”   
Indeed, all participants of the Center’s seminar thought it was “well done.” Favorable comments 
from social workers about the post-evaluation of the workshop overflowed, ranging from “Merci 
pour la création de cette organisme, faites-vous connaitre sur la Rive-Sud” and “Très intéressant 
et utile, merci beaucoup” to “Merci! Le baromètre est un super outil que je vais diffuser en table 
de concertation jeunesse.” Simard evidently holds contentious remarks in regards to the Center. 
While she believes that the Center is a great ally when it comes to supporting the needs of 
families, I would argue that Simard also was unsure of the CPRLV’s prevention tools. Although 
she felt that a certain level of ambiguity was embedded into the behavior barometer, Simard 
reconciled such unease by the overall positive response of the workshop by social workers. I 
would argue that tensions encountered with non-Muslim community organizations and Muslim 
community organizations mirror similar concerns: while both groups encourage the mission of 
the Center as a leader in anti-radicalization practices, most on both sides of the spectrum are also  
critical of their methods. Muslim community groups like the CMQ believe the Center will 
employ racial profiling heavily in their detection practices while non-Muslim groups like 
COFAQ do not fully understand the Center’s tools of prevention, especially concerning the gray 
areas embedded in the behavior barometer.  
TENSIONS IN QUEBEC MINISTRIES ON THE ACTION PLAN 
In theory, the Centre’s work on radicalization complements, rather than conflicts with, that of the 
provincial ministries. While the Center is mostly preoccupied with refining and developing 
effective workshops, seminars and training programs on anti-radicalization, provincial ministries 
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are more engaged with the institutionalization of detection, prevention, social cohesion 
programs. As the provincial action plan against radicalization leading to violence is a provincial 
creation, several Quebec Ministries had a hand in it implementation. Indeed, the action plan is a 
concerted approach comprised of nine Ministries and two organizations, each responsible for its 
own content. In practice, tensions have emerged in this concerted work in two forms: tensions 
between different ministries and tensions between the Centre and the provincial ministries 
(collectively). 
Some of these tensions emerged in my interview with Laura, who works with one of the 
ministries. I asked her about the “Signalement d’incidents suspects” (SIS) detection program, 
which is listed in the detection section of the action plan. This program calls for the RCMP and 
the Sûreté du Québec to collect alerts from social workers about suspicious incidents. Laura was 
ignorant about this program, as the SIS program is strictly a matter for the Ministère de la 
Sécurité publique. However, she went on to say: “The word that rallies all the departments 
together is prevention. If there is barbaric violence, it’s certain that the police will take care of 
this but in Quebec, we would like to work in function of alerts.” She went on to state: “This 
creates ill-intentioned people, people who manipulate the mind, and recruits them. So to act in 
terms of prevention, we want these youths to have agency and to feel like they have their place in 
this society”. In fact, Laura believes that key words like “prevention”, “openness”, “welcoming”, 
and “intercultural dialogue” represent the character of Quebec as a nation. Different ministries’ 
(mis)understanding of the SIS program represents a tension in the implementation of anti-
radicalization practices because it demonstrates how a concerted effort to join different Quebec 
ministries in the production of an anti-radicalization plan can also engender uncoordinated 
efforts within the Quebec government as a whole.  
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A similar disconnection appeared when I asked Laura about her ministry’s relationship to 
the Center. Laura mentioned that her ministry will be working with different organizations on the 
development evaluation grids that will chart how, in their meetings with youth, the youth’s 
ideologies or lines of questioning shifted during the meeting. The evaluation grids from Laura’s 
ministry, however, have little relationship to the metrics developed by other ministries or the 
Center. In light of this, I questioned Laura on whether her department works together with the 
CPRLV. She answered that they have certainly collaborated on agreements and certain measures 
in the action plan, mainly as they pertain to researching the radicalization process. They consult 
the Center because their approach is anchored in preventative practices and does not 
automatically target the religious aspect of violent radicalization. And yet, Laura’s Ministry has 
deliberately not created a Centre-like behavioral model because, according to her, suspected 
behaviors are essentially, a hit-or-miss. Laura stated: 
“We could question kids who views jihadi websites on terror or on decapitation and 
who asks questions. But someone who decides to grow a beard and who is spiritual 
or religious is not necessarily a terrorist. We make the distinction amongst us 
between ‘radical’ and ‘radical leading to violence’. We can be radical in our 
opinions...we can have convictions. That’s why, if you have noticed, we talk about 
radicalization leading to violence. There is a big difference.”  
 
My discussion with Laura, finally, brought to light some noticeable contradictions in the 
ministry’s own work. For Laura, tackling racism was an important part of the fight against 
radicalization. “The action plan has targeted measures to deal with racism. Outside of the action 
plan, we work against systemic racism as well,” explained Laura. Yet, why systemic racism 
within institutions has not been listed as a measure in the action plan remains unknown. 
Following this thread, Laura believes that integration by means of job employment and 
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“recognizing employment skills” are successful ways in combating radicalization, prejudices, 
and discrimination. She explained:  
“Most immigrants that come here have families. We want to look for a school, we 
need to buy clothes, etc. This takes money. So work is important. And when we are 
employed, we meet different kinds of people, no matter their origin, who work in 
Quebec and who are a part of society, etc.”  
 
Inclusion, according to Laura, is an effective remedy to counter radicalization and 
discrimination. And yet, the provincial government’s creation of inclusion, according to ethno-
religious community organizations, is not very effective. Indeed, it is countered by the province’s 
problematic and stigmatizing approach to radicalization. 
 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter examined how institutions like the Centre and the provincial ministries have sought 
to implement anti-radicalization practices through the forging of relationships with other 
institutions, organizations, and citizens. It examined, in particular, how tensions emerged in these 
efforts, impeding the management of anti-radicalization praxis in Montreal and in Quebec. 
Disagreements and contentions become central to relationships between the Center and the 
SPVM, non-institutional actors like local community organizations, and Quebec ministries. I 
argued that what resulted from the CPRLV-SPVM relationship, such as the information-sharing 
protocol, demonstrates instances where collaboration between both institutions can be murky and 
unethical. Muslim community organizations vehemently denounce the CPRLV’s hotline and its 
ties with the SPVM as a form of whistle-blowing and vilification of Arab/Muslim bodies as 
terrorists. Additionally, former workers at the Center also exposed the sharing of personal 
information of concerned callers as a process which forced them to go against their code of 
ethics as psychologists dealing with the possibilities of radicalization.  
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Next, I mapped out the tensions that inhabit efforts to build public support for anti-
radicalization efforts, through events like the one organized at Concordia. Here, I showed how 
some panelists at the Concordia event agreed to the CPRLV’s mission and mandate to eradicate 
radicalization, most scholars believed that the Center was perpetuating programs that incite the 
discrimination and marginalization of Arab/Muslim-ness. Similarly, efforts to build relationships 
with certain ethno-religious community organizations like the CMQ have encountered problems. 
The CMQ views institutionalized anti-radicalization praxis listed in the action plan and 
encouraged by the Center as means of targeting Muslim /Arab youths. Further, I showed that the 
inter-ministerial committee on the action plan organized by the Couillard Administration 
demonstrated moments of heightened tensions. While Muslim community leaders were invited to 
describe the “pulse” of Muslim bodies following recent terrorist attacks on Quebec soil, different 
relations of power and opinions were heavily present in the room.  
Other relationships were less fraught, but also entailed challenges. As I highlighted in this 
chapter, non-Muslim community organizations like CjM and COFAQ expressed mixed feelings 
toward the CPRLV’s detection and preventative programs, despite demonstrating instances of 
collaboration and support. Such arguments validate the argument that the Center not is looking 
for local community buy-ins to validate their services but to increase partnerships with 
organizations as a means to de-alienate their image. Finally, relationships between different 
provincial ministries and between the ministries and the Centre, encountered challenged. I drew 
out the various tensions found in the action plan when discussing preventative and security 
practices found in the action plan with a state official. The most important tensions were shown 
to lie between Laura’s ministry and the Center. 
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Tensions certainly exist in the fight against radicalization. One example points to how 
both non-Muslim and Muslim community organizations like AMAL-Québec and CjM are 
critical of the CPRLV, notably how their hotline would embody a form of anti-Muslim 
whistleblowing and how the follow-up of a telephone call concerning a potential radical would 
actually carry out by CPRLV workers. Implementing anti-radicalization practices is harder than 
it might seem. In developing this analysis, this chapter contributes to the literature on 
radicalization, which does not address the tensions encountered and navigated by powerful 
institutions like the CPRLV and the Quebec state as they attempt to implement anti-
radicalization measures. This chapter also contributes to the literature by focusing on the tense 
relationships regarding preventative and detection programs. It sheds light on the social and 
political entanglements of anti-radicalization practices by scholars, institutions and local 







CHAPTER 4: ON THE RACIALIZATION OF ANTI-RADICALIZATION 
PRACTICES  
“But I really think that we are not experiencing islamophobia in North America and 
in Canada. Not now, at least.” – Diana (Interview participant) 
 
The quote above came up during my interview with one local community organization. It sets the 
tone for how some community organizations and most states deny how race shapes anti-
radicalization practices in Montreal and in Quebec. Although my interviewee disputes that 
islamophobia exists in Canada, numerous hate incidents had already occurred before this 
interview: a pig’s head was left outside the doors of the Centre cultural islamique de Québec in 
June 2016, and acts of vandalism and physical attacks occurred in 2014 in numerous Montreal 
mosques (National Council of Canadian Muslims, 2017). Following my interview with Diana, 
the Quebec mosque shootings in January 2017 and the Concordia University bomb threat in 
March 2017 made the headlines. How actors like community organization members in Montreal 
ignore anti-Arab/Muslim racisms informs how radicalization is being managed and constructed. 
Although references to radicalization are shaped by secular liberal discourses by state and non-
state institutions, anti-radicalization programs in the West marginalize Muslim peoples, more so 
after 9/11 (Kundnani, 2014). 
This chapter examines how preventative and detective anti-radicalization tools and expert 
knowledge target ethno-religious minorities in Quebec, specifically Muslim/Arab bodies. Firstly, 
I will explore, through textual analysis, how public documents from Quebec Ministries obtained 
through access to information requests demonstrate othering praxis when referring to specific 
kinds of peoples. I show how Quebec government branches isolate newly arrived immigrants and 
ethnocultural communities as target groups in order to prevent future terrorist attacks, a move 
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that I argue perpetuates orientialist constructs. Next, I examine the presentations given by diverse 
police organizations held at the École nationale de police au Québec (ENPQ) during the seminar 
entitled, “Séminaire sur la radicalisation au Québec: agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble”. I 
argue that while great efforts were made to frame radicalization as a non-race issue by police 
officers, references to Islamic extremism, ethnocultural communities, and newly-arrived 
immigrants ultimately other such groups as racialized subjects that must be under constant 
surveillance.  
Next, I look at how state and non-state actors involved in the management of radicalization 
in Quebec verbalize their stance on the radicalization discourse. While their opinions are rooted 
in a logic of inclusion when referring to radicalized individuals through discourses on vivre-
ensemble, interview participants often racialize anti-radicalization programs by designating 
ethno-religious communities in Montreal as sole recipients of such preventative and detection 
practices. Taken together, these othering practices in anti-radicalization practices show that 
expert knowledges and practices formulated by governmental institutions and the reception of 
such practices by local community organizations feed into the specific targeting of racialized 
minorities in Quebec. In developing this analysis, this chapter contributes to the literature by 
showing how anti-radicalization practices in Quebec and in Montreal (contexts unexamined in 
the literature) become racialized.  
THE ENTANGLEMENTS OF ENTHNOCULTURAL COMMUNITIES, IMMIGRANTS, 
AND THE CONCEPT OF VIVRE-ENSEMBLE 
The othering practices of the Quebec government’s anti-radicalization program are not always 
straightforward. In part, this is because the program makes reference to racism as a potential 
cause of radicalization and claims that combating racism is an important part of the fight against 
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radicalization. In many cases, this fight against racism occurs through the concept of “vivre 
ensemble,” a concept that appears frequently in MIDI documents on radicalization. In an access 
to information request made to MIDI regarding all briefings, documents, reports and external 
communications with other ministries, only few documents were sent through. Most of the 
documents sent though, interestingly, pertain to the “vivre ensemble” component of the action 
plan. In an effort to communicate to the press the broad strokes of the action upon its release in 
June 2015, the Quebec government claims that:  
Although radicalization is influenced by many factors, it seems to particularly touch 
youths born in Quebec from immigrant parents who develop feelings of weakness, 
whether it been individual or collective, in regards to the exclusion that they and their 
close ones experience in Quebec society. Consequently, it is important to fight 
against prejudices, discrimination, and racism, to reinforce self-esteem, a sense of 
belonging, and the participation of immigrants and ethnocultural minorities in 
Quebec society (MIDI, 2015).  
The above quote encapsulates the slogan of anti-radicalization efforts by states: on the 
surface, radicalization is caused by various factors (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009) such as 
theological factors and/or individual or group psychological factors (Gartenstein-Ross and 
Grossman, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Yet, the provincial government also affirms that people 
battle with systems of oppression like racism, prejudices, and discrimination. These factors, the 
quote suggests, can lead to radicalization which needs to be combated. At the same time, the 
quote also suggests that radicalization is principally perpetrated by specific kinds of people: 
racialized second-generation youth who struggle with self-confidence and a sense of place in 
Quebec. In alluding to these peoples in this light, the rhetoric implies that radicalization 
disproportionately touches racialized youths as opposed to host communities. In this move, the 
host society and its faults fade from view. Who upholds and sustains social injustices is ignored 
by the Couillard administration.  
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However, most scholars argue that racism, xenophobia, and marginalization are 
exacerbated by anti-radicalization orthopraxis (Kundnani, 2012; 2014; Maira, 2014; Awan, 
2012; Lindekilde, 2012; Jamil 2006; Antonius 2002; CAIR-CAN 2002; Helly, 2004). The subtle 
targeting of racialized communities in the quotation above, then, participates in and legitimizes 
the targeting that was already rampant among state and non-state actors in Quebec. Many 
Canadian Muslims feel they are racially profiled, scrutinized, stereotyped and discriminated 
against whether by the government or by society in response to high-profile incidents like the 
2014 St-Jean-sur-Richelieu ramming attack (National Post, 2014). This is consistent with 
research on racial profiling: although Canada frequently denies that racial profiling occurs, 
police organizations are known to systematically discriminate based on racial categories 
(Monaghan and Molnar, 2012; Wortley and Owusu-Bempah, 2011; Tator and Henry, 2006). 
Many Canadian Muslims also think that their communities as a whole are experiencing ill 
treatment because of their religious beliefs/markers on a day-to-day basis like a passerby 
insulting a Muslim woman for wearing the hijab (Jamil, 2014). As Jamil argues, it is difficult to 
say when an action “is a reflection of securitization and [when it] is the result of ‘regular’ social 
discrimination” (Jamil, 2014, p. 150). What is clear is that statements like the quote above 
further a process of othering and marginalization already under way. 
The irony, then, is state institutions like that Quebec government that drive racist measures 
to combat radicalization also admit that radicalization and racism are co-constitutive. Under the 
context of advancing the racism-combating vivre ensemble aspect of the action plan, the 
Couillard administration naturalizes othering practices for the sake of eradicating radicalization 
leading to violence. In doing so, it normalizes rather than combats othering practices. It 
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continues to racialize anti-radicalization praxis by the constant referral to ethnoreligious 
communities and immigrants in public documents.  
The implementation of the vivre ensemble component found in the governmental anti-
radicalization action plan shows how immigrants and racialized populations become the problem 
and target: the group that needs to be taught to live properly in Quebec. The Ministère des 
Affaires municipales et de l’Occupation du territoire (MAMOT) is one ministry involved in the 
implementation of the vivre-ensemble axis of the action plan. In an access to information request 
made to MAMOT, the Ministry aims to “equip municipalities in the planning of ethnocultural 
and religious diversity.” According to the action plan, the measure consists of: 
Mobilizing municipalities in the implementation of initiatives geared towards 
assuring a harmonious social cohesion and creating spaces free of prejudices, 
discrimination, intimidation, and racism. In addition, the measure aims to equip 
municipalities in order to adequately handle challenges that might stem from the 
development of religious and ethnocultural diversity in local spaces. (MAMOT, 
2015) 
Ethnocultural and religious diversity as synonymous with multiculturalism thus 
becomes an organizing principle for MAMOT through social cohesion initiatives. 
However, such vivre-ensemble schemes further othering practices: non-white bodies 
remain at the receiving end of local diversity programs while host communities headline 
with the countering of prejudices, intimidation, marginalization, and racism.  
Similar traits are also noticeable in vivre-ensemble initiatives implemented in 
Quebec schools. How the concept of vivre-ensemble influences the fight against 
radicalization in academic spaces proves interesting. Through access to information request 
made to the Ministère de l’Éducation et de l’Enseignement supérieur (MEES), a list of 
activities from the Soutien à l’intégration des communautés culturelles et à l’éducation 
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interculturelle au collégial en 2015-2016 were made available. In a workshop entitled 
“Animation pédagogique interculturelle” designed for Cégep Vieux-Montréal, training and 
preparing personnel in colleges in the matter of good intervention techniques for immigrant 
students was centerfold. The development of a mediation service for the handling of 
accommodation also was an objective of the workshop. Further, Cégep Maisonneuve offers 
a “Supervision Clinique en intervention interculturelle” workshop, which details how 
“students who utilize psychosocial services in College are more and more from 
immigration.” Similarly, in a document entitled “Guide d’attribution des subventions 2016-
2017 Programme Soutien à l’intégration des communautés culturelle au collégial” 
presented to MESS, three objectives are listed. One prominent effort is to integrate all 
Quebec students issued from cultural communities by putting into place integration 
practices. All these initiatives under the vivre-ensemble component of the anti-
radicalization action plan spearheaded by schools suggest that they specifically target 
immigrant students who are often racialized. I would also argue that these initiatives 
engender othering practices as cultural communities and immigrants students are the main 
recipients of anti-radicalization efforts in school spaces.  
Workshops on reasonable accommodations and integration of immigrant students 
illuminate how similar concepts were treated in Quebec’s society. During the citizens’ forum as 
part of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, discourses over citizenship and integration were 
anchored in notions about who is dominant and who is subordinate, who is the ideal Quebecer 
and who is not. Further, such initiatives enforced in schools do not cater to every Quebec 
student. Such initiatives are conditioned on tolerance, a concept that Hage (2000) argues sits 
within specific, narrow boundaries and is enforced by White Europeans. Although practices of 
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tolerance are perceived as morally good, they are structurally similar to the nationalist practices 
that condone racist violence and exclusion, thus preserving and consolidating an imagined, 
White nation fantasy. As Hage states, racism has historically been associated more with tolerant 
acts rather than with intolerant acts. Tolerant acts, deployed in societies that are racially and 
ethnically diverse, maintain a sense of social cohesion.   
In the same way, how primary and secondary schools in Montreal control radicalization is 
through multiculturalism management. In an access to information request to the Commission 
scolaire de Montréal (CSDM), a document was drafted that would help teachers and education 
professionals contextualize the Paris attacks in November 2015 to youths. A few basic principles 
that would tackle students’ questions are proposed. For instance, teachers are coached into 
adapting a discourse that’s appropriate to the age of the students, adopt a neutral tone despite the 
horribleness of the attacks, and comfort them by framing the Paris attacks as a rare occurrence. A 
recurring theme embedded in such documents on anti-radicalization by state institutions is an 
emphasis on eradicating intolerance, discrimination, xenophobia and racism while cultivating 
integration, diversity and social cohesion. As follows, one guideline stipulates: “Address the 
foundational principles of a democratic society and of vivre-ensemble that are characteristic to 
Montreal and Montrealers (a multicultural and multireligious society that has lived together for 
centuries and that is enriched by a close proximity from one another).” 
The management of radicalization leading to violence through the vivre-ensemble concept 
by state institutions is indeed racialized. Living together initiatives in primary and secondary 
schools in addition to cégeps uniquely target ethnocultural peoples and immigrant students as 
opposed to white students. Vivre-ensemble schemes which aim to promote multiculturalism and 
diversity indeed drive othering practices. Diversity and tolerance programs in academia spaces 
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are designed for visible minorities by white host subjects like the Quebec and Montreal 
governments. As such, workshops geared towards combating xenophobia, racism and 
intimidation demonstrate how similar traits were dealt with during the citizens’ forum as part of 
the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. Discourses over citizenship and multiculturalism are really 
about how racialized bodies were not properly living together alongside Western institutions and 
values. 
DISCOURSES ON DEMOCRACY, CANADIAN VALUES, MULTICULTURALISM, AND 
THEIR EFFECTS ON OTHERING PRACTICES 
Anti-radicalization programs reveal how othering practices are tied to discourses on democracy, 
Canadian values, and multiculturalism. Information pertaining to how both the Quebec and 
Montreal governments have institutionalized, managed, and made sense of radicalization is 
scarce. However, upon access to information requests made to MIDI regarding all aspects of 
such phenomenon, documents were sent on two law projects: hate crimes and the protection of 
peoples’ rights. Although the connection between radicalization and hate crimes might seem 
opaque, Quebec politicians believe that hate crimes and radicalization are cut from the same 
cloth as they both demonstrate signs of rejecting Quebec values. Hate crimes, as this might 
suggest, are associated with immigrants and other groups who have ostensibly failed to integrate 
into Quebec society. Indeed, parallel to the development of the anti-radicalization project, 
Stéphanie Vallée, general attorney and Minister responsible to la Condition feminine and the 
Ministry of Justice, filed a law motion to the Quebec National Assembly against hateful speech. 
Such project includes legislative clauses which, upon the conditional adaptation by the General 
Assembly, will assure the protection of individuals affected by hate speech and subsequent acts 
of violence. More concretely, such proposed clauses desire to fight against forced marriages; 
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prevent honor crimes; set up immediate tools of protection for individuals whose security is at 
risk; protect students in subsidized school establishments (MIDI, 2015).  
As this suggests, the Quebec government believes that forced marriages and honor crimes 
are foreign imports brought on by newly-arrived immigrants to disrupt gender equality, secular 
liberalism, and freedom. In this sense, the fight against hate speech is aligned with the fight 
against radicalization: both see non-white cultures as a problem and see cultural integration as 
part of the solution. And yet, this logic is paradoxical. The above quote paints a picture that the 
governing body is benevolent towards all citizens (read: immigrants). According to the 
governing state in Quebec, radicalization is synonymous with hate crimes and the protection of 
peoples’ rights as both these issues reject Western values. However, the portrayal of a 
compassionate society that ties honor crimes and forced marriages to the management of 
radicalization by states is an example of what Henry, Tator et al.’s (2009) call the “new racism” 
– a less than compassionate form of thought and practice. 
Henry, Tator et al. (2009) argue that the new racism emerges when race is entangled with 
culture and identity. Discourses on what it means to be Canadian, for example, allow states to 
“speak about race without mentioning the word” (p. 112). In other words, according to Vallée, 
forced marriages, honor crimes, and radicalization leading to violence are issues that sully 
Quebec’s reputation as a modern nation. The perpetrators of such “crimes” are immigrants and 
ethnocultural communities (MIDI, 2015).  
This emphasis on the supposed rejection of Quebec values is not unique to the fight 
against radicalization. The broader emphasis on multiculturalism across Canada embodies a 
similar logic. Awan (2012) explains that multiculturalism is a set of cultural attitudes and beliefs 
that ostensibly promotes community integration and diversity within society. Similarly, 
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Mahrouse (2010) explains that tolerance for diversity is highly prioritized in a pluralist society. 
However, multiculturalism can also act like a double sword: on one hand, governments may 
deploy the term to promote diversity yet on the other hand, it also seeks to evaluate its citizens’ 
aptitude and knowledge on the host country’s history, culture, and values (Lord Parekh (2000) as 
cited in Awan (2012)). Following this thread, Parekh (2000) believes that multiculturalism infers 
that different ethno-religious communities should live how they want to if only in a self-
contained manner (as cited in Awan, 2012). In other words, racialized bodies must contain their 
savagery or cultural norms within their households without disturbing Eurocentric values in the 
least. We witness such containment in Quebec.  
There are also precedents for the Quebec government’s emphasis on specific “cultural” 
values. The adoption of “life standards” code of conduct for immigrants in small town 
Hérouxville in 2006, for example, naturalized othering practices as barbaric traditions like the 
stoning of women and immolation became outlawed (Razack, 2008). Indeed, such state-of-
emergency was declared mainly so that a moral contract between Quebec and ethnocultural 
communities could be enforced, thus solidifying a common public culture that would possess 
Judeo-Christian undertones (Mahrouse, 2010). If forced marriages, honor crimes, and terrorist 
acts erupt outside the confines of private dwellings, then immigrants or second-generation youths 
must be preserved, enclosed, monitored, repressed, and even removed if necessary through 
othering praxis. Such ideologies connect with Hage’s (2000) theory on the practices and politics 
of (in)tolerance. Multicultural nations who shift from intolerance to tolerance rapidly do not 
require any shake-up of Western institutions or the disintegration of uneven power relations.  
 Other values, besides “proper” marriages,” are also associated by the Quebec government 
with immigrants and non-white residents. Among the values that certain individuals ostensibly 
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reject, “democratic values” are a frequent reference. In an internal letter to MIDI referring to the 
governmental action plan against radicalization leading to violence, the provincial government 
affirms that: “Hate crime speech just like radicalizations leading to violence are both considered 
as a rejection of cherished democratic values that are held dear in Quebec society.” This 
emphasis on democratic values is a common feature of anti-radicalization programs. Denmark’s 
A Common and Safe Future action plan, for example, also endeavors to maintain a democratic, 
cohesive society which weakened due to the violent radicalization (Lindekilde, 2012). According 
to Lindekilde (2012), such institutionalized anti-radicalization programs were specifically 
intended for Danish Muslims to not only mold them through lessons on democracy and civic 
citizenship but to also monitor information flows. Nevertheless, discourses on Western values 
mask the notion that not all cultures meet the same moral standards. 
 Together, the emphasis on tolerance, proper marriages, and democratic values outlines a 
common culture, a Western culture that seems to be at odds with other cultures. Along these 
lines, Razack’s (2008) argues that contemporary race thinking reinforces East/West constructs. 
Race thinking, in other words, suggests that enlightened, rational, secular peoples must protect 
themselves from pre-modern, barbaric, religious peoples. Westerners live in the realm of law, 
reason, and science, whereas religious/Eastern peoples are aligned to the realm of culture, tribes, 
and communities. Westerners are located in modernity, Easterners are not; Westerners possess 
reason while racialized Others do not. Thus, it is the moral obligation of the host country to 
discipline, correct, and keep racialized bodies in line in order to defend against their irrational 
excesses (Razack, 2008). Such irrational excesses take on the form of violent radical acts 




 Race thinking is, of course, more than just thinking. East/West binaries have a history 
bound up with colonialism, a history that has often impacted Muslim populations. Said (1978) 
uses the concept of orientalism to describe the operation Western colonial power. The concept, 
for him, refers to a mode of thought that conceives a sharp dichotomy between the East and the 
West, between the Orient and the Occident. More importantly, is a discourse of power and 
domination over the East (Green, 2015). This form of thought and practices were not only 
prevalent during the colonial era, but also set the stage for the inflammation of islamophobia 
since 9/11 (Green, 2015). Along these lines, states employ an orientalist lens as substantive 
discussions on radicalization is focused on a static and “objective” Western narrative that does 
not depict the complexities of Islamic lived experiences. We saw this notably in Chapter 3 when 
Laura discussed behavioural indicators in tandem with the action plan. While she attempted to 
explain that if an individual who grows a beard and is religious is not necessarily a terrorist, the 
fact that Laura made reference to generic characteristics of Islam like the beard stereotype often 
affiliated with Jihadi extremism distorts differences between Muslim/Arab individuals and the 
West.  
Such orientalist depictions reinforce uneven relations of power: Islam is backwards and 
will always resort to violence, and the Eurocentric values of democracy and civility that Quebec 
has to offer will surely save the East from barbaric lifestyles. Reliance on cultural differences 
that are easily reduced to simple practices of the Islam faith reinforces uneven relations of power 
between the host countries and racialized individuals suspected of radicalization through 
astonishing simplicities of Muslim orthopraxis. Huntington (1996) describes Muslims as the 
“ideal enemy” because it’s a group that is not only racially and culturally divergent from 
Eurocentric values, but is also ideologically hostile. Superficial indicators of radicalization like 
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facial hair induce suspicions of Muslim- and Arab-ness by state institutions, mainly because such 
orientalist knowledge constructions are pervasive in the management of radicalization. These 
theories are founded upon unsubstantiated assumptions that Islamist ideology and Muslim 
culture are at the root cause of terrorism and the war on terror (Kundnani, 2014). As such, Silva 
(2017) states: “Radicalization discourse now evokes the construct radicalization as symbolic 
marker of conflict between the West and the East.” (p.138). 
Orientalist conceptions of the Muslim East shape contemporary anti-radicalization 
programs. In these program, the potential terrorist Other must be prevented, detected, and 
watched through various security measures, including anti-radicalization practices. Kundnani, 
(2012) clearly exposes this notion through the NYPD’s Radicalization in the West: the 
homegrown threat study and the “Moroccan initiative” in which not only “jihadi-Salafi Islam” 
indicators like growing a beard and giving up cigarettes become racialized indicators but how the 
police force utilize such markers for the mass surveillance of Muslim bodies in New York. And 
according to imperial nations like Canada, the radical other belongs to racialized, ethnocultural 
communities with an identity anchored in the multiculturalism discourse. This section argued 
that states like the Quebec government believe that the propensity of the radicalization 
phenomenon is enmeshed with Quebec citizens rejecting Western democratic values. Such 
citizens (read: immigrants or racialized minorities) who disturb the foundational principles of 
Western institutions also in turn, are also prone to radicalization processes. This link, established 
by the provincial government is orientalist in nature and employs race thinking to further the 




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND RACISM EMBEDDED IN 
THE RADICALIZATION DISCOURSE 
Concerns over (re)nationalizing and (re)nativizing citizenship are an integral part in the 
radicalization discourse. Such concerns are associated to anti-radicalization programs in Quebec 
because they showcase how Western states further othering practices. Institutional concerns over 
tolerance, multiculturalism, and social cohesion constitute key remedies for the abolition of the 
radicalization problem. As Laura, a ministry worker, states: “Inclusion really is a key word for 
Quebec.” Yet, as mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, interests over social difference 
experienced by youths are always framed in the saw way by the provincial government: youths 
are radicalized because they experience racism, discrimination, and marginalization. Further, 
Laura explains: 
“As a government, we would like to show them [youths] that they have an active role 
to play in society, that they are not marginalized regardless of unfortunate 
experiences they had to live in comparison to their parents. Often, the second 
generation feel frustrated, excluded [because] their parents immigrate here with 
degrees and cannot find work that is up to par so they have to work even harder than 
others, etc. And so these youths who are born in Quebec feel really marginalized 
because even the second generation who are born here, who go to school here, who 
have degrees here, are not viewed as Quebecers.”  
 
While Laura does not go into detail as to who enforces such “unfortunate experiences”, she 
does believe that systemic racism assists in the social marginalization of Quebec youths. As 
mentioned toward the end of the previous chapter, Laura acknowledges that several initiatives 
have been designed to combat racism. Outside of the confines of institutionalized anti-
radicalization measures however, Laura and her Ministry plan on countering systemic racism 
through job employment and integration. “The action plan has targeted measures to deal with 
racism. Outside of the action plan, we work against systemic racism as well,” states Laura. What 
seems problematic with Laura’s statement is why othering practices experienced by visible 
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minorities in the Quebec job market are not an integral part of the action plan against 
radicalization leading to violence and is a concern pushed to the sidelines in relation to anti-
radicalization practices. Such othering praxis follows Laura’s views on citizenship rights in 
Quebec.  
During my interview, she brought up how “immigration is not the same here as it is in 
France. The historical context of immigration in France is not the same. Here, we choose our 
immigrants who are professionals. In France, they have a heavy colonial past.” Such denial of 
Canada’s violent colonial history sheds light on Hage’s (2000) concept of the White nation 
fantasy which condones cycles of violence, racism and exclusion. While Canada is utmost guilty 
with not only a heavy colonial past but with the continuing colonization of Indigenous peoples 
(Razack, 2008; Mahrouse, 2013; Bilge; 2013), Laura’s stance that Quebec citizenship is only 
accorded to white-collar immigrants stems from othering practices. As Arat-Koc (2010) states, 
current anti-immigrant/refugee sentiments has (re)nationalized and (re)nativized citizenship due 
to cultural assimilation demands, strict immigration policies, and enhanced deportation systems. 
Moreover, these developments are accelerating and justified in the heightened post-war on terror 
security climate. How (re)nationalizing citizenship ideologies are connected to anti-radicalization 
programs in Quebec illuminates how Quebec ministries and white host countries further othering 
practices. Nation-making as a powerful tool in the war on terror has indeed cemented a global 
color divide. Such color divide has resulted in a West/Muslim schism, especially with the onset 
of institutionalized anti-radicalization practices. Nationalizing the West through heavy control 
and containment of non-white peoples through counter-radicalization programs indeed becomes 
warfare between West/East and Westerner/Muslim-ness as is also demonstrated at the École 
nationale de police au Québec. 
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RACIALIZING ANTI-RADICALIZATION PRACTICES  
Police organizations in Quebec Islamize or racialize anti-radicalization practices while clouding 
such tendencies in liberal, inclusive rhetoric. Indeed, discourses on the racialization of anti-
radicalization programs in Quebec by state and non-state institutions are often insidious in 
nature. In an opening statement made by Marie Gagnon, Deputy Minister to the Ministère de la 
Sécurité publique, at École nationale de police au Québec (ENPQ), the racialized underpinnings 
that would contextualize radicalization leading to violence. Gagnon explained that a multitude of 
complicated motives exist that would push a person to radicalize, such as an existential crisis, 
issues of social integration, a need for destruction, or simply due to vulnerability. Yet, Gagnon 
stated that: “Despite multiple reasons that would define radicalization, it is important to consider 
that the problem of radicalization tied to [pause] Islamic extremism is tied to geopolitical reasons 
tied to the conflict in Syria.”  
The politics of “Islamic extremism” can be made sense of in two ways: firstly, Muslim 
communities are seen as failing to adapt to modernity because of their Islamic culture; secondly, 
extremism is viewed as a violent pervasion of Islam’s message to its disciples. Kundnani (2014) 
states extremism is the result of twentieth century ideologues that transformed Islam’s essential 
teachings into an antimodern political ideology. Moreover, the war on terror is not about 
Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations concept over the West’s liberal, secular, and 
democratic values and Islam’s fanaticism. The clash lies instead between Islam as an apolitical, 
tradition that’s incompatible with Judeo-Christian values and an appropriation of Islam’s 
meaning that has transformed it into a violent, political ideology (Kundani, 2014).   
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Such relations of power between host countries and racialized bodies often translate into 
concerns over integration difficulties of ethnocultural communities by police organizations. 
Indeed, Marie-Ève Côté-Henri, police and prevention officer in radicalization for the Ville de 
Québec (SPVQ) racializes anti-radicalization prevention programs by connecting the 
phenomenon of radicalization to ethnocultural communities. In her slideshow presentation, she 
lists “developing and maintaining a zone of intercultural dialogue in order to reinforce 
confidentiality links between the police and ethnocultural communities and increasing the 
implication of such communities in the prevention of terrorism” as a primary objective for the 
police force in the City of Quebec (Refer to Figure 5). Such objective feeds into the racialization 
of preventative and detection programs. 
 
Figure 5. A slide of Côté-Henri’s presentation “Plan d’action en prévention de la radicalisation” 
at the École nationale de police au Québec in April, 2016. 
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The target groups for these objectives include religious leaders of particular communities, 
youths from ethnocultural communities, and newly-arrived immigrants (Côté-Henri, 2016). 
Although most seminar presenters referred to ethnocultural communities as key players in the 
radicalization phenomenon in Quebec, other presenters made sure to negate the association of 
racialized minorities to prevention programs. For instance, Khanh Du Dinh from SPVM believes 
that racial profiling and stigmatization of targeted bodies induces stereotypes, especially as it 
pertains to Muslim/Arab individuals. However, participants of the seminar were not receptive to 
his message. Following Du Dinh’s presentation, an audience member asked: “This is a question 
concerning the SPVM-CPRLV information exchange protocol. Let’s say three of four 
brainwashed people are radicalized” to which Du Dinh asked for details. The audience member 
continued on by specifying how it was “three youngsters who are recruited by imams and 
eventually there is a security risk.” In this case, even if Du Dinh disassociates the racial profiling 
of Muslim bodies with terrorist acts, the audience member’s comments prove that anti-
radicalization rhetoric and practices are inescapably twinned to Islam. As Vakil (2011) states: 
“Religion is ‘raced’, Muslims are racialized” (p. 276). Though some presenters made great 
diplomatic efforts to not Islamize recipients of anti-radicalization practices, other presenters did 
quite the opposite. 
One way that state institutions get away with racializing perpetrators of terrorist acts is by 
framing preventative and detection praxis in a secular, liberal framework. As the conference 
subject switched to “State of situation on national security in Quebec and in Canada”, RCMP 
Sergeant Hakim Bellal, who coordinates on community sensitization concerning national 
security, emphasized how information-sharing, both on the part of police officers and laypeople, 
can significantly prevent the chances of terrorists attacks harming national security (ENPQ, 
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2016). One thing that stood of from Bellal’s presentation was the numerous references to ISIS 
and Al-Qaida. According to Bellal, these ideological groups not only pose a harmful threat to the 
well-being of Quebecers and Canadians but are vigorously encouraging the recruitment of 
impressionable youngsters in the West through religio-political indoctrination.   
Yet Bellal disrupted the Islamization of radicalization by keeping up with what Kundnani 
(2014) refers to as the theorization of radicalization as the wiser, more liberal alternative to the 
more controversial accounts of terrorism. By referring to other non-Islamic ideologies like neo-
Nazis, the Jewish Defense League, and Les Citoyens souverains, Bellal assured the audience that 
radicalization isn’t always entangled with racial/religious groups. One of the ways in which 
policing organizations make key contributions to counter-radicalization programs is their 
emphasis on non-discriminatory and agnostic tools for assessing probabilistic processes of 
radicalization leading to violence. Bellal adopts an identical approach to radicalization by 
including rhetorics that moved beyond Islam and the war on terror.  
The CPRLV is also guilty of rendering the definition of radicalization to fit agnostic 
tendencies. By offering examples of anecdotal non-Muslim radicalism, the Center employs 
passing references to paint a picture that radicalization affects and is affected by everyone. While 
the Center frames radicalization as encompassing different facets like powerful, revolutionary 
radicals of nonviolence who opposed democratic norms like Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and 
Nelson Mandela (CPRLV, 2016), such broad discursive formations on radicalization turn the 
racialized profiling of Muslims as reasonable and objective. 
A key aspect in anti-radicalization practices is the allegation that such phenomenon is not 
exclusive to Islam but to any other kinds of ideologies or politics. In Quebec, MIDI and the 
provincial government approach radicalization with a non-discriminatory and agnostic character 
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in an effort to emphasize that the heightened focus on terrorism is not about the war on terror and 
Islam. Nevertheless, pre-emptive practices are rendered as “objective”, as extensive 
rationalizations to prove that such programs are not anchored in prejudices and in discrimination 
are pushed by institutions and states. Both the CPRLV and MIDI pushes the usage of 
preventative practices in efforts to police radicalization based on indicators, a technique that is 
far distinguishable from the criticized practices of racial profiling. Monoghan and Molnar (2016) 
argue that despite discourses rooted in liberal inclusivity, the surveillance of radicalization is 
deeply embedded within a wider set of racialized problematics towards Islam. In fact, scholars 
note that surveillance practices associated with counter-radicalization are indicative of orientalist 
knowledge constructions (Kundnani, 2014; Breen-Smyth 2014; Croft 2012; Eroukhmanoff 
2015). 
THE INFLAMMATION OF ISLAMOPHOBIA THROUGH ANTI-RADICALIZATION 
PRACTICES IN QUEBEC 
When speaking about radicalization, people involved in the prevention and management of 
terrorist acts deny that islamophobia occurs in Quebec. However, cultural representations of 
Islam as violent, fanatic, and primitive rooted in orientalist constructs drive the radicalization 
discourse in Quebec. Such essentializations of cultural difference also animate islamophobia. 
However, not everyone agrees that islamophobia is pervasive in Quebec society. Diana from 
CjM states that: 
 “I think that the definition of radicalization is rather big. For the moment, we are 
talking about religious radicalization and how people express themselves can lead to 
islamophobia. But I really think that we are not experiencing islamophobia in North 
America and in Canada. Not now, at least.”  
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State institutions on the other hand recognize that anti-Muslim and anti-Arab racisms are 
prevalent in Quebec. In a note to Deputy Minister André Lavallée of the Metropolitan Region of 
Quebec concerning measure 3.6 in the action plan, under the “Comments” section, facts about 
islamophobia in Quebec are listed. Notably, the document recalls that in February 2015, the 
municipality of Shawinigan refused to modify zoning violations that would permit the building 
of a mosque in the industrial sector of the city. Similarly, MIDI explains in a funding proposal to 
Fonds de recherche du Québec-Société et Culture (FRQSC) that violent radicalization reinforces 
prejudices and discrimination which in turn becomes fertile ground for racism, notably 
islamophobia. In other words, the Ministry of Immigration confirms that in Quebec, 
radicalization intersects with islamophobia. Indeed, different research subjects are proposed 
under “Axe 1: Understanding radicalization leading to violence phenomenon and 
deradicalization” like issuing a comparative analysis of deradicalization programs in Europe and 
in other countries; understanding the Internet usage, social media networks, and traditional media 
coverage on radicalization; and, understanding the influence of religion in (de)radicalization 
(community, inter-community, intracommunity and intergenerational aspects). 
The first research subject, that of comparing (de)radicalization practices in Europe, is 
useful in understanding anti-Muslim racism(s). Great Britain’s Prevent Strategy geared towards 
monitoring and challenging radical organizations and individuals demonizes and discriminates 
Muslim bodies simply because of their race, faith, culture, or ethnicity. A large strand of research 
literature agrees that anti-radicalization programs like Prevent negatively impact Muslim 
relationships with the police, thereby failing one of their core objectives, that of building 
community partnership work (Kundnani, 2014; Githens-Mazer, 2011; Alam, 2011; Allen, 2011; 
Brown, 2011; Gregory, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Jarvis and Lister, 2011; Klausen, 2009; McGhee, 
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2011; Spalek , 2011 as cited in Awan, 2012).  Fenwick and Choudhury (2011) heavily scrutinize 
Prevent programs and anti-radicalization legislation. They reveal that British Muslims, and 
young British men in particular, feel a sense of resentment and alienation, mainly due to the 
construction of Muslim peoples by counterterrorism policies as suspect. Surveillance, detention, 
racial profiling, and systematic stop and searches have become standardized policy-driven tactics 
that attempt to deal with radicalization and how Muslim bodies are singled out as suspect point 
to how states racialize counterterrorist tactics.  
Counter-radicalization policing encouraged by the Prevent program also lead to the 
infiltration of mosques by undercover police officers (Awan, 2012). A similar situation also 
reproduced in New York and in New Jersey where the NYPD surveillance program deployed 
undercover “mosque crawlers” to detect suspicious Arab and Muslim Americans (Maira, 2014; 
Kundnani, 2012). Awan (2012) states that several parts from the Prevent Strategy reveal how 
Muslim bodies are deemed as suspect. The institutionally-sanctioned program believes that 
radicalization remains a problem solely with the Muslim community: “We believe that 
radicalisation in this country is being driven by an ideology that sets Muslim against non-
Muslim” (HM Government, 2011, p. 18). While such programs endeavours for improved social 
cohesion, they clearly target a particular ethno-religious group as in Muslim bodies and a certain 
faith as in Islam, elaborating similar protocols for different orthodoxies in Britain is overlooked. 
Similar strides are evident is Quebec’s action plan against radicalization, particularly, the “vivre-
ensemble” axis aimed for better, inter-community togetherness. Such axis also addresses 
Muslim-ness as co-constitutive of radicalization.   
Likewise, similar strides in Axe 2 “Preventing and countering amalgams and prejudices” of 
MIDI’s research proposal to FRQSC point to the racialization of anti-radicalization programs. 
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One research goal is geared towards understanding “the perceptions of Quebecers in regards to 
the link between radicalization leading to violence and radical Islam.” However, a notable 
research trail involves: “the contribution of counter religious discourse (of Muslim confession) in 
the prevention of radicalization leading to violence and interventions in the context of 
deradicalization.” Orthodoxies pertaining to Islam are explicitly disclosed as converging with 
(de)radicalization by the state.  Such discoveries are essential when criticizing anti-radicalization 
practices in Montreal and in Quebec. These technologies of surveillance directed towards visible 
minorities and/or immigrants who are Muslim inevitably intensify anti-Arab and anti-Muslim 
racisms. In doing so, state institutions discipline, discriminate, and stigmatize racialized bodies.  
CONCLUSION 
 The racialization of anti-radicalization practices is often insidious in nature. Although state 
institutions and public organizations fasten their anti-radicalization ideologies and actions in 
secular liberalism, the prevention, detection, and surveillance of immigrant, ethnocultural 
communities, and Muslim bodies indeed feed into a cycle of violence. Such practices of 
othering, as I showed in this chapter, occur in various ways in the fight against radicalization. 
Concerns over the tarnishing of democratic values normalize othering practices by governments. 
Such worries target racialized ethno-religious bodies more than white Europeans. Institutions 
also manage radicalization under the disguise of hate speech laws: honor crimes and arranged 
marriages tied to the Terrorist Other must be eradicated and in turn, radical acts will be 
prevented. These representations of Islam as violent, fanatic, and primitive are rooted in 
orientalist constructs. These essentializations of cultural difference animate islamophobia and 
other forms of racisms, which consequently still ignite contemporary concerns over race issues in 
Montreal and in Quebec. 
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Imperialist societies who deploy phrases like Canadian values, democracy, and freedom 
in the post 9/11 context also further othering by strengthening the rationality/savagery binary. 
Such discursive ploys are masked under the vivre-ensemble concept found in the governmental 
action plan against radicalization leading to violence. Several Quebec ministries utilize social 
cohesion as a way to target ethnocultural peoples as perpetrators of radical acts. Along these 
lines, I showed in this chapter how governmental concerns over tolerance and multiculturalism 
constitute key remedies for the abolition of the radicalization problem. Police organizations in 
Quebec similarly employ discourses on integration to specifically target racialized bodies when 
referring to preventative and detective praxis. Such discourses are usually manifested as the 
wiser, liberal alternative to the more controversial accounts of terrorism. Not much discussion is 
given to how anti-radicalization practices instituted by states and powerful institutions can 
become racialized. This chapter contributes to the literature by offering how counter 
radicalization praxis in Montreal and in Quebec indeed target Muslim bodies and racialized 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The construct of radicalization as manageable and intelligible remains an important concern for 
the Quebec government and local community organizations in Montreal. Political ideologies 
entangled with radicalization must be studied and detected through various forms of Western 
governmental interventions. As I have argued, the discursive shift from radicalization as 
politically-motivated to radicalization as religious extremism certainly enhances contentious 
relationships between different kinds of community organizations from all fronts in the 
prevention of radicalization leading to violence. Yet when the radicalization discourse is 
dismantled as a concept rooted in ambiguities and geared towards showcasing its secular and 
liberal undertones, we witness how states like the Quebec Government and other powerful 
institutions like the CPRLV utilize such concept for something greater.  
In truth, according to state and policing organizations, the radicalization discourse has 
emerged as a framework to make sense of terrorist activity. By extension, radicalization is 
deployed as a marker of difference in order to racialize certain kinds of peoples as violent and 
undemocratic: Muslim bodies. However, as I have examined, anti-Muslim accounts powered by 
MIDI and other Quebec ministries perpetuate many discursive ploys so that the radicalization 
problem stays politically correct. For instance, ethnocultural communities and (second 
generation) immigrants are the subjects of preventative and detection practices and thus should 
be contained and under constant surveillance by states. While the Couillard administration is 
careful as to not associate terrorist acts with extremist, Islamic doctrines, an “us” and “them” 
distinction is apparent in the management of anti-radicalization techniques. This is clearly 
demonstrated in the vivre-ensemble axis of the action plan. The othering of visible minorities 
and ethno-religious peoples in Quebec further enhances uneven relations of power as racialized 
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and gendered others are being racially profiled for the sake of safekeeping urban security and 
democratic values. 
My purpose in studying anti-radicalization programs in Montreal and in Quebec was to 
answer three crucial questions:  
• how is the radicalization problem elaborated and produced through the 
proliferation of definitions, causal factors and models;  
• how are the institutionalization and subsequent materialization of the 
radicalization discourse into security and preventative growing through contested 
relationships and tensions in Montreal; 
• and how does race shape radicalization practices that are proposed by the 
CPRLV, by various Quebec ministries and by the action plan? 
The first research question was answered through various preventative and detection 
tools that are fabricated by the Center, the Quebec government, and the Quebec and Montreal 
police force. The multitude of Venn diagrams, definitions, charts, and models help to strenghten 
the knowledge production of the radicalization phenomenon. In turn, the institutionalization of 
such tools into preventative and security practices centers on broad-based assumptions: while it’s 
imperative for institutional key players to deliver caution to the public by adopting a liberal, 
wiser view of radicalization, such strategy falters. Vague theories and concepts do not only play 
within an inclusive, liberal rhetoric that makes radicalization intelligible but insidiously furthers 
a security agenda that aims to supervise and control specific kinds of bodies under the rubric of 
violent radicalization management. I have argued that certain initiatives found in both the 
Denmark and Quebec action plan show similar strides in the targeting of Muslim peoples and 
that such religious/racial profiling create tensions in Montreal. No current studies examine how 
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institutionalized anti-radicalization practices in Montreal and in Quebec have come together over 
time to solve the problem of radicalization in a manageable and intelligent manner. My thesis 
contributes to the literature in the following way: definitional issues, causal factors, various 
scientific models, and charts utilized by the Quebec and Montreal governments, the CPRLV, and 
police organizations to educate Quebecers on how to prevent radicalization is problematic. The 
knowledge production consumed and instigated by institutional actors is indeed rooted in 
theories and concepts that prove ambiguous and confusing. These deviations in turn are 
incorporated into preventative and security practices.   
Contentious relationships and alliances are at forefront of radicalization in the Montreal 
context. Tensions particularly permeate the CPRLV-SPVM information exchange protocol. I 
have especially outlined how information-sharing between two powerful institutions prominent 
in the fight against radicalization, The Center and the SPVM, points to moments where 
collaboration can become unethical and murky. Other instances of tensions are portrayed in the 
CPRLV’s hotline. Local Muslim community organizations denounce such detection tool as it 
simultaneously whistle-blows and vilifies Arab/Muslim individuals as suspects of terrorism. We 
notably also witness the various layers of contention and power relations within Muslim 
community partners in Quebec during the roundtable discussion on the action plan in 2014. 
Similar strides are also apparent in non-Muslim community organizations in Montreal where 
instances of ambivalence vis-à-vis the Center’s detection and preventative programs peek 
through. Indeed, the close examination of community partnerships is crucial because it helps to 
map out how the Center strives for local community buy-ins in order to portray their institution 
as benevolent despite harsh criticisms from the public. This research adds to academic literature 
through an in-depth exploration of how contested relationships between institutional and non-
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institutional partners in Montreal and in Quebec are important in understanding the power 
relations underlying anti-radicalization management. 
Surveillance and security practices collectively and inevitably identify Muslim bodies as 
potential violent threats to Quebec’s national security. Consequently, anti-radicalization praxis 
unravel discriminatory abuse. As chapter 2 reveals, although governments secure radicalization 
logics in secular all-inclusivity, preventative and detection practices conceived by the Quebec 
government, the police force and the CPRLV are racialized. The constant appeal to cater counter 
programs to (second generation) immigrants and ethnocultural communities leads to the 
solidification of othering practices. We witness this notably as exercises of nation-building 
through discourses on citizenship rights, multiculturalism, and (in)tolerance shed light on how 
the destruction of Quebec’s democratic values, freedom, and gender equality are important 
concerns for states. Indeed, such institutional anxieties target racialized ethno-religious 
individuals like Muslims more so than non-Muslims. By placing hate speech laws, honor crimes, 
and arranged marriages conveniently under the heading of anti-radicalization programs, states 
employ orientalist constructs to strengthen the East/West divide as it is the moral duty of 
Western countries to contain terrorism as an Eastern import that brings savagery to destroy 
structures rooted in rationality. As I have argued, these discursive ploys are shrouded under the 
vivre-ensemble axis found in the action plan. These anti-radicalization strategies fuel 
islamophobia and other kinds of systemic racisms in Montreal and in Quebec. My thesis will 
contribute to the literature as it explores how counter radicalization programs are shaped by race 
and how expert knowledge and tools designed by institutional organizations and governments 
feed into the specific targeting of non-white individuals. 
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While this research lightly touches upon one facet that wrongfully discriminates 
racialized minorities, many other forms of systemic racism are institutionalized by nation-states. 
Technologies of surveillance geared only towards peoples of color are worrisome. With better 
knowledge of anti-radicalization practices, we are better equipped to dealing with social 
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Study Title: Radicalization and its effects on prevention and security practices and programs in 
Montreal 
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You are being invited to participate in the research study mentioned above. This form provides 
information about what participating would mean. Please read it carefully before deciding if you 
want to participate or not. If there is anything you do not understand, or if you want more 




The purpose of the research is to understand how radicalization in Montreal is governed by the 
implementation of various prevention, detection and security practices and programs by various 




If you participate, you will be asked to answer questions concerning your involvement in the 
discussion/management of radicalisation and its effects on security and prevention programs and 
practices in Montreal. 
In total, participating in this study will take 45 to 60 minutes. The interview will be audio-
recorded and transcribed. 
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
You might face certain risks by participating in this research. These risks include a low level of 
emotional distress related to rethinking about difficult discussions and/or debates that you were 
implicated with. 
It is very important for me to protect your security and your well-being.  If you consent to 
participate in this study, you still have the right to refuse at any moment to answer any question 
that makes you uncomfortable or a question that you think is private.  You also have the right to 
feel comfortable stopping the interview at any point.  There will be no negative repercussion if 
you choose to stop the interview, to skip a question or to abandon the study. 
You can benefit or not from your involvement in this study.  Advantages include gaining a better 
understanding on the management of radicalization in Montreal by various prevention and 
security programs and practices.  As a participant, you will make an invaluable contribution to 
 130 
 
research on radicalization in Montreal and in Quebec.  The results of this study will be used to 
write a research report.  If you choose to ask, you will receive an electronic or printed version 
of any publication resulting from this research.  




As a participant, you will allow me as a researcher to gain access to information on the 
management and discussion concerning radicalisation and its effects on prevention and security 
programs and practices in Montreal.  Such information will be gathered based on questions 
involving your implication in this process. 
We will not allow anyone to access the information, except people directly involved in 
conducting the research. We will only use the information for the purposes of the research 
described in this form. 
The information gathered will be identifiable. That means it will have your name directly on it.  
We will protect the information by keeping all electronic files on a computer that is password-
protected and all paper files in a locked filing cabinet. 
We intend to publish the results of this research. Please indicate below whether you accept to be 
identified in the publications: 
[ ] I accept that my name, the name of the organization or institution that I 
represent and the information I provide appears in publications of the results of the 
research. 
 
[ ] Please do not publish my name, or the name of the organization or institution 
that I represent, as part of the results of the research.  
 






E. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
You do not have to participate in this research. It is purely your decision. If you do participate, 
you can stop at any time. You can also ask that the information you provided not be used, and 
your choice will be respected.  If you decide that you don’t want us to use your information, you 
must tell the researcher seven days after the date of the interview. 
There are no negative consequences for not participating, stopping in the middle, or asking us 
not to use your information.  
 
F. PARTICIPANT’S DECLARATION 
 
I have read and understood this form. I have had the chance to ask questions and any questions 
have been answered. I agree to participate in this research under the conditions described. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
DATE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
If you have questions about the scientific or scholarly aspects of this research, please contact the 
researcher. Their contact information is on page 1. You may also contact their faculty supervisor.  
 
If you have concerns about ethical issues in this research, please contact the Manager, Research 






APPENDIX B: FORMULAIRE DE CONSENTEMENT DE PARTICIPER À 




CONSENTEMENT ÉCLAIRÉ À LA PARTICIPATION À UNE ÉTUDE 
 
Remarque : Le masculin est utilisé pour faciliter la lecture. 
 
Titre de l’étude : la radicalisation et ses effets sur les programmes et les pratiques de prévention 
et de sécurité à Montréal  
Chercheur : Sujitha Sugen 
Coordonnées du chercheur :  
Département de géographie, urbanisme, et l’environnement 
Université Concordia 
1455 boul. de Maisonneuve O., H-1494 
Montréal, Québec H3G 1M8 
Sujitha_s64@hotmail.com 
(438) 827-1990 
Professeur-superviseur : Dr. Ted Rutland 
Coordonnées du professeur-superviseur : 
Département de géographie, urbanisme, et l’environnement 
Université Concordia 
1455 boul. de Maisonneuve O., H-1255-43 
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Montréal, Québec H3G 1M8 
ted.rutland@concordia.ca 
(514) 848-2424 ext. 2053 
 
Nous vous invitons à prendre part au projet de recherche susmentionné. Le présent document 
vous renseigne sur les conditions de participation à l’étude; veuillez le lire attentivement. Au 
besoin, n’hésitez pas à communiquer avec le chercheur pour obtenir des précisions.  
 
A. BUT DE LA RECHERCHE 
 
Cette étude a pour but de comprendre comment la radicalisation à Montréal est gérée par 
l’implémentation de divers programmes et pratiques de prévention, de détection et de sécurité 
par divers organismes communautaires, organismes à but non lucratif ainsi que quelques 
Ministères du gouvernement du Québec. 
 
B. PROCÉDURES DE RECHERCHE 
 
Si vous participez à l’étude, vous devrez répondre à des questions concernant votre implication 
dans la discussion et/ou gestion  de la radicalisation et ses effets sur les programmes et pratiques 
de  prévention et de sécurité. 
Somme toute, votre participation s’étendra de 45 à 60 minutes. L’entrevue sera audio 
enregistrée et transcrit. 
 
C. RISQUES ET AVANTAGES 
 
En participant à cette étude, vous pourriez être exposé à certains risques, y compris une détresse 
émotionnelle de bas niveau lié à la reprise de discussions et/ou débats difficile dont vous avez été 
impliqué. 
 
Il est très important pour moi de protéger votre sécurité et votre bien-être. Si vous consentez à 
participer, vous savez le droit de refuser, à tout moment, de répondre à toute question qui vous 
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rend mal à l’aise, ou que vous jugez être une question privée. Vous devez aussi vous sentir à 
l’aise d’arrêter l’entrevue à n’importe quel moment. Il n’y aura aucune répercussion négative si 
vous choisissez d’interrompre une entrevue, de sauter une question, ou d’abandonner l’étude. 
 
Vous pourriez bénéficier ou non de votre participation à l’étude. Les avantages éventuels seraient 
notamment une meilleure compréhension sur la gestion de la radicalisation à Montréal par divers 
programmes de prévention et de sécurité. En tant que participant, vous ferez une contribution 
inestimable à la recherche sur la radicalisation au Québec et à Montréal. Les résultats de l’étude 
seront utilisés pour rédiger un rapport de recherche.  Si vous le demandez, vous recevrez une 
version imprimée ou électronique de toute publication résultant de cette recherche.  
 




En tant que participant, vous permettez au chercheur d’avoir accès à des renseignements sur la 
gestion et discussion concernant la radicalisation et ses effets sur les programmes de prévention 
et de sécurité à Montréal. Ceux-ci seront obtenus à des questions sur votre implication dans ces 
processus. 
 
Excepté les situations précisées aux présentes, seules les personnes qui mènent cette recherche 
auront accès aux renseignements fournis. Nous n’utiliserons l’information qu’aux fins de l’étude 
décrite dans ce document. 
 
Les renseignements recueillis seront identifiés.  Cela veut dire que votre nom apparaîtra sur le 
document. 
 
Nous protégerons l’information fournie en gardant toutes fiches électroniques sur un ordinateur 





Nous avons l’intention de publier les résultats de cette étude. Veuillez indiquer ci-dessous si 
vous acceptez d’être identifié ou non à cette fin : 
 
[ ] J’accepte que mon nom, le nom de l’organisme ou de l’institution dont je 
représente, et  l’information que je fournis figurent dans la publication des résultats de la 
recherche. 
 
[ ] Je ne souhaite pas que mon nom, ni le nom de l’organisme ou de l’institution 
dont je représente, figure dans la publication des résultats de la recherche.  
 
Nous détruirons les données cinq ans après la fin de l’étude. 
 
E.  CONDITIONS DE PARTICIPATION 
Vous pouvez refuser de participer à la recherche ou vous en retirer à n’importe quel moment. 
Vous pouvez aussi demander que l’information que vous avez fournie ne soit pas utilisée; le cas 
échéant, votre choix sera respecté. Si vous prenez une décision en ce sens, vous devrez en avertir 
le chercheur dans sept jours de la date de l’entrevue. 
Vous ne subirez aucune conséquence négative si vous décidez de ne pas participer à l’étude, 
d’interrompre votre participation à celle-ci ou de nous demander de ne pas utiliser votre 
information.  
F. CONSENTEMENT DU PARTICIPANT 
 
Je reconnais par la présente avoir lu et compris le présent document. J’ai eu l’occasion de poser 
des questions et d’obtenir des réponses. Je consens à participer à l’étude dans les conditions 
décrites ci-dessus. 
 
NOM (en majuscules)  __________________________________________________________ 
 






Si vous avez des questions sur l’aspect scientifique ou savant de cette étude, communiquez avec 
le chercheur. Vous trouverez ses cordonnées sur la première page. Vous pouvez aussi 
communiquer avec son professeur-superviseur.  
Pour toute préoccupation d’ordre éthique relative à ce projet de recherche, veuillez communiquer 
avec le responsable de l’éthique de la recherche de l’Université Concordia au 514-848-2424, 





















APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
(ENGLISH VERSION) 
 
1. How has your institution been involved in the management of radicalization leading to 
violence?  The gouvernemental action plan for 2015-2018 entitled: «La radicalisation au 
Québec: agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble» outlines prevention, detection and 
social cohesion programs.  What are some of the major programs in this action plan that 
your institution has been involved with?  How have these programs been implemented?  
What are the major aims of these programs?  Have you partnered with other 




2. What would you say are the primary concerns concerning the fight against radicalisation 
in Montreal and in Quebec?  How do current prevention, security and social cohesion 
programs address or fail to address these concerns?  Have these programs evolved since 
their conception?  If so, how?   
 
 
3. The governmental action plan aims at preventing radicalisation by basing itself on the 
behaviors of individuals rather than on social/racial profiling.  Why is it important to 
make the distinction between behaviors and profiling when discussing radicalisation 
leading to violence?  How have concerns about radicalisation changed over the past two 
years (i.e., since 2014), or have they changed? 
 
4. Why has it become important to mobilize different communities, especially Muslim 
organizations and/or communities when discussing radicalisation?  How are current 
events related to terrorism or violent extremism shaping these interactions?  How do you 
think the management of radicalisation has changed, if at all, since these current events?  









APPENDIX D: GUIDE DE DISCUSSION POUR LES 
REPRÉSENTANT(ES)S DU GOVERNEMENT (VERSION FRANÇAISE) 
 
1. Comment est votre institution impliquée dans la gestion de la radicalisation menant à la 
violence?  Le plan d’action gouvernemental pour 2105-2018 intitulé : «La radicalisation 
au Québec : agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble» propose des programmes de 
prévention et de détection. Quels sont les programmes que votre institution est impliquée 
avec?  Comment est-ce que ces programmes on été implémentés?  Quels sont les buts 
principaux de ces programmes?  Avez-vous crée des relations avec d’autres institutions 
ou organisations en ce qui concerne la gestion de la radicalisation?  Comment ces 
partenariats ont été crées? 
 
2. Quelles sont les préoccupations primaires concernant la lutte contre la radicalisation à 
Montréal et au Québec?  Comment les programme de prévention, de sécurité et du vivre-
ensemble courants répondent ou échouent de répondre à ces préoccupations?  Est-ce que 
ces programmes ont évolué depuis leurs conceptions?  Si c’est le cas, comment? 
 
3. Le plan d’action gouvernemental a pour but de prévenir la radicalisation en se fiant sur 
les comportements des individuels et non sur le profilage social ou racial.  Pourquoi est-il 
important de faire la distinction entre comportements et le profilage lorsqu’on parle de la 
radicalisation menant à la violence? Comment les préoccupations sur la radicalisation 
ont-elles changées  durant les deux dernières années (depuis 2014)? 
 
4. Pourquoi est-il devenu important de mobiliser différentes communautés, notamment les 
communautés ou organisations musulmanes lorsqu’on parle de la radicalisation?  
Comment les événements courants liés au terrorisme ou à l’extrémisme violent impactent 
les interactions avec ces communautés ou organisations?  Comment croyez-vous que ces 
événements  ont eu un impact sur comment la gestion de la radicalisation a changé ou si 
il y a eu un changement?  Quelles sont vos perspectives sur ces changements?   Est-ce 









APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MEMBERS OF LOCAL 
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS (ENGLISH VERSION) 
1. How has your organization been involved in the management of radicalization leading to 
violence?  The governmental action plan for 2015-2018 entitled: “«La radicalisation au 
Québec: agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble» outlines prevention, detection and 
social cohesion programs.  What are some of the major programs in this action plan that 
your organization has been involved with?  How have these programs been implemented?  
What are the major aims of these programs for you?  Have you partnered with other 
institutions/organizations in the management of radicalisation?  How were these 
partnerships formed? 
 
2. What would you say are the primary concerns concerning the fight against radicalization 
in Montreal and in Quebec?  How do current prevention, security and social cohesion 
programs address or fail to address these concerns?  Do you think these programs 
evolved since their conception?  If so, how?   
 
3. The governmental action plan aims at preventing radicalisation by basing itself on the 
behaviors of individuals rather than on social/racial profiling.  Why is it important to 
make the distinction between behaviors and profiling when discussing radicalisation 
leading to violence?  Do you think this distinction has been carried out? How have 
concerns about radicalisation changed over the past two years (i.e., since 2014), or have 
they changed? 
 
4. Why has it become important to mobilize different communities, especially Muslim 
organizations and/or communities when discussing radicalisation?  How are current 
events related to terrorism or violent extremism shaping these interactions?  How do you 
think the management of radicalisation has changed, if at all, since these current events?  










APPENDIX F: GUIDE DE DISCUSSION POUR LES MEMBRES DES 
ORGANIZATIONS COMMUNAUTAIRES LOCALES (VERSION 
FRANÇAISE) 
1. Comment votre organisation est-elle impliquée dans la gestion de la radicalisation 
menant à la violence?  Le plan d’action gouvernemental pour 2105-2018 intitulé  «La 
radicalisation au Québec : agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble» propose des 
programmes de prévention, de détection et de «vivre-ensemble».  Quels sont les 
programmes majeurs dont votre organisation est impliquée avec?  Comment ces 
programmes ont-ils été implémentés?  Quels sont les buts principaux de ces programmes?  
Avez-vous crée des relations avec d’autres institutions ou organisations en ce qui 
concerne la gestion de la radicalisation?  Comment ces partenariats ont été crées? 
 
2. Quelles sont les préoccupations primaires concernant la lutte contre la radicalisation à 
Montréal et au Québec?  Comment sont les programme de prévention et de sécurité 
courants répondent ou échouent de répondre à ces préoccupations?  Est-ce que ces 
programmes ont évolué depuis leurs conceptions?  Si c’est le cas, comment? 
 
3. Le plan d’action gouvernemental a pour but de prévenir la radicalisation en se fiant sur 
les comportements des individuels et non sur le profilage social ou racial.  Pourquoi est-il 
important de faire la distinction entre comportements et le profilage lorsqu’on parle de la 
radicalisation menant à la violence?  Comment les préoccupations sur la radicalisation 
ont-elles changées  durant les deux dernières années (depuis 2014)? 
 
4. Pourquoi est-il devenu important de mobiliser différentes communautés, notamment les 
communautés ou organisations musulmanes lorsqu’on parle de la radicalisation?  
Comment les événements courants liés au terrorisme ou à l’extrémisme violent impactent 
les interactions avec ces communautés ou organisations?  Comment croyez-vous que ces 
événements  ont eu un impact sur comment la gestion de la radicalisation a changé ou si 
il y a eu un changement?  Quelles sont vos perspectives sur ces changements?   Est-ce 








APPENDIX G: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS 
(ENGLISH VERSION) 
1. How has your organization/institution been involved in the management of radicalization 
leading to violence?  The governmental action plan for 2015-2018 entitled: “«La 
radicalisation au Québec: agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble» outlines prevention, 
detection and social cohesion programs.  What are some of the major programs in this 
action plan that your organization has been involved with?  How have these programs 
been implemented?  What are the major aims of these programs for you?  Have you 
partnered with other institutions/organizations in the management of radicalisation?  How 
were these partnerships formed? 
 
2. What would you say are the primary concerns concerning the fight against radicalisation 
in Montreal and in Quebec?  How do current prevention, security and social cohesion 
programs address or fail to address these concerns?  Do you think these programs 
evolved since their conception?  If so, how?   
 
3. The governmental action plan aims at preventing radicalisation by basing itself on the 
behaviors of individuals rather than on social/racial profiling.  Why is it important to 
make the distinction between behaviors and profiling when discussing radicalisation 
leading to violence?  Do you think this distinction has been carried out? How have 
concerns about radicalisation changed over the past two years (i.e., since 2014), or have 
they changed? 
 
4. Why has it become important to mobilize different communities, especially Muslim 
organizations and/or communities when discussing radicalisation?  How are current 
events related to terrorism or violent extremism shaping these interactions?  How do you 
think the management of radicalisation has changed, if at all, since these current events?  










APPENDIX H: GUIDE DE DISCUSSION POUR LES CHERCHEU(SES)RS 
UNIVERSITAIRES (VERSION FRANÇAISE) 
 
1. Comment votre organisation est-elle impliquée dans la gestion de la radicalisation 
menant à la violence?  Le plan d’action gouvernemental pour 2105-2018 intitulé : «La 
radicalisation au Québec : agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble» propose des 
programmes de prévention, de détection et «vivre-ensemble».  Quels sont les 
programmes majeurs dont votre organisation est impliquée avec?  Comment ces 
programmes ont-ils été implémentés?  Quels sont les buts principaux de ces programmes?  
Avez-vous crée des relations avec d’autres institutions ou organisations en ce qui 
concerne la gestion de la radicalisation?  Comment ces partenariats ont été crées? 
 
2. Quelles sont les préoccupations primaires concernant la lutte contre la radicalisation à 
Montréal et au Québec?  Comment sont les programme de prévention et de sécurité 
courants répondent ou échouent de répondre à ces préoccupations?  Est-ce que ces 
programmes ont évolué depuis leurs conceptions?  Si c’est le cas, comment? 
 
3. Le plan d’action gouvernemental a pour but de prévenir la radicalisation en se fiant sur 
les comportements des individuels et non sur le profilage social ou racial.  Pourquoi est-il 
important de faire la distinction entre comportements et le profilage lorsqu’on parle de la 
radicalisation menant à la violence?  Comment les préoccupations sur la radicalisation 
ont  changées  durant les deux dernières années (depuis 2014)? 
 
4. Pourquoi est-il devenu important de mobiliser différentes communautés, notamment les 
communautés ou organisations musulmanes lorsqu’on parle de la radicalisation?  
Comment les événements courants liés au terrorisme ou à l’extrémisme violent impactent 
les interactions avec ces communautés ou organisations?  Comment croyez-vous que ces 
événements  ont eu un impact sur comment la gestion de la radicalisation a changé ou si 
il y a eu un changement?  Quelles sont vos perspectives sur ces changements?   Est-ce 
que ces changements ont été positifs?  Si oui, comment? 
 
 
